Charles Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 64 F.4th 736

Background

Charles Jackson was wrongfully convicted of murder in 1991 and exhausted several postconviction attempts before the Ohio Innocence Project became involved.
In August 2016 the Ohio Innocence Project requested investigative records; Assistant Prosecutor Barbara Marburger produced a heavily redacted Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office file. The City of Cleveland produced an unredacted file nine months later (May 2017) showing significant exculpatory evidence.
Jackson used the unredacted materials in a 2018 postconviction petition; his conviction was vacated and charges ultimately dismissed in 2019.
Jackson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Marburger’s redactions denied him access to the courts; the district court denied Marburger’s motion to dismiss on absolute and qualified immunity grounds.
On interlocutory appeal the Sixth Circuit held Marburger was not entitled to absolute immunity but reversed the denial of qualified immunity, concluding that while Jackson plausibly alleged an access-to-courts violation, the unlawfulness was not clearly established in 2016.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prosecutor has absolute immunity for redacting records in response to a public-records request	Marburger acted as a prosecutor whose conduct was connected to postconviction/judicial proceedings and so should be absolutely immune	Responding to a records request and redacting documents is an administrative function, not advocacy immune under Imbler/Buckley	No absolute immunity — redaction in response to the request was administrative and not intimately associated with judicial advocacy
Whether Marburger violated the right of access to the courts by redacting exculpatory information	Redaction concealed exculpatory evidence, rendered state remedies ineffective for ~9 months, and caused substantial prejudice to Jackson’s postconviction claims	Even if prejudicial, qualified immunity protects her because law was not clearly established; redactions were made pursuant to Ohio law in effect at the time	Majority: Jackson plausibly pleaded an access-to-courts violation (prejudice and unavailable remedy), but qualified immunity applies because it was not clearly established in 2016 that redacting records in response to a public-records request violated the right of access
Whether Jackson plausibly pleaded an access-to-courts claim	Alleged all four Flagg/Harbury elements: nonfrivolous claim, obstructive action, substantial prejudice, and relief unobtainable elsewhere	Marburger disputed only remedy/prejudice; argued delay or state-law avenues could have remedied issue	Majority: complaint plausibly alleged the access claim; Concurrence (Murphy, J.) would have dismissed—concluding delay did not produce the required litigation-related prejudice and relief sought was available via existing claims

Key Cases Cited

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (establishes absolute immunity for prosecutors acting as advocates in initiating and presenting the State's case)
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (functional approach: immunity depends on the nature of the function, not the actor)
Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2003) (prosecutor not entitled to absolute immunity for non-advocacy investigative/administrative acts; access-to-courts precedent recognizing cover-up theory)
Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259 (6th Cir. 1997) (access-to-courts violation where official cover-up renders state-court remedy ineffective)
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002) (framework for backward-looking access-to-courts claims and requirement that requested relief not be obtainable in other suits)
District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (limits Brady obligations in the postconviction context; state procedures govern postconviction disclosure)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two-step—constitutional violation and clearly established law)
Wesby v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (warning against defining clearly established law at a high level of generality)