Chi v. Loyola University Medical Center
787 F. Supp. 2d 797
N.D. Ill.2011Background
- Dr. Alexander Chi sues Loyola University Medical Center and Dr. Suneel Nagda for defamation, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and IIED.
- The court previously dismissed Chi's second amended complaint; Chi files a third amended complaint which defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- Choice-of-law dispute: Defendants urge Illinois law (ICPA), Chi urges Arizona law for defamation; Illinois choice-of-law rules apply in diversity. The court uses Restatement factors and dépeçage to analyze each claim separately.
- Arizona defamation law governs Chi's defamation claim; Illinois law governs his remaining tortious interference and IIED claims.
- The ICPA defense is addressed: Illinois law applies to the ICPA issue, and the court analyzes whether the action was genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.
- The court ultimately grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss; counts II and III are dismissed; count I (defamation) remains pending, with ICPA analysis proceeding but not dispositive at this stage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What law governs defamation? | Chi argues Arizona law applies. | Loyola/Nagda argue Illinois law governs under the ICPA. | Arizona law governs defamation. |
| What law governs tortious interference and IIED? | Chi seeks Illinois law for these claims, given Illinois contacts. | Illinois and Arizona laws do not materially differ; Illinois law applies by forum rules. | Illinois law applies to tortious interference and IIED. |
| Does the ICPA immunize Chi's defamation claim? | ICPA does not shield because issues are not genuinely aimed at procuring government action. | ICPA immunizes if actions are aimed at procuring favorable government action. | IIf the action is not genuinely aimed, ICPA immunity does not apply; Chi's defamation claim survives to some extent. |
| Is the ICPA an Erie-substantive issue in federal court? | ICPA is procedural and thus not applicable under Erie. | ICPA provisions are substantive, affecting conduct outside litigation. | ICPA provisions are substantive and apply in this diversity case. |
| Should the order be certified for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)? | Certification could be warranted for ICPA issues. | No controlling question with substantial ground for difference of opinion. | No interlocutory appeal is warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1990) (defamation standard on matters of public concern; provable as false not universal outside public concern)
- Turner v. Devlin, 174 Ariz. 201 (Ariz. 1993) (provable-as-false standard applicable to public concern; input on private context limited)
- Dube v. Likins, 216 Ariz. 406 (Ariz. App. 2007) (defamation standard outside public concern context; implies factual assertion requirement)
- Sandholm v. Kuecker, 405 Ill. App. 3d 835 (Ill. App. 2010) (Noerr-Pennington/No-favor exception test for ICPA; objective and subjective intent analysis)
- City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (U.S. 1991) (Noerr-Pennington doctrine; framework for evaluating government-action-related immunity)