Charles Lee v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company
802 F.3d 626
4th Cir.2015Background
- Charles Lee, an African-American carman for Norfolk Southern (NS), was suspended without pay for six months in July 2011; Lee alleges the suspension was racially motivated and/or retaliatory for safety whistleblowing under the FRSA.
- Lee filed a § 1981 racial-discrimination suit in federal district court (Sept. 2011). During that suit he filed an OSHA complaint under the FRSA whistleblower provision; OSHA dismissed and Lee pursued the FRSA administrative process and later elected to sue in district court.
- The district court granted summary judgment to NS on the § 1981 claims. After that judgment, Lee filed a separate FRSA retaliation suit raising the same suspension and related factual allegations.
- The district court granted summary judgment to NS on the FRSA claim, holding FRSA’s Election of Remedies provision, 49 U.S.C. § 20109(f), barred Lee from seeking FRSA protection because he had already sought relief under § 1981 for the same act.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding the Election of Remedies provision does not bar sequential suits where the same act is challenged as unlawful for different reasons (racial discrimination v. whistleblower retaliation).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FRSA § 20109(f) bars Lee’s FRSA suit because he previously sought relief under § 1981 for the same suspension | Lee: § 20109(f) prohibits pursuing FRSA plus another statute only when the act is unlawful for the same reason; a racially motivated suspension is not the same "allegedly unlawful act" as a suspension motivated by FRSA-protected whistleblowing | NS: The textual phrase covers any single act that is "allegedly unlawful" for any reason; the same act (the suspension) cannot be relitigated under another statute — election required | Held: Reversed district court. "The same allegedly unlawful act" means unlawfulness must be the same in both suits; race-based suspension and FRSA-retaliation suspension are different unlawful theories, so § 20109(f) does not bar the FRSA claim |
| Whether grammatical/textual reading supports NS’s broader interpretation | Lee: Ordinary meaning and grammar show "same" modifies the phrase "allegedly unlawful act," requiring identical unlawfulness | NS: Argues adjectives independently modify "act," so any act that is "allegedly unlawful" for any reason is covered | Held: Court adopts Lee’s reading (and punctuation/grammar supports it); statute unambiguous in Lee’s favor |
| If ambiguous, whether legislative history and statutory context support NS’s reading | Lee/Secretary of Labor: History shows § 20109(f) was meant to avoid duplicative remedies among overlapping whistleblower statutes (e.g., OSHA §11(c)) — not to force election between safety whistleblower claims and discrimination claims | NS: Relies less on history; emphasizes policy against claim-splitting and practical problems from FRSA’s administrative procedures | Held: Legislative history and context support a narrow reading — Congress intended to bar overlapping whistleblower/retaliation remedies, not discrimination claims |
| Whether claim-splitting doctrines or procedural rules independently bar Lee’s FRSA suit | NS: Procedural FRSA rules (OSHA/Secretary-first, "kick-out") make joint pleading impossible and election provision should prevent piecemeal litigation | Lee: Election provision language controls; claim-splitting is separate defense | Held: Court rejects using § 20109(f) as a de facto claim-splitting rule; leaves claim-splitting defense for remand/ district court to address in first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- EEOC v. Great Steaks, Inc., 667 F.3d 510 (4th Cir. 2012) (standard for reviewing statutory interpretation questions)
- Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (begin statutory construction with text)
- Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (consider language, specific context, and broader statutory context to determine ambiguity)
- Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997 (2012) (use ordinary dictionary meanings when statute does not define words)
- Araujo v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2013) (contrast FRSA burden-shifting with McDonnell Douglas standard)
- U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993) (statutory punctuation can inform meaning)
- Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (statute of limitations for § 1981 claims)