Chinatown Neighborhood Assn v. Kamala Harris
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12942
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- California enacted the "Shark Fin Law" (Cal. Fish & Game Code §§ 2021(b), 12000) banning possession, sale, trade or distribution of detached shark fins to combat shark finning and conserve marine resources.
- Federal law (MSA and later amendments, and federal finning prohibitions) ban finning at sea and regulate fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); MSA creates regional Fishery Management Councils (FMCs) and Fishery Management Plans (FMPs) to achieve "optimum yield."
- Plaintiffs (associations whose members engaged in shark-fin commerce and cultural practices) sued, claiming the California law is preempted by the MSA and violates the dormant Commerce Clause by burdening interstate commerce in shark fins.
- District court denied a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs amended their complaint, and the district court dismissed with prejudice; Ninth Circuit reviews dismissal de novo and affirms.
- Majority held no actual or inevitable conflict with the MSA: MSA does not affirmatively guarantee onshore sale/use of fins or mandate specific harvest quantities that would make compliance with both schemes impossible; presumption against preemption applies.
- On Commerce Clause, majority found the law nondiscriminatory, regulating in-state conduct with at most indirect extraterritorial effects, and not imposing a significant burden on interstate commerce under Pike, so it survives dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preemption under Supremacy Clause | The Shark Fin Law conflicts with MSA/FMPs and thwarts federal balancing and management of shark fisheries in the EEZ | MSA does not expressly preempt onshore sale regulation; no direct conflict or impossibility; states retain authority within their borders and participate in FMCs | No preemption: plaintiffs failed to show a clear and manifest congressional intent or an actual conflict; dismissal affirmed |
| Method/conflict with federal management technique | State law undermines federal method of balancing conservation and economic objectives (optimum yield) | MSA contemplates cooperative state participation; conservation is paramount and federal scheme is not exclusive | No conflict in technique: cooperative federalism and state role defeat inference of preemption |
| Dormant Commerce Clause — extraterritorial regulation | Law effectively regulates interstate commerce and blocks flow of shark fins across state lines | Law regulates in-state conduct (sale/possession) and is not a price-control or extraterritorial price-fixing regime | Not per se invalid: statute regulates in-state conduct and is unlike price-control cases (Healy, Brown-Forman) |
| Dormant Commerce Clause — Pike balancing | Burden on interstate commerce is excessive relative to local benefits (conservation, animal welfare) | Law is nondiscriminatory, addresses local conservation/health concerns, and does not impose significant interstate burden | Pike inquiry not warranted because plaintiffs did not show a significant burden; statute upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (federal-state regulatory conflict requires impossibility or obstacle to federal purpose)
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (state law preempted where it interferes with federal objectives or balances)
- Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (purpose of Congress is ultimate touchstone in preemption analysis)
- Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989) (state laws that have extraterritorial effect in price regulation are invalid)
- Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (facially discriminatory or extraterritorial statutes invalid under Commerce Clause)
- Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (nondiscriminatory state regulation invalid only if burden on commerce is clearly excessive relative to local benefits)