194 Conn.App. 843
Conn. App. Ct.2019Background
- Chase (and successor plaintiffs) brought a mortgage foreclosure against Scroggin; Scroggin was defaulted for failure to plead after the original complaint but later an amended complaint was filed.
- The trial court (Judge Aurigemma) initially entered a judgment of strict foreclosure; this court in Chase I reversed in part and remanded, concluding the effect of the amended complaint on the earlier default required consideration.
- On remand the substitute plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to liability on count one; the 45‑day response period expired and Scroggin filed a belated Practice Book § 17‑47 motion for an extension, which the trial court denied as untimely. Scroggin did not file a substantive response to the summary judgment motion.
- The summary judgment motion was marked ready for short calendar; at the May 29, 2018 short calendar the judge granted the motion “absent opposition” without soliciting or hearing oral argument. Scroggin’s counsel appeared and interposed a § 51‑183c recusal remark but had not filed a written motion to disqualify.
- The trial court then entered a new judgment of strict foreclosure; Scroggin appealed. The appellate court reversed, holding the summary judgment was improperly decided without required oral argument, and affirmed that § 51‑183c did not apply because no ‘‘trial’’ had been held; it also held denial of the extension was not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 51‑183c required the trial judge to recuse after this court reversed the prior strict‑foreclosure judgment | Recusal unnecessary because the statute applies only to judges who presided over a "trial"; no written disqualification motion was filed | § 51‑183c required recusal after reversal of the prior judgment | Held: § 51‑183c did not apply—statute applies only to judges who tried a case; the prior judgment was entered after a short calendar matter, not a trial, so no mandatory recusal |
| Whether the court erred by granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment without hearing oral argument (Practice Book § 11‑18) | No oral argument required because no opposition was filed and defendant failed to file the § 11‑18(a)(2) written notice | Oral argument was a matter of right: the motion had been marked ready under § 11‑18(a)(1) and defense counsel appeared to argue | Held: Reversible error—§ 11‑18 gives nonmovant a right to oral argument when the motion is marked ready; the court granted the motion before allowing argument |
| Whether the court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s untimely motion for extension to respond to summary judgment (Practice Book § 17‑47) | Motion untimely; defendant failed to file within the 45‑day response period in § 17‑45(b) | Denial was an abuse because § 17‑47 contains no explicit timing and defendant needed discovery (deposition of corporate designee) | Held: No abuse—§ 17‑47 imports the § 17‑45(b) forty‑five‑day deadline; defendant’s § 17‑47 request was untimely and lack of diligence was fatal |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Miranda, 260 Conn. 93 (2002) (interpreting § 51‑183c as applying exclusively to trials)
- Lafayette Bank & Trust Co. v. Szentkuti, 27 Conn. App. 15 (1992) (section 51‑183c does not extend to short‑calendar or pretrial proceedings)
- Higgins v. Karp, 243 Conn. 495 (1998) (contextual discussion of reassignment after reversal where original judge presided over a trial)
- Higgins v. Karp, 239 Conn. 802 (1997) (prior decision reversing trial court’s denial of motions to set aside defaults following jury trial)
- Gagne v. Vaccaro, 311 Conn. 649 (2014) (Supreme Court reversed Appellate Court’s recusal holding as moot where procedural requirements to seek disqualification were not satisfied)
- Marinos v. Poirot, 308 Conn. 706 (2013) (standard of review for summary judgment is plenary)
- Plouffe v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 160 Conn. 482 (1971) (continuance/Rule 56(f) principle: timely affidavits showing need for discovery should be liberally treated)
- Sheridan v. Board of Education, 20 Conn. App. 231 (1989) (denial of continuance for discovery justified where nonmovant lacked diligence in complying with summary judgment rules)