Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Sally Jewell, 767 F.3d 900

Chemehuevi Tribe appeals district court’s grant of summary judgment for Interior on APA claim about land assignments to tribal members.
Tribe sought to have BIA approve land assignment deeds under 25 U.S.C. § 81, which imposes Secretarial approval for encumbrances seven years or longer.
IBIA held that deeds encumber and convey under § 177, which requires Congressional approval; thus Interior could not approve.
Historically, 1872 § 81 and 2000 amendments narrowed § 81 to encumbrances, not all contracts touching lands; § 177 prohibits non-congressional conveyances of land titles.
Tribe argued § 81 amendments implicitly repealed § 177 or permitted approvals despite § 177; Interior argued Congress preserved § 177’s veto over conveyances.
Court declines to adopt Tonkawa reasoning and holds Congress’ intent clear at Chevron step one; § 81 cannot authorize § 177-encumbering conveyances.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 81 and § 177 conflict governs approval power	Chemehuevi: § 81 approvals can cover encumbrances without violating § 177.	Jewel: § 81 cannot authorize conveyances prohibited by § 177; Congress did not intend overlap.	Yes; § 81 cannot authorize § 177-prohibited conveyances.
Does Tonkawa govern the extent of § 177's reach	Chemehuevi relies on Tonkawa to require full extinguishment for § 177 to apply.	Jewel: Tonkawa applies to complete extinguishment; § 177 covers conveyances short of full divestment as well.	Tonkawa not controlling; § 177 covers partial conveyances.
Did amendments to § 81 implicitly repeal § 177	Amendments expanded Secretary’s authority to approve encumbrances.	Implied repeal disfavored; express language shows no repeal of § 177.	No implied repeal; amendments do not override § 177.
Chevron step one vs step two applicability	Agency interpretation should be reviewed for reasonableness under Chevron if Congress is silent.	Congress’ intent is clear; no need for step two deference.	Court stops at step one; Congress’s intent is clear.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. Supreme Court 1984) (establishes two-step Chevron deference framework)
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (U.S. Supreme Court 2000) (articulates limits of agency interpretation where statute is clear)
Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotes respect for unambiguously expressed Congressional intent)
Northpoint Tech., Ltd. v. FCC, 412 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (contextual framework for statutory interpretation and deference)
Adams v. U.S. Forest Serv., 671 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2012) (applies Chevron step one in statutory interpretation)
United States v. Santa Ana Indian Pueblo, 731 F.2d 706 (10th Cir. 1984) (fiduciary duty to protect Indian lands under § 177 framework)
Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty. of N.Y., 414 U.S. 661 (U.S. Supreme Court 1974) (statutory constraints on tribal conveyances without Congressional approval)
Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards, 75 F.3d 1039 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressed scope of § 177 regarding extinguishment of title)
Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978) (illustrates limitations on tribal land conveyances without approval)
United States v. S. Pac. Trans., 543 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1976) (easements subject to § 177)
Penobscot Indian Nation v. Key Bank of Maine, 112 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 1997) (historical treatment of § 81 and land encumbrances)