Cheryl Sinclair v. Lauderdale County, Tenn.
652 F. App'x 429
6th Cir.2016Background
- Stephen Sinclair entered a court-ordered rehab program (Rose of Sharon) under a Consent Order requiring return after furlough and naming his mother Cheryl Sinclair as his exclusive transport.
- Stephen received a temporary furlough July 26–27, 2014, failed to return on time, spent the night with his girlfriend, and later returned to the facility where he fled and went into hiding.
- Rose of Sharon staff sent a letter to Stephen’s probation officer stating Stephen left the program and mistakenly reporting he returned with his mother.
- The assistant district attorney asked jail staff to prepare affidavits charging Stephen with escape and Cheryl with accessory after the fact; Investigator Newman reviewed the Consent Order, the letter, a similar indictment, and prosecutor’s charging recommendation and signed an affidavit charging Cheryl.
- Cheryl was arrested, jailed 37 days, and charges were later dismissed; she sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution.
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants; the Sixth Circuit majority affirmed, holding the information available provided probable cause to arrest and prosecute Cheryl; a concurrence/dissent would have denied probable cause but found qualified immunity for the individual defendants and allowed a municipal claim to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Probable cause to arrest Cheryl for accessory after the fact | Letter did not show Cheryl helped Stephen avoid arrest or left with him; no probable cause | Documents (Consent Order, letter, similar indictment) and prosecutor’s instruction gave a reasonable basis to believe Cheryl assisted Stephen | Held: Probable cause existed for arrest/prosecution (majority) |
| Applicability of Tennessee "escape" statute to Stephen | Stephen was on probation so his conduct was a probation violation, not "escape" under the statute; thus Cheryl could not be accessory to escape | Even if statute was misapplied, the officer’s mistake was objectively reasonable given Consent Order, letter, and similar local prosecution | Held: Officer’s mistake of law/fact was reasonable; treating Stephen as having committed escape was permissible for probable cause analysis |
| Use of hearsay (Rose of Sharon letter) to establish probable cause | The letter is hearsay and lacked independent corroboration; cannot form basis for probable cause | Letter came from a credible, custodial source (program secretary/director) and may be credited for probable cause; corroborating materials existed | Held: The letter could be credited; hearsay did not defeat probable cause |
| Municipal liability (Lauderdale County) | County responsible for arrest/detention policy and the sheriff’s instruction; county may be liable under Monell | No underlying constitutional violation, so no municipal liability; or, if none, individual immunity applies | Held by majority: No municipal liability because no constitutional violation; concurrence would remand municipal claim (dispute of sheriff’s role) |
Key Cases Cited
- Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff bears burden to prove arresting officer lacked probable cause)
- Stricker v. Township of Cambridge, 710 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2013) (probable cause requirement for malicious prosecution)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (Fourth Amendment tolerates objectively reasonable mistakes of law)
- Crockett v. Cumberland College, 316 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2003) (probable cause standard and evaluation)
- Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1999) (officers need not accept suspect’s explanation before arrest)
- Wong v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (probable cause requires more than suspicion but less than proof of guilt)
- Ventresca v. United States, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (hearsay may support probable cause if there is a substantial basis for crediting it)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (qualified immunity protects all but plainly incompetent or knowing violations)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (Monell municipal liability requires official policy causing the constitutional deprivation)
- Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) (qualified immunity tolerates reasonable mistakes)