Chang-Williams v. Department of the Navy
766 F. Supp. 2d 604
D. Maryland2011Background
- Chang-Williams sues under the FTCA; the proper defendant is the United States, and Navy, JAG, and Marine Corps must be dismissed.
- The underlying 2002 incident involved Sergeaent Estabon Eugene attacking Chang-Williams’ family, resulting in the deaths of Kelvin and Aldwin and injuries to Chang-Williams.
- Administrative claim filed Nov. 12, 2004 for wrongful death and injury; Navy denied on Sept. 29, 2009 on grounds of FTCA assault/battery exclusion, lack of scope, and no duty to protect.
- Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint March 30, 2010 asserting claims for wrongful death, malicious act, and personal injury against four defendants.
- Court treats Government’s motion as summary judgment; Virginia is the place of the negligent act for substantive law, but Maryland law governs certain tort duties in the FTCA context; issue of a special relationship to protect is central.
- Court grants in part and denies in part the Government’s motion and grants supplement motions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| FTCA scope of employment applies? | Eugene acted within Marine Corps duties; acts were incident to employment. | Eugene’s acts were outside the scope of employment; FTCA cannot reach them. | Scope issue favors dismissal of direct vicarious liability; some agents' assurances may fall within scope, but Eugene’s acts are outside. |
| Does the 2680(h) intentional tort exception bar negligent failure-to-protect claims? | Independent negligence to protect can be viable; not barred where duty arises from promises to protect. | All claims tied to the assault/battery are barred by the intentional tort exception. | Sheridan-based framework allows non-employment-based negligent duties to protect to survive; not barred here for promise-based duty. |
| Does the discretionary function exception shield alleged failure-to-protect actions? | Breach of a specific promise to protect may be non-discretionary and actionable. | Defendant’s protective decisions are discretionary policy judgments. | Discretionary function exception does not bar a breach-of-promise-to-protect theory where reliance is shown; not automatic immunity. |
| What law governs the personal injuries and the wrongful death claims under the FTCA? | Maryland law governs, with Virginia/ Maryland dynamics recognized for wrongful act place. | Virginia law applies for place-of-wrong; Maryland Wrongful Death Act governs beneficiaries’ rights. | Virginia substantive law governs place-of-wrong; for Maryland wrongful death, statute dictates who may recover; amendments needed to include proper beneficiaries; Maryland substantive tort law applies to coverage. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Sherwood, 304 U.S. 584 (1941) (FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity; scope and exceptions setup)
- United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976) (FTCA liability mirrors private party liability; subject to exceptions)
- Shelter v. Heard (Shearer), 473 U.S. 52 (1985) (broad interpretation of 'arising out of' assault or battery; pre Sheridan)
- Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988) (negligence independent from assault can survive FTCA when duties are independent)
- Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568 (2003) (special relationship based on dependence and ceding control; flexible standard)
- Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, 370 Md. 447 (2002) (special relationship analysis; reliance and conduct considerations)
- Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101 (2000) (affirmative acts and specific promises can create a duty to protect)
- McNack v. State of Maryland, 398 Md. 378 (2007) (limits on public-emergency liability; absence of specific affirmative acts reduces duty)
- Pendleton v. State, 398 Md. 447 (2007) (emergency-service context and special relationship considerations)