Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County

A.2d Individually, etc, v. MUTHUKUMARANA, Sriyani Maryland, COUNTY, et al. MONTGOMERY Fried, al., et Sarah

v. Archer,

Kim et al. Term, Sept. 2001.

Nos. Maryland. Appeals Court Aug. (Brown brief), Bethesda, Gould, LLP, on A. Brown &

Daniel appellant. for Burrell, Principal for V. Counsel Self-Insurance

Sharon Jr., (Charles County Thompson, Attorney, Appeals W. brief), Robertson, Chief, Rock- Litigation, Division of Joann ville, appellees. Cumberland, County Buckel, Atty., County Asst.

Linda W. Schuett, County, Maryland, M. Allegany Linda Com’rs Annapolis, County, Maryland, County Atty., Anne Arundel Jr., Solicitor, Baltimore, Zollicoffer, Mayor City Thurman W. Gilliss, Baltimore, County J. City Council Edward Towson, Wiseman, III, County Atty., Atty., Asst. William J. Demedis, County County, Maryland, Emanuel Baltimore Frederick, County, County Com’rs for Atty., Prince Calvert Millender, County Atty., Maryland, Kimberly Acting A. West- County, Bar- minster, Maryland, for County Com’rs Carroll Laws, Cook, Solicitor, A. Asst. County Sr. bara M. Rebecca Solicitor, Ruzzi, County Solicitor, County P. Asst. Louis Sr. City, Ellicott County, Maryland, Howard Cookerly, Ernest S. Chestertown, County Atty., County County, Com’rs for Kent Maryland, III, Guy Ayres, City Solicitor, R. City, Ocean Mayor City Wallace, Council of City, Ocean Sean D. County Atty., Bielec, Deputy John A. County Atty., Upper Marlboro, County, George’s Maryland, Prince Patrick E. Thompson, County Atty., Stevensville, County Com’rs for Queen County, Maryland, Anne’s Richard Douglas, County W. Atty., Hagerstown, County Com’rs for Washington County, Baker, Maryland, Edgar Jr., A. County Atty., Salisbury, Wi- County, Maryland, Jr., comico Hammond, Edward H. County Atty., City, County Ocean Com’rs for County, Worcester Maryland, Rumsfeld, Counsel, Kurt T. Legal Intern. Ass’n of DC, Fire Fighters, Washington, Henry Underhill, Jr., W. Director, General Counsel Executive & Intern. Lawyers Mun. Ass’n, Washington, DC, Counsel, Spurrier, Mark Maryland G. Ass’n, Inc., Greer, Chiefs of Police Largo, Counsel, Sue Cusick Maryland Ass’n, Inc., Annapolis, Fink, Sheriffs Roger Lee Atty., County LaPlata, County County, Com’rs for Charles Maryland, curiae, brief of amici appellees, for amicus curiae. (Hardwick Hams, LLP,

Clifford L. Hardwick brief), & on Baltimore, for petitioners. Roberts, (A.

Philip County Atty. Carven, III, S. Asst. Frank County Atty., brief), Air, respondents. Bel C.J.,

Argued BELL, RAKER, ELDRIDGE, before WILNER, CATHELL, BATTAGLIA, HARRELL and JJ.

HARRELL, Judge. Archer, cases, Fried v. two These September Term, No. 2001, and Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County, No. September Term, 2001, share a common issue: whether local government emergency telephone system employees (specifi- cally operators, dispatchers, and managers) owe an individual persons services, tort and, so, need their if under what employees may circumstances the be held liable for the negligent performance duty.1 of that present These cases also Throughout opinion, this we shall utilize the reference "911” to refer emergency telephone systems mandated and to describe various

457 address, at core of both is but the we shall other issues which this shared issue. pro-, and factual

Following separate examination of the our cases, and rephrase shall in both we backgrounds cedural will for our review. We questions presented consolidate the case. however, unique the each separately, consider issues to 911 will applicable employees general Our review the law at hand. applied specifically be to both cases then I. Fried,

A. Fouts, daughter Tiffany 11On November Petitioner, Fried, arranged spend night Ms. Sarah (1957, Maryland employees stalling systems. Code those Pursuant number, 911,” 18-101, digit § is Repl.Vol.), Article "the three Maryland.” primary telephone emergency for the State of "the number Every county City dispatch Maryland has a center "to and Baltimore public safety proper authori receive 911 calls and route them (filed Brief, County, Montgomery at 3 Muthukumarana v. ties." Amicus 2002). January issues, although Additionally, present us similar the cases before cases, emergency systems in the operation telephone involved involved, along employees are not with the individual duties of the 911 ("ihe County example, Sheriffs Office identical. For the Harford officer, HCSO”), Fried, upon police the focus of communications call, receipt responsible dispatching emergency for the call to of an is Muthukumarana, police. Montgomery County, In situs of emergency responsible receives calls and is for services aide information, gathering pertinent transferring appropriate call to dispatcher, remaining gather line to more information and pur responding emergency personnel. dispatcher For assist arid however, occupy not further poses opinion, differences will of this these Therefore, "systems,” "opera our to 911 our attention. references tors," “dispatchers,” "employees” be understood as encom should passing systems parties involved in ihese cases. all of the relevanl emergency telephone Finally, persons of” our reference to "in need 1) calling on their own to include individuals services intended assistance, 2) whom individuals need of assistance for behalf party opinion, we are concerned with a third contacts this relationship party personally in a third caller who is not between legal relationship, employee, but with the need of assistance any, persons actually and 911 in need of assistance if between those employees. friend, the home of her Melanie Meadowcroft. That evening, Tiffany and visited home of Melanie one of Melanie’s F., acquaintances, Drive, Eric located at 1443 Charleston K Court, Edgewood, Maryland. in boys Three other also were present home, W., at evening Ricky W., Eric’s Donte D., mother, along Louis with Eric’s Ms. Tresa F.2 Tiffany arrived, Shortly after and Melanie “alcoholic bever ages were made available and of’ consumed all the minors hour, at Tiffany the home. Within began one to vomit and time, “became semiconscious.” At that guests “certain en gaged in non Tiffany,” consensual sexual acts with dropped “heavy objects” head, on her upon and “urinated In an her.” condition, effort Tiffany’s to conceal F. Eric and Donte W. dragged her outside of through They the home the basement. Tiffany, wearing only shirt, skirt, socks, shoes, “left a tee in an area of directly woods located behind the townhome.” Archer, 229, 238, 430, Fried v. Md.App. cert. (2001). granted, 366 Md. 783 A.2d 221 The weather at time “was cold and wet” with a “forecast[ed] winter storm, snow, including approaching the area.” Id. W., Donte

Subsequently, presence of Eric F. and W., Ricky (“the called Harford County Sheriffs Office HCSO”) ostensibly inform Tiffany.3 them of the location Archer, Kim Respondent, Ms. a police officer, communications received the call. The conversation unfolded as follows: case, At 2. the time of the girls, Tiffany relevant events in this the two Melanie, F., W., W., D., boys, Ricky and the Eric Donte and Louis boy were all minors. At least one involved in this case was involved in juvenile proceeding as a evening result of his behavior therefore, question, description boys we limit our and the related (Eric mother) adult F.’s the first initial their last names. F., consulting 3. Ricky After with W. and Eric Donte W. called directly, dialing HCSO request rather than assistance. Accord- W., ing they hoping by doing to Donte were so to hide the fact that Tiffany drinking had been Eric F.'s home. In our consideration of however, appeal, this it is irrelevant that Donte W. did not dial 911 directly. purpose The emergency and services telephone system he reached are the same as those he would have reached had he dialed Office, Archer. PCO County Harford Sheriffs [Archer:] Hello. [DonteW.:] Yes.

[Archer:] the woods Um, girl back of there’s [Donte W.:] like. Back of what woods.

[Archer:] Um, Square. Harford [Donte W.:] exact address? Okay. What’s the [Archer:] at. she’s no exact address where There ain’t [Donte W.:] is? Can she Okay. the residence where What’s [Archer:] rear she’s front where you give me the residence of? people to those over What’s the address W.:]

[Donte (Inaudible.) 1436? way. that further there? Cause she’s 1436.4 Square. Okay. Harford

[Archer:] Yes, K Court.

[DonteW.:] doing, sir? Okay. And what’s she [Archer:] laying there. Just [Donte W.:] of the house? just laying to the rear Okay.

[Archer:] She’s was a—. She Yes, was over she was. She [Donte W.:] laying was there. and she drinking over here Black she a white female? female? Okay. Is [Archer:] Yeah. [DonteW.:] Which one?

[Archer:] White female.

[Donte W.:] name, Okay. your And last Okay. White female. [Archer:] sir? say anonymous. I’d just

[Donte W.:] out. someone Okay. We’ll send [Archer:] near Ricky W. Eric F. for the address W. both 4. Donte asked home, F., explained that he in the Tiffany’s Eric who lived location. (i.e. boys were located than where the provided a different address Court) Court, coming prevent police from to K to K of 1443 instead drinking. discovering underaged their his home and Thanks. [Donte W.:] call,

Following dispatched Deputy Archer Sheriff Kevin Thomas”) (“Deputy investigate. Thomas to In a transmission Thomas, at Deputy which occurred approximately p.m., erroneously reported Tiffany Archer was lying the rear Court, aof residence on J not K Court.5 The content of the transmission was follows: rear

10-25 of 1436 Harford Square Drive —1-4-3- 6—Harford It will Square. be J —John—Court. Cross is Anonymous requesting street Charleston. male’s check on being of well number female. lying She the rear of this residence. He believes she’s 10-56. give Unable to any us description. further reference to “ Upon Court, Deputy Thomas’s arrival at 1436 J ‘it was ” raining pretty Fried, hard’ ‘[v]ery and was cold.’ (alteration Md.App. 775 A.2d at 437 in original). Deputy Thomas his car exited and walked around the rear townhomes, the J Court Tiffany. but was unable to locate He returned his car and called Archer request a recontact. asked, He complainant out come to the back and “Mould out point young lady might where this replied be?” Archer information, there was no reconnect stating, an “[i]t’s anonymous male. He didn’t want to give his information.” “ Deputy Thomas then th[e] ‘walked whole line of houses ” that side of the court and then back around to front.’ Id. He a Maryland “encountered trooper State who had also call, responded to Court, but had searched behind J1 separate another court to next J Court.” Id. A few minutes later, one, no finding Deputy after Thomas radioed and Archer stated, “10-8,10-12.” According to Deputy Thomas’s testimo- alleges negligent directing 5. Fried that Archer was in Deputy Thomas to Court, Court, failing "J" rather than to 1436 report "K" and in to note, Tiffany however, that was near a "forested area.” We that was Square Thomas "familiar” with the develop- "Harford townhome ment” buildings,” and knew that there were "even no numbered such 1436, on legal analyses K Court. Given of the shared issue in cases, these this factual distinction is not material. an that the call was ny, 12” indicated his determination “Code complaint.” “unfounded unclear, Eric F. testified precise frame

Although time Archer, “out boys went report their to making that after later, F. Eric Tiffany. time back” and checked Some once again, To outside Ricky attempted go W. testified that he and mother, who “came downstairs but his prevented were Neither stay had in the house.” told that to [and] [him he] again that attempted go W. outside Ricky Eric F. or 12 November Unfortunately, early in hours of evening. where hypothermia from the location Tiffany died F. W. had left her. Eric and Donte Fried, mother, Tiffany’s wrongful filed a death

Petitioner County for Harford and survival action the Circuit Court (the Archer, Mr. Terrell chief against Respondent James and County’s Emergency Management Operations Harford (“un- Division), County, Maryland, Doe Harford John/Jane Harford emergency employees service dispatch identified Division”), County’s Emergency Management Operations F., HCSO, Thomas, Deputy Ms. and the State Tresa alleged Archer “breached her Maryland. Fried that inquiries make of Donte W.” was by failing care basis ... Court reporting Tiffany “in was behind ‘J’ negligent ‘K’ be and was in fact behind reported when fact she was Fried also that Archer was “further Court.” maintained . . report Tiffany . was behind negligent failing Terrell, Regarding townhomes near forested area.” [sic] proce- negligently “employed improper that he Fried asserted “a which was properly train [Archer]” dures failed and/or proximate Tiffany.” the death of cause of defendants,”6 “county including

On 28 December Terrell, claims filed motion to dismiss the Archer and motion, enjoyed against According their Archer them. no and Terrell owed immunity, official Archer Archer, Terrell, Doe, "county were The defendants” John/Jane County. Harford “duty protect [Tiffany] to from the criminal acts of teenage boys in company voluntarily whose placed she ....” In herself addition, HCSO, Thomas, Deputy Mary of and the State land also filed motions to dismiss.7 Court, 1999,

The Circuit on 16 November filed its memoran- Terrell, opinion Archer, dum dismissing Mary- State land, and Doe.8 The court relied Fried’s com- John/Jane plaint and opposition her to Respondents’ motion to dismiss conclude that Archer did not “enjoy public official It status.” held, however, that legal the “lack of a duty Archer between (Tiffany) victim preclude[d] [ judgment ] favorable According Court, the Plaintiff.” to the Circuit “no special relationship [Tiffany] existed Archer between and without .and existence relationship, legal no Archer had duty [Tiffany].” Likewise, though even the trial court found enjoyed public that Terrell official immunity, also general found that owed “no duty he to [Tiffany]” and that “no special relationship ever existed [Tiffany] between and Terrell bring legal about a duty in this case.”

On an June Fried filed appeal to Court of Special Appeals judgment from the dismissing Archer and “ argued Terrell. Fried ‘Archer and Terrell did owe a legal [Tiffany] of care to based on [Tiffany] the fact that was an individual and a persons member the class who subjects are the calls, 911 or emergency ... and injury to failing give her from correct location information was ” Fried, readily foreseeable.’ Md.App. 775 A.2d at (some in original). alterations Additionally, she main- tained that the lower court “erroneously applie[d] the concept ” a ‘special relationship’ to Archer “a because she is mere government employee,” rather than a public official. As Terrell, argued Fried that the “lower court erred in determin- point prior motions, 7. At disposition some Fried "dis F.,” Archer, 229, 241, missed Ms. 430, 437, Md.App. [Tresa] Fried v. granted, (2001), cert. 366 Md. 783 A.2d 221 Harford County, and the HCSO. Only Ms. Respondents Archer and Mr. Terrell appeal. are in this “erroneously official” and public ... was ing that [he] and duty of existed” between Terrell that no care determined Fried, “by foreseeability virtue the Tiffany. According to proper failure to establish resulting potential from of harm to train- respect safeguards and with policies, procedures legal duty care” emergency dispatch operators, ing of Tiffany. and existed between Terrell Appeals opinion, Special In reported Court “legal duty by dispatchers police owed held that the calls, subject persons emergency who are of 911 or class Fried, duty to aid.” 139 by position, their is a virtue of 257, appro A.2d at 446. The Court found Md.App. at 775 therefore, police negligence liability “measure the priate, police applied the same standard officers dispatchers case-by-case respond dispatches,” applied who their duty set forth Ashburn v. special of the rule application (1986), 617, 510 1078 County, Anne Arundel 306 Md. A.2d Fried, liability of Archer and Terrell. its determination 257, special 775 A.2d at 446. rule Md.App. 139 at The that, provides police relationship for a between officer special order

[i]n found, it the local victim to be must be shown that specific victim government affirmatively protect acted to victim, specific group thereby of individuals like or a specific upon police protec- inducing the victim’s reliance tion. 250-51,

Fried, (quoting at 775 A.2d at 442 Md.App. 631, Ashburn, 1085). As 306 Md. at 510 A.2d at the Court “ a relationship, without such ‘lia Special Appeals explained, against not protect another citizen does lie bility failure ” Fried, 250, 775 at 442 police Md.App. at A.2d officers.’ 1083). Ashburn, 628, A.2d 306 Md. at at (quoting test, Special its of the Ashburn Court of application “specific reliance,” as interpreted mentioned Ash- Appeals bum, justifiable and sub to mean “detrimental reliance” allege sequently found that Fried failed to the reliance “neces Fried, duty.” at sary Md.App. to establish a 775 A.2d at 451. According appellate the intermediate court, the court err dismissing trial did not claims Fried’s against Tiffany did not rely Archer because to her detriment on promise boys Archer’s to send an and the did officer Fried, rely justifiably promise. on 139 Md.App. Archer’s 266-67, 273-75, Likewise, 775 A.2d at the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Fried’s against allegations claims Terrell because “no there were indicating Tiffany or her assailants specifically relied Ter- Fried, allegedly rell’s training procedures.” insufficient 276-77, 139 Md.App. at 775 A.2d at 458. granted

On October we Fried’s petition for writ of proper analysis certiorari to determine the to be utilized in evaluating scope tort of the duties and liabilities of Archer and Terrell.9 presented following

9. questions petition: Fried in her Special Appeals concluding, 1. Did the in Court of err aas case of impression, emergency telephone dispatch an operator, first that Archer, Terrell, emergency operations, and a of director owed no Fouts, private duty Tiffany of care to the deceased minor child of Sarah Fried? Special Appeals determining, 2. Did the of in Court err in a case of impression, an first that unconscious victim not entitled to a promise emergency transferred reliance assistance to a would-be rescuer? holding Special Appeals “special 3. Did the Court of err that the duty" applies emergency rule dispatch telephone operator to an such "special relationship” necessary impose be would care? Special Appeals 4. Did the determining Court of err in that would- rescuers, Fouts, intending be Tiffany to orchestrate the rescue of did rely justifiably upon dispatch not operator's promise help to send in order to the disabled victim? rescue Special Appeals determiningf 5. Did the Court err in ] that would- Fouts, intending Tiffany be rescuers to orchestrate the rescue of did detrimentally upon rely dispatch operator's promise to send help in order to rescue the disabled victim? Special 6. Appeals assuming Did the Court of err role fact finder its unilateral conclusions as to whether detrimental reliance justifiable part reliance existed on the of would-be and/or such that a rescuers jury have should determined those issues fact? See questions presented Part I.C. for our consolidation infra both cases. B. Muthukumarana Muthukumarana, Appellant, Sriyani Ms. August On 23 celebrated, Budrani, along with children, Emil and her Regional members, birthday at Wheaton Emil’s family other from the County. returning home After Montgomery Park in husband, Muthukumara- Mr. Basaru celebration, Appellant’s agitated na, party, became birthday did not attend who tray be- her, had used reportedly because she with Emil, cousin, Budrani, their Thara- longed to him. While and her nie, Appellant Muthukumarana playing, were outside during the point At their home. some argued husband inside against head [Appellant’s] “bashed argument, her husband scream, Upon hearing to scream. her wall” which caused her entered the home. all three the children home, Mr. Muthukumarana After the children entered 911 from the dialed upstairs. Appellant ran Muthukumarana gathered, and kitchen,10 of the children had all three where Woodward, Appellee, Kelley spoke police services aide Emergency Communica- Montgomery County located at the call, classified the receipt of the Woodward Upon tion Center. violence,” about the call information call as “domestic entered dispatch. computer, into and sent the call onto Woodward her Muthukumarana, “subjected to According Appellant she had been in this case." prior the date of the events issue domestic violence 1994," episode "response particular violence she to a domestic signed.” ex-parte judge the At applied protective order for “an which time, Appellant in the mail an received "Information/Instruction Sheet For Ex Parte for Protection for Domestic Orders Violence/Child Abuse.” section Adult One information/in- Abuse/Vulnerable safety, your provided, you have to fear “[if] struction sheet reason ” Appellant you ASSISTANCE’.... should call '911' for ‘EMERGENCY received it” at the time and asserts [she] “read that Instruction sheet instance. It is “relied directive" to call 911 this [the] that she entity governmental sent her the instruction somewhat unclear which Montgomery Sheriff of form the masthead of the sheet. The bears Office and County note between Sheriff's and makes distinction (“although closely County Department we work with each Police other, Department . . . are two .. . Sheriffs Office and the Police ."). agencies testified separate . Ms. Muthukumarana and dislinct however, from the deposition, received the instruction sheet that she Montgomery County Department. Police then remained on the with Appellant, attempting line to obtain her, continuously information from entered that informa- tion into A computer.11 transcript her that conversation and background sounds follows:

[Appellant:] (Screaming) Montgomery County 911, Hello,

[Woodward:] Hello. [Appellant:] (Screaming) Hello? is

[Woodward:] What the emergency? nature I [Appellant:] help please. My trying need husband is please. kill me What is

[Woodward:] the address?

[Appellant:] Claridge Drive. your What is

[Woodward:] name? [Appellant:] Hurry. Sriyani. go on. Budrani — your [Woodward:] Where’s husband at?

[Appellant:] right hurry He’s home now. up. Pleasure [sic] Hello. mam, your

[Woodward:] Ok What is name?

[Appellant:] Sriyani. Terry?

[Woodward:] [Appellant:] My, my is bleeding, hurry please. head up Montgomery County Department 11. The of Police Communications Operating ("SOP”) Division has Standard Procedure for a call taker responding to a domestic procedure provides violence call. The that a any injuries call taker will if require "[d]etermine re- Fire/Rescue sponse” pertinent including and then will "[o]btain information” "type any weapons,” and location of whether the caller the victim or witness, ("in residence, where the assailant is located left scene in foot”), drugs vehicle or on and if there "are or alcohol involved.” The screen, “[c]omplete call taker then will including call critical informa- tion in dispatch.” ‘REMARKS'section procedure and forward The that, "[i]f, point, then instructs at this it is determined that the caller is danger,” in immediate taker call shall “advise the caller to leave the police scene and re-contact from a safer location.” "If the victim phone,” calls from the safer location remains on the the call taker "[ojbtain will including, "relationship additional information” involved,” persons scene, people present "number at the children,” including "police whether have [the] been to residence violence,” before for domestic protective whether the victim has “a parte order or ex against order ... the abuser.” at? your husband Where is [Woodward:] bleeding. It’s [Appellant:] at? your husband Where is

[Woodward:] home. He’s home—he’s [Appellant:] scream- with you I can’t understand Where? [Woodward:] ing. Huh?

[Appellant:] screaming. you with I can’t understand [Woodward:] please. Please come [Appellant:] at? your husband Where

[Woodward:] now. right He’s home [Appellant:] name? your husband’s What is [Woodward:] Basara. [Appellant:] Matsabu?

[Woodward:] Basara.

[Appellant:] any weapons there. Are there [Woodward:] screaming. kidsMy I can’t are I’m hear. [Appellant:] sorry, any weapons? Are there [Woodward:] Yeah, gun, biga rifle. has a he has [Appellant:] he Where, gun at? where is [Woodward:] he, it uh, know, he has some- Uh, he, I don’t [Appellant:] where, ok? gun at? it at? is the Where is Where

[Woodward:] Huh? [Appellant:] gun is the at? Where

[Woodward:] He, has somewhere. uh, he has—he [Appellant:] possession? have it in his Does he [Woodward:] shots).12 (screaming in his He has it [Appellant:] events, was on Appellant while Muthukumarana tragic turn of In a Woodward, kitchen entered the Mr. Muthukumarana phone with Tharanie, Appellant pistol. semi-automatic carrying a caliber Colt .45 niece, neighbor’s home. to a ran out of house Muthukumarana’s Budrani, children, Emil and his two then shot Mr. Muthukumarana himself. The conver- subsequently shot and killed times number concluded at Appellant Muthukumarana between Woodward sation Hello, Hello. [Woodward:]

PHONE DISCONNECTED. The elapsed time the conversation Appellant between approximately Woodward was forty one minute seconds. 1999, Appellant On 27 December Muthukumarana filed wrongful death and survival for action her two children in the for Montgomery County against Circuit Court Woodward and Maryland. Montgomery County, In complaint, her Appellant alleged Muthukumarana that Woodward “negligently and discharge carelessly responsibilities” failed to Appellant her to Muthukumarana “a by, reasonable and careful manner among things, failing timely other to advise to [her] leave the premises and back call from a safe neigh- location such as a pay bor’s house or a phone.” She also maintained that Montgomery County, “through its employees at the E[mer- C[enter], gency] C[ommunication] to discharge ha[d] its responsibilities callers in a reasonable and careful her, According manner.” Montgomery County “negligently carelessly failed to discharge” responsibilities “by, those among things, failing timely other advise [her] leave the premises.” 2000, Woodward,

On 30 November along Montgomery with County, filed a motion summary for judgment in the Circuit arguing Court that Muthukumarana had “failed state negligence” claim for and that Montgomery County was “enti governmental immunity tled to from” her A hearing claims. on February the motion was held on 8 hearing, 2001. At that Appellant Muthukumarana “conceded that [Montgomery C]ounty governmental immunity,”13 ha[d] but maintained that unnecessary it was a “special determine whether relation scene, police that occurrence. When the arrived on Emil and transported hospitals. Budrani were to different pro- Both were nounced dead a time short later. Appellant against Montgom- Muthukumarana abandoned her claim ery County in pursued the Circuit Court and has not or briefed the issue Therefore, Montgomery County’s liability appeal. direct we limit scope our Appellee review to the liability. Woodward’s Appellant because Woodward and existed between ship” immediately by triggered doctrine [wa]s “Good Samaritan alternative, In undertaking to assist” her.14 Woodward’s relationship existed asserted Muthukumarana County “Montgomery and herself because between Woodward persons in by acting protect to assist and affirmatively acted “affir system,” and the 911 danger by implementing imminent her ... by providing ... matively encouraged to call [her] ... context orders parte an instruction sheet ex with addition, Appel violence incident.” previous of a domestic “affirmatively by asking acted lant maintained that Woodward throughout ask questions that she chose to specific and on ...” “relied on that assistance” phone call and that she believ[ing] had “reasonably she questions,” “those affirmative Finally, get help.” Muthuku questions to those respond government was “a mere argued marana that Woodward therefore, and, “not official,” was public not “a employee,” immunity.” any official public entitled to hand, Woodward, argued that the Good Samar- on the other addition, In she maintained apply. itan doctrine should not did, not what [she] the should “look at what trial court Ac- County enacting system.” Montgomery did summary judg- cording argument, to her she was entitled relationship, and [she “there no [wa]s ment because Muthukumarana].” not liable to [Appellant wa]s invoke the Appellant Petitioner Fried 14. Both Muthukumarana and arguments to That doctrine in their this Court. Samaritan Good Torts, § on provides, expressed in 323 of the Restatement of doctrine rely: which both Muthukumarana and Fried consideration, undertakes, gratuitously to render One who or necessary for recognize as services to another which he should subject liability person things, to the protection of the or other's resulting reason- physical harm from his failure to exercise other for perform undertaking, if able care to his harm, (a) the risk of such failure to exercise such care increases his (b) upon reliance the harm is suffered because of other's undertaking. See, (1965). § Part IV.B. (Second) Restatement Of Torts infra (discussing applicability doctrine of the Good Samaritan duties). employees performance their in the actions of February On 9 granted Circuit Court Woodward’s summary motion for judgment. its order and opinion, the Circuit held that Court Woodward was “a official and qualified immunity therefore entitled to liability.” from tort The Circuit Court also concluded that Woodward had not a ‘special relationship’ “created Appellant with” Muthukumar- ana “absolutely because there was no action affirmative upon Woodward which [she] relied that would create liabili- ty inducing special relationship.” agreed While court — “that the circumstances leading to this of action cause [we]re incredibly and soul tragic wrenching, it c[ould] not find that Woodward, in performance operator, her duties as a 911 any incurred legal liability for tragedy.” th[e] n Appellant Muthukumarana an appeal then filed in the Court Special Appeals. On 12 October we issued writ of certiorari on our own motion while the was pending case in the Special Appeals Court scope order consider the possible duties liability and the tort of Woodward.15 14On January granted we the motion of governmen- numerous tal an entities associations to file amicus brief on behalf of Appellee.16 Appellant presents following questions Muthukumarana ap- peal: law, 1. ruling, Whether the Circuit Court in erred as a of matter that public PSA Woodward qualified was official and thus entitled immunity. 2. manner, failing any Whether the Circuit Court recognize, erred in in application of the Good Samaritan doctrine this case. law, 3. ruling, Whether the in Circuit Court erred of as a matter special relationship arising no existed of out certain affirmative acts by taken upon PSA Woodward Appellant which relied to her detri- ment, any qualified which immunity would waive Woodward to any immunity extent such exists. Part our questions See I.C. for consolidation of presented infra

both cases. joint by A County amicus brief was filed 16. Commissioners for Allegany County, County, Mayor Anne City Arundel and Council of Baltimore, County, County Baltimore Commissioners for Calvert Coun- County ty, County, County Commissioners for Carroll Commissioners County, County, for Charles County Howard Commissioners for Kent County, Mayor City City, George’s County, and Council of Ocean Prince

C. fluidity, and reada- organization, In an to enhance effort rephrase and opinion, shall consolidate bility of this we presented in Fried and Muthukumara- overlapping questions unique in each case. issues na separately and address the our the basis of consider- following will form questions The ation: Appeals in Fried was Special Court of

1. Whether the law, boys determine, if as a matter permitted for promise of assistance Respondent Archer’s “relied” special relationship test. satisfying purposes in Muthukumarana denied 2. Whether the Circuit Court right process due procedural her Appellant Muthukumarana 311(f) by ruling Appellee Maryland under Rule 2— to qualified entitled official and thus Woodward was immunity. operators threshold dispatchers,

3. Whether immunity. public official matter, may common law assert applies doctrine to actions 4. Whether the Good Samaritan in handling emer- operators dispatchers taken gency employment. calls in the course their in Fried and the Special Appeals the Court of Whether County in Muthukumarana Montgomery for Circuit Court relationship test 911 em- applying erred manag- specifically operators, dispatchers, ployees, ers, determining employees that the subsequently special relationship special duty had with or question no individual victims. owed to the Standard(s) of

II. Review standard(s) review, our we must first To delineate special relationship that a address whether the determination Queen County County County, Anne's Commission- Commissioners for County Washington County, County, Commissioners Wicomico ers Fighters, County, Inter- Association Fire for Worcester International Association, Maryland Chiefs of Police Municipal Lawyers national Association, Association, Inc., Maryland Inc. Sheriffs individuals, thereby tort, exists between two creating duty a question is a of fact or law Assuming these cases. application test relationship employees to 911 is appropriate, see Part (discussing IV.C. applicability infra test), of special relationship both Petitioner Fried and Appellant Muthukumarana argue that the lower courts erred in determining a special relationship whether existed between employees Specifically, they and the victims. maintain that such questions determinations were of fact and should fact, have been left to the trier of rather than as decided cases, matter of law. Under the of circumstances these we disagree. 62, Holfeldt, 67, 698, Liberto v. 221 Md. 155 A.2d

(1959), recognized we “when facts are not disputed is certain that reasonable minds could draw but one facts,” from inference such the issues of and causation “may be as a of resolved matter law.” See also Dersookian v. Helmick, 627, 631, (1970) 472, 256 Md. 261 A.2d (quoting Liberto). recently We reaffirmed this notion in Valentine v. Inc., Target, On 353 Md. (1999), 727 A.2d 947 that, explained “[generally, adequate whether is proof there required elements needed to negligence succeed question action is a by finder; fact to be determined fact but, the legal duty existence question [a] is law be Valentine, by decided the court.” 353 Md. A.2d at State, 706, 716, 949. See also Bobo v. 346 Md. (“The (1997) a duty existence of is a matter law to be and, therefore,

determined the court is an appropriate dismissal.”). issue to disposed be of on motion This reasoning applicable to the cases at hand. us,

In both cases disputes before there no as are the material facts.17 The conversation between Archer and W., Donte as well as the conversation between Woodward and 473-74, explain, pages 17. We why shall both are appropri- cases infra grants summary ate to review judgment, though even in Fried a motion to dismiss for purportedly failure state cause of action was dispositive procedural vehicle used.

473 tran- Muthukumarana, each recorded were Appellant of the mo- considerations circuit courts’ prior to the scribed do not Muthukumarana Appellant tions. Fried Petitioner than accurate transcriptions are other allege that their of sequence events they dispute the complete, nor do in the papers and court police in the cases as reflected therefore, holdings, prior with our records. Consistent existed be- relationship a special of determinations whether in Fried and Muthu- victims employees 911 and the tween the questions appropriately considered below kumarana were of law. Muthukumarana, we have of

Regarding our review summary a of a motion reviewing grant that in explained judgment, dispute with whether “most often concerned

we are 227, 221, 366 Md. Jung, v. Lippert material fact exists.” (2001). 206, dispute is no there 783 A.2d 209 Where fact, however, has stated material this Court “ summary judgment a grant ‘standard of review for ” (quoting legally [Id.] trial court was correct.’ whether the Balt., Inc., 185, 204, 343 Md. 680 v. Hosp. Goodwich Sinai 1067, (1996)). [County Comm’rs also A.2d See Sons, Inc., 358 County J. Roland Dashiell & v.] Caroline (“ (2000) [83], 94, [600], reviewing ‘In 747 A.2d 606 [ ] Md. responsibili is our summary judgment, propriety any perti issue of fact ty to whether there was determine not, law and, if the substantive ruling to the whether nent Thus, summary upheld, to be correctly applied.... was scrutiny on both its must withstand judgment under review ”) Bloomgarden v. legal (quoting factual and foundations.’ (alteration (D.C.Cir.1973)) 201, 479 F.2d 206-07 Coyer, legal trial court’s conclusions original). We review the v. How de novo. Matthews rendering summary judgment (2000) ell, [152,] 162, [69,] 74 [ ]. Md. Underwood, 160, 171, Md. v.

Md. the Env’t Dep’t of omitted). (2002) (some In Mu citations A.2d 1136-37 thukumarana, the materi- genuine disputes as to there are no facts, 472; therefore, al supra page see our is limited review legally whether the Circuit Court was correct in granting Appellee Woodward’s motion for summary judgment. Fried, Petitioner Fried contests the Circuit Court’s

grant of Respondents’ motion to dismiss. “reviewing When motion to dismiss for claim, failure to state trial and appellate courts must assume truth of well-pleaded, all relevant, and material facts in complaint any reason able inferences can be drawn therefrom.” Allied Inv. Jasen, Corp. & Allied v. Venture P’ship 354 Md. (1999) Bobo, (citing

A.2d 346 Md. at 697 A.2d at 1372). 2-322(c), however, if, Under Md. Rule on a motion to claim, dismiss for failure to state “matters outside the [complaint] presented are to and not excluded the [trial] court, the motion shall be as for summary judg treated one ” ment .... See Ctr., Inc., also Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. 772, 782, Md.App. (1992) (quoting Md. 2-322(e)). Rule

In 2-322(c), the context of Md. Rule our review of the record in Fried reveals that “matters outside [complaint]” presented were to the Circuit Court which the trial court judge did not Specifically, Fried, exclude. Petitioner subse quent to hearing dismiss, on the motion to prior but to the filing issuance and opinion order, Circuit Court’s and a supplemental filed memorandum in support position of her included, exhibits, as sections Deputy of Thomas’s testi in mony juvenile one of the proceedings (including portions of Archer) his transmissions with of transcript the tele phone conversation between Donte W. and The Archer. trial judge explicitly did not any of exclude these additional materi als. 2-322(c),

Pursuant to Md. Rule the trial judge’s failure to exclude the additional facts operated transmute the motion to dismiss into consideration a motion summary for judg- (“If ment. id. See the court does exclude the outside matters, ... the rule mandates motion ‘the shall be ....’”) summary (citation treated as one for judgment omit- trial court’s ted) (alteration To construe original). in as upon Fried surprise no or unfairness thusly works action the informa- that the court consider she, intending presumably of, beyond allegations tion, matters introduced factual from, There- complaint. her inferences drawable reasonable applicable of review in Fried fore, standard apply will we summary set judgment, a motion reviewing grant of Muthukumarana, there As supra pages 472-74. forth at Fried, facts in so as to disputes no the material genuine are legally was the Circuit Court is limited to whether our review granting the motion. correct

III. Procedural Issues

A. Issue 1—Fried Appeals wrongfully Special argues that the Court Fried W., F., Ricky W. “relied” Eric whether Donte determined conduct, special relationship applicable on Archer’s test, issue[ ] jury th[at] should have determined because “a ... looking addition, that “instead of contends fact.” Fried ... cause action complaint determine whether Special Appeals alleged,” the Court properly had been rulings on matters erroneously upon itself to make “took to under a motion dismiss.” “authority fact” its and exceeded fail. reasons, arguments shall following both of these For the 471-73, no there is supra pages where As noted at we facts, it for a proper is as to the material genuine dispute law, special relation- decide, as a matter whether court to law, as matter of requires a court infer ship exists. It facts, alleged the material whether from uncontroverted the recognize as law is prepared is the reliance one test. relationship the application special trigger sufficient alleges, is not based, as Fried That determination Petitioner Therefore, if we assume fact-finding this judicial on case. appropriate, was relationship test application the IV.C., dispute no see there was Part because infra Fried, proper for the trial and interme- facts in it was material law, determine, as a matter courts to appellate diate a special relationship whether Respondent existed between Valentine, Tiffany. 549, Archer and See 353 Md. at 727 A.2d (“[T]he at 949 a legal duty question existence of of law to be court.”). by decided

Likewise, do accept we not Petitioner Fried’s contention Special Court of Appeals improperly exceeded its judicial authority by relying beyond on factual sources original complaint explaining its judgment. Pursuant 474-75, our court, discussion at supra pages trial in opting not to “the [complaint]” presented exclude matters outside the Archer, Petitioner Fried and treated the motion to dismiss 322(c). summary as a judgment. motion for Md. Rule 2 - Therefore, on appeal, Special Court of Appeals was required to limit itself original pleading to the in its consider Brown, 70, 79, ation of the case. See Ashton v. 339 Md. (1995) (“In A.2d reviewing grant summary judgment, this Court must consider the facts reflected in the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories answers to and affida vits in light most non-moving plaintiffs favorable ----”) Balt., (quoting 662, 677, v. Mayor Clea 312 Md. (1988)). A.2d See v. also Grimes Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 29, 73, (2001) 366 Md. (quoting Ashton).

B. Issue 2—Muthukumarana Appellant Muthukumarana maintains the Circuit Court her “procedural process right frustrated due to be heard the issue Woodward’s official status” under Md. Rule 311(f).18Specifically, Muthukumarana contends the Circuit 2— Maryland 2-311(f) provides: Rule motion, hearing party desiring A on a other than a motion filed (Motion

pursuant judgment to Rule 2-532 notwithstanding [ for tire verdict) ], (Motion trial) ], (Motion [ 2-533 for new or 2-534 [ to alter ], judgment) or request amend a response shall so in the motion heading "Request Hearing.” under Except when a rule expressly provides hearing, for a the court shall determine in each held, hearing may case whether a will be but it not render decision dispositive hearing that is of a or claim defense without a if one was requested provided in this section. public was entitled ruling in that Woodward Court erred argue” she was “did not immunity because Woodward official “summary motion judgment immunity her entitled such summary judgment “at support” or memorandum hand, Woodward, maintains that Mu- on the hearing.” other 2-311(f) as Rule on “mistakenly M[d.] thukumarana relies and asserts argument” due procedural process for support her a court authority prohibits that pointed to no that she “has grounds summary judgment on disposing of claims on from party proposed.” moving than those that the other tarry long argument. this necessary It not us to is for ... right to be that she was “denied her maintaining While status, official public Woodward’s on the issue of heard” concurrently acknowledges that she raised Muthukumarana that summary judgment to the motion opposition her immunity, even public entitled to official Woodward was not had not it. As Muthukumarana though Woodward asserted argument, and at oral explained, [she] her brief “[i]n both official.” public was not a plainly asserted that Woodward of a amount a denial fail to how these circumstances We see Despite Wood- “procedural right due to be heard.” process immu- public official failure to mention the doctrine ward’s summary judgment, Muthukumarana nity in her motion for argued Appellant the issue. Muthu- obviously anticipated immunity public official before injected kumarana issue the Circuit Court.20 summary judgment, Appellant opposition her to the motion for (Ms. Montgom- Appellees Woodward and Muthukumarana stated that (nor Kelley they) is ery County) "have asserted can that Woodward not negli- any immunity [Appellant’s] claim of entitled to individual from gence.” Appellees could not also maintained Muthukumarana Kelley immunity "satisfy” prong test Wood- “first because hearing public argument at the on the is official.” In oral ward not argued judgment, "Kel- summary Muthukumarana likewise motion for official; any public ley public is not a she is entitled Woodward Woodward, case, any immunity. Kelley just like . . . in our is official government employee. mere She is not other civilian. She immunity.” public official entitled erroneously

20. Even we the Circuit Court acted had concluded any may reaching question immunity, official error 478

IV. generally We now shall address the overlapping questions presented in Fried and Muthukumarana regarding whether employees, specifically operators, dispatchers, manag- and ers, special duty owe a persons tort to in need of their services, may and whether employees those held be liable for negligent performance of their duties. Our review the remaining whole, three issues will address as a than rather individually, arguments cases, issues relevant both as forth set below. Individual application our conclusions to each case hand will follow that review.

A. Public Immunity Official Petitioner Fried and Appellant Muthukumarana maintain operators that 911 and dispatchers not public are entitled to official immunity. According Muthukumarana, the Circuit erred, Court in concluding that Woodward was entitled to public official immunity because Woodward not “satisfy does the prerequisite public a being official” and was “not performing a ‘discretionary required act’ ... public as to claim immunity.” manner, official In like Fried asserts that Archer official, was “not a governmental merely employee, but an but, was not performing discretionary rather, merely a ministerial act.”

Woodward contends that because the Circuit Court “found that did not have a special [she] relationship with [Appellant] Muthukumarana,” the determination as to whether the Circuit Court in holding “erred that public was a official [she] entitled qualified immunity not dispositive [wa]s appeal.” [her] argument Archer cotmters Fried’s and maintains that “the dispatch constitute, have immunity occurred issue would greatest, at the light disposition mere error harmless of our on the " issue, And, merits of long see Part IV.A. ‘it has been settled infra ” policy of this not to [C]ourt reverse for harmless error.’ Beahm v. Shortall, 321, 330, (1977) 279 Md. (quoting 368 A.2d 574, 588, Higgins Simpson, Johnson & v. 163 Md. 163 A. (1933)). Hatcher, 507, 537, also See Benik v. 358 Md. (2000) ("It judgment is well settled civil not will be reversed the complaining party unless prejudice.”). shows both error and and that “[a]s as a official” police dispatcher qualifies employ- scope within the her exercising discretion was [she] immunity a matter law.” ment, official enjoyed public she reasons, agree Petitioner we with following For and conclude that Muthukumarana Appellant Fried facts, are entitled dispatchers, on these operators law, actor immunity. government common public official At for his or her immunity liability from enjoy qualified will (1) public a official rather he ‘is “non-malicious acts where: (2) his employee agent; and government a than mere performing he was discretion tortious conduct occurred while ministerial, his official acts in ary, opposed furtherance ” Ashburn, 622, (quoting at 1081 306 Md. at 510 A.2d duties.’ 315, 323, 418 A.2d George’s County, v. Prince 288 Md. James (1980)) omitted). 1173, Lovelace v. (emphasis See also 1178 726, (2001) Anderson, 690, (quoting 704, 734 366 Md. 785 A.2d “ James). is a it is the individual ‘Once established performing a public official and the tort was committed while discretion, qualified a duty which involves the exercise of malice, immunity attaches; absence of namely, ” Lovelace, 366 liability.’ free from Md. individual involved is James). 705, (quoting 785 A.2d at 734 at James, guidelines In we be used in enumerated official, public including an is a determining whether individual whether:

(i) continuing The and involves position was created law not and occasional duties.

(ii) duty. important public an performs The holder (iii) position portion calls for the of some The exercise sovereign power of the State. (iv) for a position has a definite which commission The term required. an oath are is issued and bond and James, 324, (citing 1178 Md. at 418 A.2d at Duncan v. 288 (1970)). 98, 547, Koustenis, 105, 260 Md. Addi- guidelines, to the tionally, exceptions there at least two are tests, and “where an individual fails to meet most the above yet public official,” is nevertheless considered to be which portion include individuals who ‘a large “those exercise ” sovereign power government,’ and individuals “those who can be on to police powers called exercise as conservators of Duncan, (citation peace.” 260 Md. at at A.2d omitted) James, omitted). See also (emphasis 288 Md. 324- Duncan). (quoting 418 A.2d at 1178-79

Pursuant to our standards for determining whether an individual is a immunity, official entitled to it is apparent operators dispatchers that 911 qualify do not that protection. Although agree that operators we dispatchers perform important public duty, an they fail to satisfy most of the requirements “public for classification as a Specifically, official.” their positions by law,” are not “created do not “call for ... sovereign the exercise of power State,” do not “have a term definite for which commission is James, issued,” “require” not do “bond and an oath.” 288 Md. at 418 A.2d at 1178. addition, operators dispatchers do fall

within exceptions guidelines, either of the two to the where an individual is to public “nevertheless considered be a official.” Duncan, atMd. 271 A.2d at 551. exception, The first which requires that an large individual “exercise ‘a portion of ” sovereign power government,’ contemplates someone (cita legislative “in a capacity.” Id. serving policymaking or omitted). Duncan, tion we public held that a school did teacher not meet the terms of that exception because he regulations not make “d[id] rules and or county determine Id. policy.” rationale, educational opera Under the same dispatchers tors and because, cannot invoke that exception by duties, execute, the nature of their they than rather determine adopt, governmental and policy. exception,

The second applicable to those who “can be called on to police powers exercise peace,” as conservators of the also operators does not to Id. dispatchers. extend and Again Duncan, in compared teacher, a public we school did who not sheriff, to a who did meet the exception, meet the second exception, and noted a police nature of authority distinction between

subtle The former is authority used a teacher. and the power public it subject to to for the opposition those exercised to benefit is as a service whereas the latter exercised good to the subject to it while also directed immediately those public ultimate welfare. “authority

Duncan, Any at 271 A.2d at 551. Md. right,” in his we might to own teacher be considered exercise police power.” nature of “would not be explained, Duncan, Similarly, the acts 260 Md. 271 A.2d at 551. to benefit dispatcher providing a service operator a 911 satisfy not public welfare also do an individual caller emergency is not an handling an call exception. The subject to for the power “in to those opposition exercise of Duncan, 107, 271 at 551. 260 Md. at A.2d public good.” Rather, of those in power it is for the benefit an exercise need 911 services. dispatchers are not operators

Because we find James, officials,” it is “public contemplated in Duncan and as particular necessary question acts us examine performed they discretionary determine whether were of 911 official The initial failure scope within the duties. pre- dispatchers qualify public officials operators and immunity at com- enjoying from official vents them mon law.21

B. Doctrine Good Samaritan contend Appellant Petitioner Fried and Muthukumarana doctrine, subjects an individual Good which Samaritan care in liability for his or her reasonable failure exercise another, applicable to the rendering protective services in the course of operators dispatchers actions of 911 taken liability in scope Respondent Terrell’s 21. Because we delimit ihe V.A., necessary to determine here Parts IV.C. it is not for us infra immunity. he is to common law official whether entitled performing their employment According duties. Fried, Respondent perform paid Archer “was her functions as an emergency dispatch operator,” “failed to exercise reasonable duties, and, care performing” her as a result her failure care, to exercise reasonable should be liable for the “increased the risk of harm” Tiffany “by she caused to beginning to assist ” her, failing but to follow through.... Similarly, Muthuku- alleges Appellee marana “undertook, Woodward for con- ..., sideration to” render services Appellant and should be “subject to liability her failure exercise reasonable care where” her “failure to follow the Operating] Standard] Appellant, P[rocedure]” increased the risk harm to by where she relying “suffered harm on 911 and Woodward’s questioning.”

In response, Archer argues that a principle, different tort specifically special relationship test, is controlling in her case. Woodward also argues that “the Good doc- Samaritan trine is not the appropriate apply standard to to determine the liability of 911 operators” and cites “chilling effect” it would “on a government’s ability have to hire and retain 911 operators.” Additionally, Woodward maintains she “did not undertake to Appellant [Muthukumarana],” assist as re- quired by doctrine, Good Samaritan taking “basic information from” her.

The doctrine, Good Samaritan argued by Fried and (Second) Muthukumarana from the Restatement Torts, provides:

§ Negligent of Undertaking Performance to Render Services. undertakes, who

One gratuitously consideration, or for render services to another which he should recognize as necessary protection for the person or things, other’s subject liability to the for physical other harm resulting from his failure to perform exercise reasonable care to his undertaking, if

(a) his failure to such exercise care increases the risk of harm, such

483 (b) of the other’s reliance is because harm suffered undertaking.22 upon the (1965). Even assum- § 323 (Second) Torts Of

Restatement recognizes analysis, Maryland of this ing, purposes for in Re- doctrine as framed law Samaritan common Good statement, apply not here. would undertakes, 323, who § to an individual

Pursuant consideration,” protective ser for render “gratuitously or liability his her subject for or may be vices to another doing Petitioner care so. reasonable failure exercise interpret us Muthukumarana would have Appellant Fried and salary paid including the clause “for consideration” thereby employers, dispatchers their operators and 911 for actions taken employees on 911 liability those imposing Drawing employment their duties. performing of the course analogous meaning of an interpretation our prior immunity Maryland’s Good Samaritan term in the context statutes,23 to do so. we decline (b) in her from the Restatement did include subsection

22. Fried not argument. immunity immunity provide statutes Maryland’s Good Samaritan liability arising general under the and entities for certain individuals See, (1974, e.g., doctrine. Md.Code principles of the Good Samaritan Art., (“Emer- Proceedings § 5-603 Repl.Vol.), and Judicial 1998 Courts care’’); (“Fire § companies”); § 5- gency and rescue medical 5-604 (“Law acting jurisdiction”); § 5-607 outside 605 enforcement officer ("Volunteer (“Emergency § veteri- sports program physicians”); 5-614 assistance”). nary Appellant the existence Muthukumarana seize on Petitioner Fried argue Samaritan doctrine should statutes and Good these dispatchers Legislature “chose apply operators because the to 911 note, however, regard.” We immunize 911 call takers this any legislative history provide for or Muthukumarana that neither Fried any attempt such a statute or for to extend enacted Good Samaritan if support position. Even there were personnel 911 this statute to specific on a proposals, "the fact that bill evidence of such failed Assembly reed subject passage in the General rather weak fails of intent,” ascertaining legislative Auto. Trade upon lean in which to State, 24, 15, of Md., Md. Inc. v. Ins. Comm’r Assoc. (1981), solely "legislative from intent cannot be inferred ” Comptroller Treasury, v. Income Tax a bill .... NCR failure of Div., 118, 126, (1988). A.2d 313 Md. (1974, Maryland Repl.Vol.), Under Code Courts Article, 5-603, Proceedings § Judicial certain emergency med providers ical civilly care are “not act any liable or care, in giving any if,” omission assistance or medical in part, provided assistance or medical care is “[t]he without fee ” added.). .... compensation (Emphasis Gigliot Tatum v. ti, (1991), 321 Md. 583 A.2d 1062 interpreted we Act, language of an earlier version Good Samaritan 43, 132(a) (recodified specifically (1981), § Md.Code Art. as (1974, Repl.Vol.), 1998 Md.Code Courts and Judicial Proceed Art., 5-603), ings § provided which immunity certain indi aid, rendering care, viduals or “medical for assistance which charges he no compensation.”24 fee or In so doing, we affirmed judgment Special of the Court of Appeals, Tatum 559, (1989), v. Gigliotti, Md.App. 80 565 A.2d aff'd, 354 321 623, (1991), Md. 583 A.2d 1062 and held that a salaried emergency operating medical technician scope within his duties immunity provided was entitled in the statute. Special Appeals explained, As the Court of personnel “salaried do not ‘compensation’ receive within the meaning this Tatum, 568, Md.App. section.” 80 at at A.2d 358. “consideration,” Although § as used in 323 of the Restatement, 5-603, “compensation,” § as used in are not terms, they identical are recognized as generally synonyms of each Accordingly, other.25 it is appropriate for us to extend holding salary our not compen does constitute a “fee or § sation” under 5-603 to an interpretation “for consider § ation” under Specifically, Restatement. under § imposition liability on an individual for his or her (1974, slight statutory 24. language difference in The between Md.Code Art, 5-603, Repl.Vol.), Proceedings Courts and Judicial § as (1981), today, codified former its codification as Md.Code Art. 132(a), § not interpretation "compensation” has altered our in 623, 629, Gigliotti, (1991). v. Tatum 321 Md. 25. "Consideration” is defined "[r]ecompense” "payment.” as Web- (9th ed.1989). Collegiate “Compensation,” Dictionary Ninth ster's New similarly, "something means recompense” that constitutes ... or a "payment.” Id. not another does undertaking to services to negligent render or operator a 911 non-voluntary actions taken include the A 911 employment. in of his or her dispatcher the course from his or salary generally receives operator dispatcher That of assistance. person in need employer, her not from within the mean- as “consideration” payment qualify would Therefore, common law Good Samaritan ing §of case, doctrine, applica- in this would not be argued least dispatchers taken operators ble the actions of 911 duties. employment of performing the course their Relationship Special C. Appellant Muthukumarana

Finally, Fried and Petitioner Special and the Circuit Court argue Appeals Court of County, applying erred Montgomery respectively, or, in the special relationship employees test alterna- tive, determining question had employees that the erred individual special relationship duty no with or owed Specifically, Spe- maintains that the victims. Fried Court “erroneously that a tort owed Appeals cial determined telephone to a victim is emergency dispatch operator from an According to governed by relationship’ rule.” ‘special Fried, a “special applicable only public a relationship ...,” Respondents public duty official under the doctrine and Likewise, employees. Archer and Muthuku- Terrell are mere doctrine, not the marana that the Good Samaritan contends test, relationship applied operators to 911 special should be duty a imposed and that doctrine “the Good Samaritan may a any duty from lie under (separate Woodward in a special relationship) to act reasonable manner toward Plaintiff.” Archer, Woodward, acknowl- parts,

For their and Terrell public a generally duty owe to the edge employees that 911 however, only large. According Appellee Respondents, specific if an “assurances that induce employee such makes citizen, a by he or [does she] create[ ] reliance duty relationship extending general public citizen with the in specific private duty owed to a tort.” reasons, following For agree we with Appellee that, Respondents absent a special relationship a between employee services, an individual in need of emergency employee an does not such an private duty owe individual a in tort. To maintain an action in negligence, plaintiff a must “ ‘(1) following assert the elements: that the defendant was (2) a duty protect plaintiff under injury, from that the (8) duty, plaintiff defendant breached that that the suffered loss, (4) actual or injury injury that the proximate loss ly resulted from the duty.’ defendant’s breach Valen tine, 549, Lane, Md. at 727 A.2d at (quoting & E v. BG 34, 43, 307, (1995) 338 Md. 656 A.2d (citing Rosenblatt v. Exxon, 58, 76, 180, (1994))). 335 Md. “Duty” negligence “has ‘an obligation, been defined as to which the effect, give law will recognition and particular conform to a ” Ashburn, standard of conduct toward another.’ 306 Md. at (citation omitted). 510 A.2d at 1083 The existence “a legally recognized duty by owed th[e] defendant to th[e] plaintiff or to a class of persons plaintiff which is a th[e] sustaining member is vital to a cause of action negligence.” Valentine, Ashburn, 353 Md. at 727 A.2d at 949. See also 306 Md. at 510 A.2d at 1083 (“[Njegligence is a breach of duty one, to' duty, owed and absent that can be there no consideration, negligence.”). therefore, Our begins with a determination of employees whether 911 legally recog owe a duty tort nized to individuals in need their assistance. cases, previous scope we have defined the duty by the tort police persons owed officers to need assistance applying “public duty Generally, doctrine.” public duty doctrine, under the when a statute or common law “imposes upon public entity duty to the at large, and duty particular individuals, to a class of is not one enforceable tort.” Dan B. The Law Of Torts Dobbs, (footnote (2000) omitted). § 271 explained Ashburn, As we “duty by the owed the police by positions of virtue their duty protect Ashburn, officers is a to public.” 306 Md. at 628, doctrine, 510 A.2d at therefore, 1084. Pursuant to the police ordinarily may officers be not held liable failure to

487 first duty, owe no as the persons they because protect specific requires, to those individuals.26 action negligence of a element doctrine, however, is without public duty The application it no when the Specifically, limitations. “has its has created a or court order concludes that statute court class to a special duty obligation particular or specific large.” Dobbs, supra, persons than at rather added). explained, is “noth § As we have this (emphasis 271 principle that application ing more than modified duty in to act although negligence there is no terms generally indeed any particular person, when one does for the benefit another, in a he must act reasonable act for the benefit Ashburn, 631, (citing at 306 at 510 A.2d 1085 manner.” Md. Watson, 548, (1976); Scott v. 160, 170-71, Md. A.2d 169, 129 A. 36 v. Pennsylvania Yingling, R.R. Co. 148 Md. (1925)). Therefore, plaintiff ... is not without proper “[a] that alleges If he facts to show recourse. sufficient public duty recog- application police officers 26. The of the doctrine to nizes activity [police] act react in the milieu of criminal officials who every personnel fraught deploy where law enforcement decision uncertainty proceed without fear with must have broad discretion to liability “unflinching discharge . . . duties.” [I]f of civil in the their by police duty member were held to enforceable each individual real, every complaint imagined, public, then —whether liability for spectre would raise the of civil failure re- frivolous spond. and evaluate each Rather than exercise reasoned discretion particular allegation police may well on its own merits the be hasty solely pressured the threat of to make arrests eliminate putative personal prosecution victim. 629, 1078, County, 306 Md. 510 A.2d Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Columbia, (1986) Morgan (quoting v. District of (citations (alteration (D.C.1983) omitted)) original). Furthermore, acknowledges policy places on a that “a which safety community police olficer to of each member of the insure Ashburn, unnecessary judicial system.” would create an burden Md. 510 A.2d at 1084. As the District of Columbia Court of application public duty police Appeals explained, of the doctrine to "juries judge recognizes ill-equipped are officers courts legislative-executive particular decisions' as to how commu 'considered protect nity be should or should have been allocated resources (cita public.” Morgan, individual 468 A.2d at 1311 members omitted). tions 488 policeman

defendant created a ‘special relationship’ with him upon relied, may which he he maintain his action in negligence.” urn, 630-31, 306 Md. at 510 A.2d at 1085 Ashb (footnote omitted). and citation In order for a special rela police found, tionship between officer and an individual to be however, required we that Ashbum it “be shown that local government or police affirmatively officer acted protect specific victim or specific group individuals like victim, thereby inducing specific the victim’s reliance upon police protection.”27 Ashburn, 631, 306 atMd. 510 A.2d (citations omitted). our

Although opinion in applica Ashburn involves the public duty tion of the police officers, doctrine to it does not limit application of principle to police officers alone prevent otherwise our consideration it in the context of 911 employees. A personnel review of the of 911 duties reveals personnel that 911 play significant role in coordinating, facilitating, effectuating adequate emergency service re sponses. explained,28 As the amicus brief Supreme Washington applies 27. The slightly Court of different factors exists, determining relationship provided whether a but has description special relationship general. useful of the test In Bab- 6, County cock v. Mason Fire Dist. No. Wash.2d 30 P.3d 1261 " (2001), explained special relationship exception ‘[t]he [to the public duty ‘focusing doctrine] is a tool’ used to determine whether a government [entity] local general duty public ‘is under a to a nebulous ” Babcock, or whether that has focused on the claimant.’ 30 P.3d Taylor (quoting County, at 1268 v. Stevens 111 Wash.2d 759 P.2d (1988) (citation omitted)). presented 28. The information quoted the amicus brief and here gleanable record, undisputed otherwise from sources within the includ- ing Appellee deposition testimony Woodward’s delineating the duties Montgomery County describing aide in services the Coun- ty's Emergency system, Montgomery Communication Center Coun- ty call, responding SOP for a call taker ato domestic violence Deputy testimony, juvenile proceedings, Thomas’s in one regard- of the ing Respondent his communications with Archer as a result of Donte W.'s We provides call. borrow here from the amicus brief because it explanation general concise and coherent employ- duties of 911 ees and the of 911 nature services as a whole. emergency personnel provide is not to job of 911 [t]he needs, or for someone for himself the caller services that appropriate resources. else, response of but to facilitate the together lumped Although personnel are sometimes matter, operational an operators, as referred communica- emergency in 911 and other personnel centers act as call some perform specific tasks: personnel tions callers; others, and to as fire takers, directly speak who relay the who dispatchers police dispatchers, or rescue still safety personnel; and public to message appropriate supervise operations, center others, supervisors, as who call-taking or dis- personnel, perform and even train 911 require. call volume staffing functions as and patch job primary call taker’s emergency communications [T]he to enough emergency about the is to find out from the caller safety response, and appropriate public the call classify of the caller.... verify to the name address classify to do more than But call takers are often asked emergency to call help. applicable calls send Protocols encourage operator stay to jurisdictions in some takers line, already personnel after have been emergency on the may dispatched, get to to information try additional response may responder affect the of or that assist the level they and deal with the situation when arrive. understand protocols designed internal are determine whether Other police, anything may the caller need to do before there is personnel emergency fire or medical arrive. Brief, at Montgomery County,

Amicus Muthukumarana v. 8- (filed 2002). January of 11 14 Based on the nature his her duties, agree dispatcher’s work is police “[a] we necessari ly emergency ultimate integral an link in the chain of services Fried, ly officers.” 139 by responding police delivered 257, Therefore, Md.App. while we do not at 775 A.2d at 446. duties or suggest operators dispatchers that 911 have officers, police we responsibilities commensurate with those of 490 with

agree Special Appeals the Court of that “it appropriate is negligence liability, liability to measure” their as the well managers supervisors, their “by ap- the same standard plied police respond dispatches.” to the officers who their legal duty Id. Pursuant to that holding, owed employees “by position, virtue of their public duty [also] Id. aid.”29 officers, police

As significant policy with concerns motivate application duty our personnel. doctrine “ Special Appeals Fried, As the Court of explained ‘[f]or the proclaim protection courts to and general new in the tort, may law particular even those who be the seekers protection hazards, on specific based could and would inevita bly police determine how the limited resources of the commu ” nity predictable should be allocated and without limits.’ Fried, 258, Md.App. (quoting 775 A.2d at 447 Riss v. York, City New N.Y.2d 293 N.Y.S.2d (1968)). N.E.2d By applying public duty doctrine personnel, prevent to 911 we are able to “that general new and duty of protection” resulting from “in public the reduction of safety services, including emergency response programs and personnel, to community.” Id. See also Wanzer v. District Columbia, (“If 127, (D.C.1990) 132 it were other of wise, city then the would potentially be for ‘every liable omission, oversight, or blunder’ of its official—a liability which potentially could so deplete resources necessary provide police protection, protection, fire and ambulance as to service result in the of altogether.”). elimination those services addition,

In holding recognizes our the fact that when involved, emergency services are “the circumstances are often jurisdictions A29. number of apply outside of this State also See, operators dispatchers. doctrine to-the actions of 911 e.g., Sacramento, 1070, City Cal.App.3d Sullivan v. Cal.Rptr. 190 235 844 of Columbia, (1987); (D.C.1990); v. Johnson District 580 A.2d 140 of Columbia, (D.C.1990); Hines v. District 580 133 A.2d v. Wanzer Columbia, (D.C.1990); Jordan, City District 580 A.2d 127 Rome v. 26, (1993); Erie, County Delong v. 263 Ga. 296, 426 S.E.2d 861 60 N.Y.2d 611, (1983); 469 Welp, N.Y.S.2d 457 N.E.2d 717 v. 145 Bratton 572, (2002). Wash.2d 39 P.3d 959

491 occur, when ... wili even demanding and some mistakes quite conscientiously adminis organized is well the service Erie, N.Y.2d County v. DeLong tered.” (1983). in As observed N.E.2d N.Y.S.2d brief, amicus telephone skills or language has with caller

[pjroblems the difficult. Cellular make communication equipment may verification difficult. often make location telephone calls communication; fre- may state affect The caller’s emotional hysteria, con- is ... near emergencies, in caller quently difficulty compre- may have with a situation that he fronted may difficulty he even more and that have hending himself provide callers explain to else. Some trying to someone cases, caller is or some incomplete false information. in, to, emergency unwilling participant an witness taker provide the call incident and reticent to information is Moreover, problem always exists requests. is exacerbated be- interpreting someone else’s statements going what on.30 call taker cannot see cause the Br., in Ashburn holding to our Amicus at 9-10. Similar “ officers, every we conclude here ‘where regarding police personnel is deploy rescue] law [or decision to enforcement “ ” ‘must have broad uncertainty,’ personnel fraught with proceed liability without fear of civil discretion to ’ ” Ashburn, Md. at discharge of their duties.’ ‘unflinching omitted). (citation York the New 629, 510 A.2d at 1084 As must be Appeals explained DeLong, “[a]llowance Court emergen demanding involved made for” the circumstances error, may services, any slight, have “although however cy provide some of the difficulties associated 30. Both cases illustrations of Muthukumarana, taking emergency Appellant's In with calls. the of quality of between the communication "emotional state" affected stating Appellee reflected in Woodward twice herself and Woodward "scream- Appellant because she was that she could "not understand” Fried, Likewise, Respondent were exacerbated ing.” in Archer's duties regarding the provision of W.'s intentional false information Donte Tiffany unwillingness provide all relevant infor- to location of his mation, including name and his location. justify it will consequences[,] always dire an award for 611, damages.” DeLong, 469 N.Y.S.2d N.E.2d duty doctrine, therefore, to public Pursuant generally in employee duty owes no tort for negligent performance of his her or duties to an individual in need of emergency telephone As we explained services. at supra however, 486-88, duty pages the special applica rule limits the bility Specifically, of if an plaintiff this doctrine. individual employee that a 911 him special establishes owed or her a duty, based on the of a special relationship existence between two, may employee found liable to the in be individual negligent performance tort for the of his her duties. delineating required the conditions special establish a individual, a 911 relationship employee between an give possible liability rise to tort order sufficient over doctrine, public duty come the have urged we been not to Ashburn, apply the police test used officers supra see 487-88, and pages adopt specific, a more categorical instead questions list or factors to guide making such decisions. A jurisdictions developed number other have such formulaic approaches determining special relationship whether a ex public employees ists between various and private individuals. instance, York, For New order establish a relationship protection defeat duty doctrine, plaintiff must demonstrate four distinct factors:

(1) assumption by an municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative to act on party behalf (2) injured; knowledge who was part on the of the munici- (3) pality’s agents harm; that inaction could lead to some form contact municipality’s direct between the agents and (4) injured party; justifiable party’s reliance on municipality’s undertaking. affirmative 232, City Grieshaber v. 279 A.D.2d Albany, 720 N.Y.S.2d (2001) 214, York, (quoting v. Cuffy City New 69 N.Y.2d 372, 937, (1987)), 513 N.Y.S.2d 505 N.E.2d appeal denied, 96 N.Y.2d 733 N.Y.S.2d 759 N.E.2d

493 Jamestown, 251, 74 N.Y.2d (2001). City Kircher v. See also of (1989) 443, (quoting Cuffy). 446 995, N.E.2d 543 544 N.Y.S.2d adopted by a explicitly been approach factor has This four (White v. Michigan including jurisdictions, of number other 1, (1996) (noting Mich.308, 4-5 552 N.W.2d 453 Beasley, one in more than adopted test “only special-relationship Appeals in Court of adopted by the New York state is the test ” police applied when that test “at least Cuffy adopting and 222, Hills, (Sawicki 37 officers”)), v. Ohio St.3d Ohio Ottawa (1988) for Cuffy “principles 468, (adopting the 478 525 N.E.2d al is special wherein a application cases Ohio 182 City Wheeling, v. Virginia (Wolfe leged”)), and West (1989) W.Va.253, 307, (adopting Cuffy 311 387 S.E.2d test)). addition, Georgia also em Supreme Court of test, require third but deletes the braces most of New York’s agent municipality’s between the ment of direct contact justifiable for and detrimental injured and calls both party Rome v. requirement. City See fourth reliance (1993). Indiana, 861, Jordan, 26, 426 S.E.2d 863 263 Ga. turn, v. City See Benton adopted Georgia’s approach. has (Ind.1999) (“[W]e 224, 12 721 N.E.2d 231 n. City, Oakland is for appropriate [Jordan ] to believe that the test continue immunity determining government qualifies a unit whether ”). emergency dispatch for failure to services.... special own jurisdictions ostensibly formulated their

Other tests, relationship adopting popular instead New York’s one, Most, however, many, if not approach. retain at least example, For York’s test. the same characteristics New heavily concept of reliance North Carolina draws that, relationship, requires special plaintiff to establish (1) police to promise show “an actual was made create (2) reasonably this was relied special duty,” promise “that (3) causally was “that this reliance [upon] by plaintiff,” by plaintiff.” Bras injury ultimately related to the suffered 363, (1991). Braswell, 897, v. well N.C. S.E.2d Similarly, relationship exception Wash invoke the (1) ington, “there some form plaintiff must show public plaintiff entity and the that differ privity between the (2) public,” “the plaintiff general from entiates (3) entity express made an plaintiff,” assurance to the “the plaintiff justifiably relied on the assurance.” Bratton v. Welp, 572, 577, (2002). 959, 145 Wash.2d 39 P.3d also See v. County Babcock Mason Fire No. Dist. 144 Wash.2d (2001). 30 P.3d In Pennsylvania, Superior Court to focus on the municipality, elected actions of the explaining that “the individual a claiming ‘special relationship’ (1) must police” demonstrate that the were of “aware (2) particular unique status,” individual’s situation “had knowledge potential particular for the harm which the (3) suffered,” “voluntarily assumed, individual light in of knowledge, protect the individual from precise harm which was Phila., occasioned.” City Melendez v. 320 of 59, 1060, 1064(1983). Pa.Super. 466 A.2d approach

The adopted by South Dakota and Minnesota places weight on legislative the existence of a mandate in deciding recognize special whether to a Specifi- relationship. “ cally, they provide that there are ‘at least four factors which ” should be in considered’ determining “governmental whether “ individuals,” (1) duty action creates a including ‘the state’s ” “ knowledge condition,’ (2) actual of dangerous ‘reason- by person able reliance on the representations state’s ” “ conduct,’ (3) ‘an ordinance or statute that sets forth mandatory clearly protection acts particular of a class ” persons of whole,’ (4) rather than as a “ by ‘failure the state to due increasing use care avoid ” risk of 7, (S.D.1999) harm.’ E.P. 604 Riley, v. N.W.2d 12-13 Park, (quoting v. 801, St. Louis 279 N.W.2d 806-07 Cracraft (Minn.1979)). Tabor, See also v. Tipton Town 538 N.W.2d of 783, (S.D.1995) 787 (adopting approach Minnesota’s Cra- craft). Supreme As the Court of explained, South Dakota “[sjtrong concerning any evidence combination of these factors may impose be sufficient to liability government on a entity.” Tipton, 538 at 787. N.W.2d

Although many jurisdictions adopted have specific, step-by- step guidelines for determining a special whether relationship exists, jurisdictions there are some which rely continue to general considerations, more we did Ashburn. In Cali- state, as through agents, voluntarily fornia, its “when the the public a member of duty toward certain protective sumes a member, thereby on behalf of that action undertakes as a reliance, to the same standard care inducing it is held State, v. organization.” Williams Cal.3d person or private 137, (1983). Likewise, Cal.Rptr. P.2d Columbia, “in order to convert a owed District duty,” must plaintiff into a a demon general public special protect particular individual specific undertaking “a strate v. Morgan justifiable plaintiff.” reliance [and ... a] (D.C.1983). Columbia, 1306, 1314 See 468 A.2d District of Columbia, 140, 142 n. 2 580 A.2d also v. District Johnson Columbia, (D.C.1990) (quoting Morgan); Hines v. District of (D.C.1990). Tennessee, there are establishing general alternative means number in Ash- including approach similar to our relationship, test provisions. statutory existence of requiring bum and one care when Specifically, special duty “a exists” Tennessee (1) “officials, actions, pro affirmatively undertake to their upon plaintiff, plaintiff relies the undertak tect the (2) provides for a of .action ing,” specifically “a cause statute to a municipality Injuries resulting or against an official individuals, of is a plaintiff of which the particular class (3) member, laws,” or “the from failure enforce certain intent, malice, involving or alleges a cause of action plaintiff Cockrell, 394, v. 902 402 misconduct.” Ezell S.W.2d reckless (Tenn.1995). acknowledge spe a formulaic

Although we that more may greater predictability, facilitate our relationship cial test requirements many special relationship review of the different choice not to adopted by jurisdictions reinforces our other regimented approach Maryland’s spe a into incorporate more “the cial We continue to believe that intent relationship test. by our ‘special relationship’ of doctrine is better addressed ” preserves in it general outlined Ashburn because standard relationship a special exists” ability our determine “whether Williams, 150, Md. A.2d “case-by-case on a basis.” 359 at 753 Therefore, incorporating personnel 911 into at 67-68. after 496 doctrine, purview of public duty we find also that the in

special relationship appropriate analyt test Ashburn is the in paradigm evaluating ical be used negligence work-related against 911 personnel. test, claims Under that in order for a special relationship between a 911 in employee person exist, need assistance must be shown that 911 affirmatively employee protect or specific acted assist the individual, a specific group individual, of individuals like the assistance, thereby need of often inducing specific Ashburn, reliance of the employee.31 individual See 306 631, atMd. 510 at A.2d 1085. Absent the existence of those factors, relationship may not be found to exist individual, between employee and a 911 employee may be held tort to an liable individual. Special Appeals

31. The Court of "specific Fried defined reliance” meaning justifiable under this test as Many “detrimental and reliance.” jurisdictions other have necessary likewise described the reliance special relationship being justifiable create detrimental. and/or See, Johnson, e.g., (requiring "justifiable 580 A.2d at 142 n. 2 reliance” Columbia); Hines, (same); in the District of Morgan, 580 A.2d at 138 (same); Jordan, 468 A.2d at 1314 426 at (requiring "justifi S.E.2d 863 Georgia); City able and detrimental reliance” in Benton v. Oakland 224, City, (Ind.1999) 721 (requiring "justifiable N.E.2d 231 n. 12 Indiana); 308, Beasley, detrimental reliance” in White v. 453 Mich. 552 1, (1996) "justifiable N.W.2d (requiring Michigan); 5 reliance” in 232, City 214, Albany, Grieshaber v. (2001) 279 A.D.2d 720 N.Y.S.2d 215 City "justifiable York); (requiring reliance” in New Kircher v. Jamestown, 251, 995, 443, 74 N.Y.2d 544 N.Y.S.2d 543 N.E.2d 446 City (1989) (same); York, 255, Cuffyv. New 69 N.Y.2d 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 937, (1987) (same); Hills, 505 N.E.2d 940 Sawicki v. Ottawa 222, 468, (1988) Ohio St.3d (requiring "justifiable 525 N.E.2d Bratton, Ohio); reliance” in 145 Wash.2d 39 P.3d at Babcock, (requiring plaintiff "justifiably rely” Washington); (same); City Wheeling, P.3d at 1268 v. 182 W.Va. Wolfe (1989) (requiring "justifiable S.E.2d Virgi reliance" in West nia). chosen, however, general We have to retain special more relationship preserve case-by-case test analytical approach to our to test, Although may these issues. reliance be a factor that under there may many be cases analysis, in which reliance is irrelevant to the such Therefore, adopting as here. "specific a limited definition of reliance” necessary present is not warranted or spite in the cases. fact we necessary interpretation that do not find it limit "specific to our reliance, justifiable reliance” recognize to detrimental and we do that others, principles, along may those provide with useful tools for assess reliance, ing necessary particular where in a case.

V. of the consolidated general analysis our Having completed cases issues, specific to apply now our conclusions we must however, addressing to task, is limited Our before us. because presented. Specifically, of the final issue part second in Special Appeals that the Court we have determined County in Mu- Montgomery Fried and the Circuit Court relationship special applying did not err thukumarana only to 1V.C., left Part we are supra to see employees, test holding that courts erred whether those determine duty relationship with or special had no employees question the individual victims. to

A. Fried negligence theory Respondent Archer’s Petitioner Fried’s to by failing duty her of care that Archer breached was W., Depu- erroneously reporting adequately question Donte Court, “K” “J” instead of ty Tiffany Thomas that was behind Court, Tiffany near failing report that was located in- Although Fried maintains in the first area.” “forested determining Special Appeals erred stance that the Court emergency dispatch telephone that tort owed from governed by the or victims is personnel individual callers rule, appears relationship in the alternative she special Respondent relationship existed between argue special that explicitly that Tiffany. she does state Archer While (in words) Archer relationship” those existed between “special on Donte W.’s “reliance Tiffany, she does assert that justifiable him affirmative statements” to was Archer’s did of the caller detrimental “reliance behalf sufficient [Tiffany].” transferred to place, take and should therefore be Terrell, negligently alleges Fried that he Respondent As to properly train employed improper procedures failed and/or Fried, relationship According had a Archer. Terrell foreseeability “improper proce- on the Tiffany with based training to those inadequate would cause “harm dures” and system.” relying on the

In reply, Respondents both that maintain there is no “alle gation of which Tiffany[’]s conduct” could have “induced spe cific Quoting reliance.” from the Court of Special Appeals opinion, they Tiffany not ‘specifically rely’ contend that “did upon promise police to send ‘Tiffany [Archer’s] assistance as help, did not call for did that so, not know the callers had done did not know that had promised out, Archer send someone stay and did not ‘choose’to outside reliance on that promise ” Fried, ....’ Md.App. at 775 A.2d at 452. addition, they argue Tiffany’s also “criminal assailants” rely did not on promise police,” “Archer’s to send and assert that we apply relationship analysis “should not the special individuals who peril.” create the

Pursuant to the standards set forth Part supra IV.C., analysis begins our in this case with a determination of whether Archer acted to protect Tiffany, specific or assist or a group of Tiffany. individuals like Fried would have us inter pret call, receipt Archer’s Donte her W.’s conversation with him regarding girl Tiffany, the unnamed that was and her dispatch system statement that the out,” would “send someone as sufficient to an constitute act part affirmative on her protect We, Tiffany. however, or assist agree with Court Special Appeals dispatcher’s a receipt “neither of a call help dispatch nor the of emergency assistance alone cre special duty ates a person need such assistance.” Fried, Md.App. 775 A.2d at 448. Morgan, See also (finding special at 1313 that a is relationship not police promise created “when the gratuitously to provide protection---- Reassuring citizen victimized criminal help conduct that way certainly does mean that at all promised inexorably costs the action follow....”); must Hines, (“[T]he 580 A.2d at 136 mere fact that an individual has emerged from general public object become an attention of employees does not create rela- tionship imposes which a special legal duty.”); Dial, Koher v. 653 N.E.2d 526 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (“Standing alone, governmental entity’s dispatch of emergency services does not a private duty.”). case, therefore, create In this where there call handling of Donte W.’s that Archer’s is no indication handling of other than her markedly was different exceeded situations, an action on shall not find we similar calls impose Tiffany sufficient or assist part protect Archer’s alleged negligent for her in Archer duty tort on special Wanzer, A.2d call. from the See handling dispatch of the enough is not to (“A help to 911 for one-time call at 132 special to a relationship.... give To rise special a establish private party must response to the agency’s relationship, the generally way response the exceed in some demonstrable hold otherwise public.”). of To to made other members protection to 911 extending our wholly would circumvent ” “ ‘unflinching of their duties’ to discharge’ personnel in the Ashburn, at 1084 Md. at 510 A.2d general public. (citation omitted). Arch

Likewise, to conclude that we also are unable handling Donte call constituted an answering of W.’s er’s group of individuals like protect specific a act to or assist (1957, Repl.Vol.), Art. Tiffany. to Pursuant Md.Code operation in 18-101-18-102, “all must “have an §§ counties” “police, fighting, and including fire system,” enhanced 911 (§§ 18-102(a), (c)), protect to ambulance emergency services” Maryland.” § of of 18- well-being the citizens safety “the 101(a).32 terms, statutory does not create this scheme By its group persons. of benefit a discrete emergency system an services, Rather, recognizes it such broad providing for of, in, times, or visitors that, any at and all citizens different system may necessary to utilize that for Maryland find view, acting protect or assist In our purposes. innumerable individuals,” special a create “specific of sufficient group a taken to serve general than actions relationship, involves more emergency large at need tele public members otherwise, to act by equating To find phone services. service, might jeopardize a general public provision with employment of 911 This to characterize statute does serve by law’’ dispatcher positions “created as term used operator or immunity. analysis official availability of those services the first instance. See Wanzer, 132; Fried, at A.2d Md.App.

at 447. Absent of an existence action on affirmative part Tiffany Archer’s protect specific group of individu Tiffany, special duty als in tort may imposed like not be dispatch handling Archer her from Donte W.’s call. result, As a unnecessary it is for us to determine whether the facts this satisfy prong case the second relationship test.

Finally, we unwilling are conclude Terrell special duty Tiffany. owed a in tort Accepting as true allegations, Fried’s is no there indication that alleged Terrell’s failure to proper policies establish and to train adequately Archer an protect constituted affirmative action to assist or Tiffany. any Fried no provides evidence of action taken Terrell in this case in excess of or substantially different than his actions towards in other individuals of 911 need assistance. addition, In general employment Terrell’s with the duties HCSO fail to a to a “specific group create of individuals” Tiffany. Code, like County Pursuant to the Harford Terrell County administers the Harford Division of Emergency Oper ations, responsible, part, which is in for “[r]eceiving and all handling telephone calls county.” Harford Code, XXXVI, County §§ Ch. Art. 9-200-9-201. As we stated, acting earlier or assist protect “specific of group individuals,” requires than general more actions taken serve all public members of the of emergency need telephone services. Because Terrell’s actions fail to satisfy the first test, prong special of relationship Terrell owed no individ ual duty Tiffany.

B. Muthukumarana Appellant Muthukumarana alleged Appellee that Woodward negligently to advise failed her to leave her home and to call back from a Although safe location. Muthukumarana main- tains, issue, as her flagship that the Good Samaritan doctrine case, should apply argues in this alternatively she also that the existence “is at special relationship question the least a (explaining that pages 471-73 supra fact.” But see material dispute of genuine is no where there summary judgment cases special relation- facts, whether material the determination law). contends Muthukumarana ship question is a exists asked, that she particular questions “|.b]y asking the that ... telephone [Appellant] on affirmatively kept Woodward pursuant to the been flee should have directed when she Procedure],” suggests also Operating] Standard] at most distinguished from members she “is from the an Instruction Sheet she “received large” because if had to fear her to call 911 she reason County which directed Muthukumarana, her According to safety.” for immediate her ... increased assistance of Woodward “specific reliance inferentially children] her peril by keeping her [and her methods of way by causing forgo other [them] harm’s assistance.” hand, that Muthukumara-

On Woodward contends the other by an act na us “infer affirmative Woodward would have by merely Muthukumarana because Wood- specific reliance explains questions,” and asked phone ward answered “ ‘a relationship not be formed based on that a should ” “ ” such assistance.’ dispatch call assistance’ ‘the 444). Fried, at (Quoting Md.App. addition, not argues special relationship was Woodward [previous- “merely Appellant Muthukumarana formed because directing to call 911 instruction sheet ... her ly] received an rely upon any ...” and that “Muthukumarana did case, unnecessary it is for us to determine this and, special relationship existed between Woodward whether because, regardless of Appellant, Emil and Budrani through in Appel tort to whether Woodward owed an individual (in Budrani, lant, this undisputed facts of case Emil the and/or call) any fail indicate tape the form of the recorded 911 to According to negligence part. of on Woodward’s evidence (“SOP”) County’s Operating Standard Procedure Montgomery call, Woodward’s initial responding domestic violence duties if any injuries were determine there were on the scene, weapons present, whether were whether the caller was witness, the victim located, or a the where assailant was drugs whether or alcohol were involved. supra See note 11. If, obtaining sending after this information and it dispatch, Woodward determined the caller was in “immediate danger,” supposed she then was to advise the caller leave the Id. A of transcript scene. review the of the conversation between Woodward and Muthukumarana reveals Wood- ward did not deviate from the terms of the Upon receipt SOP. call, she obtained the of address home where located, disturbance was immediately classified the call as violence,” “domestic sent on to dispatch. She then determine, attempted pursuant SOP, to the who was in- incident, in volved the domestic where Muthukumarana’s hus- located, band was whether any there were weapons home, and whether a weapon her husband had posses- his Unfortunately, sion. while Woodward process was obtaining “pertinent information” and before had the she opportunity to determine if Muthukumarana should and could scene, leave the Mr. Muthukumarana shot his children and then Although sequence himself. events this are case tragic, there is no indication that Woodward negligently acted in her handling relatively brief call.

Even if Woodward were negligent deemed in her call, handling Muthukumarana’s we nonetheless could not Appellant’s find in favor because the circumstances this case prong fail meet first of the special relationship test —an protect action taken to or assist Emil or aor Budrani specific group of individuals like Emil and Budrani.33 The record and tape provide recorded call no indication Appellant arguments regarding Muthukumarana's rela- tionship alleged test focus on Woodward’s actions towards her and case, alleged Muthukumarana’s reliance on Woodward. This however children, wrongful involves a death and survival action for her two focus, therefore, Emil and Budrani. Our onis the existence lack special relationship Budrani, between Woodward and Emil and between Woodward and Muthukumarana. any to or assist Emil protect took action that Woodward And, explained pages at 499- directly. supra as we Budrani not create a receipt of the call alone did Woodward’s Fried, Md.App. to Emil and Budrani. See special duty (“[Njeither receipt of a call dispatcher’s a 775 A.2d at 448 cre- alone help dispatch emergency assistance for nor the assistance.”). special to the in need such duty person ates handling answering of the Likewise, Woodward’s mere Muthukumarana, as a assistance requesting call from general public, not constitute an act to did member of Emil of individuals” such as “specific group or assist a protect supra pages Budrani. See 500-01. informa receipt of the Finally, Muthukumarana’s if call 911 she feared suggesting that she sheet tion/instruction flowing from safety special duty not for her did create to Emil and Budrani. The Woodward information/instruction designed obligation sheet was intended increase County or set Montgomery of the Communication Center receiving ex- apart Appellant its duties or other individuals Rather, from protection orders domestic violence. parte receiving to inform individuals purpose the sheet’s stated was process serving in those orders ex-parte orders involved By own ex-parte general. and the nature of orders its terms, recipient] it provided “help [the was better under Montgomery County Sheriffs] what role Office and [the stand County may play executing Montgomery [the Police recipient’s] recipient] order and how can assist.” While [the call 911 if he or explained sheet that an individual should safety, provision had for his or her was she reason fear public from of the available to the simply reminder services system Montgomery existing emergency telephone to a County, exceptional not an or variant extension service re Because Muthukumarana’s group certain individuals. sheet is insufficient ceipt the information/instruction special relationship herself and Wood establish between one, extension, ward, not create between likewise does Therefore, even if Wood- and Emil Budrani. Woodward call, ward had handled negligently Muthukumarana’s she would no individual tort owe to Emil and Budrani her fail satisfy because actions the first prong relationship test. CASE NO. 83: JUDGMENT OF

MUTHUKUMARANA THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED; APPELLANT PAY TO COSTS.

FRIED, NO. CASE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 84: AFFIRMED; OF SPECIAL APPEALS PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.

BELL, Judge, Chief dissents.

Dissenting BELL, Opinion by Judge. Chief 1 system” The “911 emergency system is an by intended the enhance, Assembly recognition General para- of their importance, mount safety well-being the and the citizens Maryland by ensuring that and timely appropriate assistance is or property rendered when lives those citizens are danger. Maryland (1957, imminent Replacement Code Volume, 18-101(a).2 2001 Cum.Supp.) § Article Recogniz- ing that a multiplicity emergency telephone numbers exists and, indeed, throughout any given county State within and telephone is the usual by emergency mode which summoned, 18-101(b), § assistance is and “concerned that delays reaching avoidable appropriate emergency aid are occurring to jeopardy property,” 18-101(e), § of life and purpose, achieve this Assembly the General “establish[ed] (1957, Volume, Maryland Replacement 1. Code Sup.) 2001 Cum. 18-101(0(5) § system” Article defines "911 telephone as "a service planning guidelines which pursuant meets the § established 18-103 ..., cpnnects automatically person and which dialing digits 911 to public safety answering point. an system established includes equipment connecting outswitching and 911 calls within a tele- office, phone trunking central from facilities the central office ato public safety answering point, equipment and to connect calls to appropriate public safety agency.” Hereinafter, indicated, unless otherwise statutory future references will chapter. be this article and telephone number, 911, primary emergency as the digit three for the provide[d] ... Maryland and number for State maintenance, sys- of 911 installation, operation orderly 18-101(e). doing, In so § See within the State.” tems number, 911, is a nation- digit that the three “acknowledge[d] may be number which telephone ally recognized applied delays caused aid and eliminate emergency summon used to emergency under- familiarity numbers by lack of with § 18- of crisis.” See confusion in circumstances standable 101(d). form,3 in all required, in an enhanced system

The § July 1, 18- after 1995. See City counties and Baltimore 102(a). police, must include through system service The and, at the emergency ambulance services fighting, fire being by the county or counties served discretion services. See emergency and civil defense system, other 18-101(c). services are safety agency § a whose While a second may separate maintain system available on calls, 18-102(d), “[a]ny § ary emergency number for backup made relating emergency services information educational county designate number or shall by available State number,” emergency though even also primary 911 as the secondary for emer may separate backup number include 18-101(e). very 911 is § It thus is clear that gency calls. See telling, emergencies. for More promoted option be Md system simply permitted. is not competition with the 911 (1999) 15-126(c)(1) provides: § Code

“(c) engaging competition from with prohibited Insurer system.— emergency

“(1) may or to this not establish entity subject An section transporta- response an medical promote emergency system is: 3. An "enhanced 911” system provides: “a 911 identification; "(i)Automatic number identification; "(ii)Automatic location 1, 1995, "(iii)After technological July other future advancements may require.” Board 18-101(0(6).

Section tion system that or encourages by directs access an or insured in competition enrollee or in with substitution Maryland Emergency System Medical Services (911) State, or other county, government local emer- gency system.” medical services system is assembly The not free. The General authorized fee, per payable cents month at the time when the bills telephone due, service paid by are to be the subscribers to service, 911-accessible including exchange switched local ac service, cess telephone 18-105(b)(l), § service wireless Fund, be in a included 911 Trust out of paid which are to reimbursements to the counties for enhancements to a 911 system expenditures to contractors in accordance with the 18-103(h)(11). provisions 18-105(a). §of §See It also autho rized:

“(c)(1) In addition to the 911 imposed by fee [§ 18- 105(b)(1)], body county governing each ordi- [to] nance or public hearing resolution adopt after enact or an charge additional not to per exceed cents month to be applied all current bills rendered for switched local exchange service, telephone service, access wireless or other 911-accessible county. service within that The amount of charge may the additional necessary exceed level eligible operation cover the total amount of and maintenance costs of county.” 18-105(c)(l).

Section emergency The 911 system emergency handles calls for police, fire, and designed medical and it is assistance to do so Thus, a more expedient efficient and manner. not while the police department emergency provider, or the provides care limited, a more important, function, but nonetheless “as a clearinghouse for all calls emergency for assistance.” Elvera Detroit, v. City Mich.App. 506, Trezzi 120 70, 328 N.W.2d 74 (1982)(Benson, J., dissenting). Because established for the purpose of ensuring provision the of emergency assistance to public, logical, the it is as one court has opined, to assume that a “once municipality help receives a call for through the 911

507 proper and reasonable obligated perform in a system, it is “ to re- manner”; agreeing call and by accepting the ‘that to a duty public now narrowed a municipality the had spond, ” Merced, v. Administratrix to that individual.’ special duty 60, York, 444, 442, 61 534 N.Y.S.2d 142 Misc.2d City New Comment, Emergency Assistance “911” quoting (Sup.Ct.1987), (1985). 103,121 L. Rev Systems, 8 Geo. Mason link integral Appeals, noting the Special Like the Court delivery of emer the duties and operator’s the 911 between Archer, 229, 257, Md.App. services, v. gency citing Fried 246, 446, 783 A.2d 221 430, Md. granted, A.2d cert. “ (2001), appropriate ‘it is to measure’ majority the holds that liability as as liability, well negligence 911 operators’] [the ‘by same standard managers supervisors, of their dispatch respond to their police who applied officers ” 447, County, v. 370 Md. Montgomery es.’ Muthukumarana Fried, (2002), 489-90, 372, 139 Md. quoting 397-98 embodied, it standard is at 775 A.2d at 446. That App. doctrine, concludes, duty Under that “public in the doctrine.” majority explains: upon public a “imposes or common law “when statute duty at and not entity duty large, to the individuals, duty is not one enforce class of particular (2000) Dobbs, § Tub Of able tort.” Dan B. Law Touts omitted). (footnote explained As in Ashburn Anne [v. we (1986) County, ] 510 A.2d 1078 Arundel Md. by positions “duty police virtue their owed Ashburn, 306 Md. protect public.” officers is a doctrine, at A.2d at 1084. Pursuant there fore, not liable police ordinarily may be held officers no they duty, owe protect specific persons failure to because negligence requires, of a action to those as the first element individuals.” omitted). (footnote 486-87, 805 A.2d at 395-96

Id. also that “absent a Accordingly, majority holds an individual need employee a 911 relationship between services, such an employee an does owe telephone 508 tort,” 486, 395, private duty

individual a in id. at 805 A.2d at and, States,4 consistently with courts legal other “the duty employees ‘by 911 of position, owed virtue their ” 490, duty to aid.’ Id. at 805 at public [also] A.2d 397-98.5 particularly, majority More states: doctrine, therefore, public duty “Pursuant to the a 911 employee generally duty no in tort negligent owes for the performance of his or to an her duties individual of need emergency telephone special duty services.... [T]he rule applicability limits the of this doctrine. an Specifically, if plaintiff employee individual establishes that a 911 owed him a special duty, or her based of a special existence two, relationship employee may between the be found out, majority points 4. duty As the applied doctrine has been See, operators dispatchers. e.g., to the actions of 911 v. Sullivan Sacramento, 1070, City (1987); 190 Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 235 844 of Columbia, (D.C.1990); Johnson v. District 580 A.2d 140 v. Hines of Columbia, (D.C.1990); District 580 A.2d 133 v. District Wanzer of of Columbia, (D.C.1990); Jordan, City 580 127 A.2d Rome v. 263 Ga. of 26, (1993); Erie, 296, County DeLong 426 v. S.E.2d 861 60 N.Y.2d of 611, (1983); Welp, 469 N.Y.S.2d 457 717 v. N.E.2d Bratton 145 572, 959, (2002). Wash.2d 39 961 P.3d reasons, majority Special Appeals explained The as the Court of Archer, 257, 229, 430, 446, Md.App. Fried v. 139 granted, 775 A.2d cert. 246, (2001): 366 Md. 783 221 A.2d proclaim general protection '[f]or courts new and of tort, may particular the law of even to who those be seekers hazards, protection specific inevitably based on could and would police community determine how the limited resources should ” Fried, predictable be allocated and without Md.App. limits.’ City 258, York, 579, (quoting A.2d at 447 v. New Riss 22 N.Y.2d (1968)). 293 N.Y.S.2d By applying N.E.2d public duty personnel, to 911 prevent doctrine we are able to "that general duty protection” new resulting from "in the reduction services, public safety including emergency response programs and personnel, community.” to the Id. See also v. District Wanzer Columbia, (D.C.1990) (“If otherwise, it were then omission, city ‘every potentially oversight, would be liable liability potentially blunder' of its official-a which deplete could so necessary provide police protection, resources protection, fire ambulance service as to in the result elimination of those services ” altogether.”).’ 490-91, 370 Md. at 805 A.2d at 397-98. performance negligent in tort for the individual liable to the of his or her duties.” majority’s 491-92, the 805 A.2d at 398-99. Critical

Id. at by operators the 911 duty of a owed analysis is absence the in cases. victims these the duty a is there was inquiry whether agree

I that the crucial care, duty of cases, a for it is true that absent in owed these Walpert, Smullian liability negligence. in See can be no there 655, 582, Katz, 645, 762 A.2d Blumenthal, 361 Md. P.A. v. & Fuller, 666, 652, 54 (2000). 96 Md. v. 587 In West Va. Central 669, (1903), explicit: we were A. 671-72

“[Tjhere duty is no that is negligence no where there can be due; duty of that one the breach some negligence is with duty owed varies As the person owes another.... other of the with the relation to each circumstances and varies, concerned, alleged negligence individuals so the negligence in law or of amounts complained the act never fact, duty.” no breach of if has been there concludes, duty that no of care agree, majority I as the do appellees in to the by operators the 911 these cases was owed respondents.6 and the good majority rejects applicability the Samaritan rule

6. The the seen, of, duty quarrel doctrine. I do not favor as we have the decision, being by adopts the one approach it followed with that 4, truth, supra. In the issue. See note other courts that have faced however, being logic is drawn between of the distinction that v. escapes commented in Ashburn approaches me. This Court two 1078, Co., 617, 631, (1986), A.2d 1085 Md. 510 that Anne Arundel 306 courts, rule,’ "[tjhis nothing duty termed ihe is 'special as has been principle although application general a modified more than any duty benefit of ly negligence terms to act for the there is no another, person, one does indeed act for the benefit particular when special relationship In a act a manner. order for he must in reasonable found, be it must be shown police officer and victim to between affirmatively police protect acted to government officer local or victim, thereby group specific specific individuals like the victim or protection.”(cifa inducing specific upon police the victim’s reliance Minnesota, omitted). City v. Supreme The Court of tions Cracraft Park, 801, (1979), point: 279 806 made the same N.W.2d St. Louis " terminology, nothing duty’ more than convenient 'Special is once a 'public duty,' for the ancient doctrine that contradistinction 510 Maryland,

In establishment negli cause of action for gence requires plaintiff that a prove: owed to the plaintiff plaintiff a class which a part; is a breach duty; of that relationship causal between the breach harm; Katz, damages 655, suffered. at 361 Md. 762 A.2d Bank, Jacques 527, 531, 587. See v. First Nat’l 307 Md. 756, (1986); A.2d Housing Cramer v. Opportunities Comm’n, 705, 712, (1985); Md. 501 A.2d Scott v. Watson, 160, 165, (1976); 278 Md. 359 A.2d Peroti v. Williams, 663, 669, 114, 118 (1970). 258 Md. 267 A.2d “duty,”

The first element is the foundation of a negligence predicate action upon and the which such action is founded. 617, 627, Ashburn v. Anne Arundel Md. County, 306 (1986). cases, negligence “duty always same—to conform legal to the of standard reasonable conduct light Keeton, the of the apparent Page risk.” W. Prosser Torts, 53, ed.1984). (5th § and Keeton on The Law of at 356 element, Analyzing Judge Cole, Court, this for pointed the out:

“ ‘Duty’ negligence has defined ‘an obligation, been as to which recognition effect, the law will give to conform to particular standard of conduct toward another.’ duty assumed, protection act to for the of voluntarily others is due though care must be exercised duty even there was no act in the to. therefore, duty,’ ‘Special first instance.... effectively could also be duty.” termed ‘assumed’ (Citation omitted). (1965), § (Second) Of Torts 323 Restatement appellants petitioner rely, which the the provides: " § Negligent 323 Undertaking Performance of to Render Services. undertakes, consideration, One who gratuitously or for to render recognize services to another which he necessary should the for protection person the things, subject liability of other's or is to to physical resulting the other for harm from his failure exercise perform undertaking, reasonable care to his if (a) harm, his failure exercise such care increases the risk such of (b) the is harm suffered because of upon the other’s reliance the undertaking.” agree majority’s rejection I with argument the of the the made the appellees respondent operators the public 911 are officials immunity. entitled to official

5H for determination. As Dean no formula this is set There itself, only but noted, sacrosanct is an ‘duty is not Prosser policy of of those considerations of sum total expression the particular is say plaintiff that the the law lead which terms, policies these ... broad protection.’ entitled administration, par- the capacity of of include: ‘convenience loss, injuries, preventing of future policy bear ties ” wrongdoer....’ to the blame attached the moral [and] Keeton, on The Law and Keeton Page Prosser (quoting W. Id. (5th Dermer, ed.1984)). See Brown v. Torts, 53, at § 164 (2000); 357, 47, 54 Rosenblatt v. Exxon 344, A.2d Md. (1994); 76-77, 180, 58, 642 A.2d 189-90 Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. (1991); 79, 84, 322 Md. 585 A.2d v. Chops, Erie Ins. Co. 527, 532, 307 Md. Maryland, Bank v. First Nat. Jacques (1986). words, is a ‘duty’ “In 756, other A.2d 758-59 any obligation under question of whether defendant Keeton, plaintiff.” Prosser and particular benefit Inc., Md. Target, v. On See supra, Valentine (1999). determining wheth- considered Among the variables be exists, said, we have are: er a to another degree foreseeability plaintiff, to the “the harm injury, closeness plaintiff suffered certainty and the conduct between defendant’s of the connection suffered, blame attached to defendant’s injury the moral harm, conduct, preventing future the extent policy consequences the com- to to the defendant the burden resulting duty a care with munity imposing exercise of breach, availability, prevalence cost and liability for and the for risk involved.” insurance of 627, 1083, Ashburn, quoting A.2d Md. at 510 at 306 Tarasoff v. 425, 131 Cal. California, 17 Cal.3d University Regents of of (1976). 334, in the 14, Inherent also 551 P.2d 342 Rptr. duty relationship that be a between concept is there Exxon, duty Rosenblatt v. parties, of which the arises. out these, 77, among we have 642 A.2d at As 335 Md. at foreseeability, important most is that the factor deemed stated 512 id.,

see although “foreseeability” we have cautioned that must not “duty,” noting: be with confused fact

“The that a may result be foreseeable does itself impose duty a in negligence principle terms. This is appar- acceptance by ent in the most jurisdictions by this general duty Court of rule that is there no to control person’s prevent third conduct so as to personal harm another, relationship’ a ‘special unless exists either between person the actor or and the third and the between actor person injured. 236, 242-44, Hopkins, See Lamb v. 303 Md. 1297, (1985); (Second) 492 A.2d 1300-01 Restatement (1965); Watson, 166, § 160, Torts 315 Scott v. 278 Md. 359 (1976) (‘a 548, private A.2d person special is under no duty to protect another from criminal acts a third person, statutes, in the absence of a relation- ship.’).” 628,

Ashburn at 510 A.2d at 1083. Thus, determining duty “[i]n the existence owed ato plaintiff, we have applied ‘foreseeability of harm’ test.” Exxon, 77, Rosenblatt v. 335 Md. at 642 A.2d 189. To be sure, test, that relationship like the parties, between the upon based recognition duty that a must be limited to liability avoid unreasonably consequences. They remote clearly also serve more duty define whether there is a duty. therefore, boundaries It surprising, is not that this Court has acknowledged legal duty arises from ‘responsibility “the each of us bears exercise due care ” K.K., avoid unreasonable risks of harm to others.’ v. B.N. 135, 141, 1175, 1178 312 Md. (1988), 538 A.2d quoting Moran v. (1975). Fabergé, 538, 543, 11, all, 273 Md. 332 A.2d After potential harm, “[t]he seriousness as well as its probability, duty prevent Almaraz, contributes to a it.” v. Faya 435, (1993). 449, 327, Md. 620 A.2d See Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Flippo, Md.

(1998).

I slightest have not the operators doubt that the 911 these cases owed the victims in these cases a of care. As twenty three seen, by statute, each of the state’s we have in required to have City of Baltimore are and the counties person automatically connects system, which place a point, at safety answering dialing 911 to an established may be service emergency fire ambulance police, which and As- the requirement, the General The reason for accessed. of such clear, delivery the was to enhance sembly made readily— more services, they that were available ensure more effi- they be delivered easily more accessed —and fact, stating purpose In in the ciently expeditiously. and expressed concern Legislature pointedly legislation, the the Maryland and well-being of the citizens safety specifically and timely assistance —it appropriate any delay in recognized danger inherent emphatically —be places the emergency an situation provided when available danger. More- in imminent citizens property lives or of those regard- material over, legislation provides that educational emergency primary num- system to 911 as the ing the refer emergency ber, importance in the emphasizing its thus further response area. emergen- with Maryland faced victims7 were citizens

The designed system kind to which cies of the case, imminently victims’ respond. In each lives were case, system attempt an In each the 911 was utilized peril. assistance, timely man- emergency appropriate to obtain answered, refused, and the case, In was ner. each the call instance operator emergency, was told of but neither emergency with the response, timely was there a consistent case, In victims suffered presented and each reported. instance, killed. each they died or were damage; each foreseeable, but, without immedi- case, only this was not result intervention, predictable. ate mandated, provid- established, funded and having

The State expressly purpose for the oversight system for a 911 ed cases, they opinion requires, given majority result In these victimized, by perpetrators arguably the actual were twice first negligently. system operators responded who harm then delays preventing avoidable in the delivery emergency services to protect property citizens, and the lives and of its any neither it nor or City of the counties Baltimore reasonably a may system duty contend that 911 a does owe to a person system, who avails him or herself of that that some- thing more than a call for assistance is necessary create the special relationship required permit for recovery damages operator’s fact, incurred as a result of 911 negligence. the is, blunt, position such a quite to be nonsensical. sure, perhaps

To be any neither the State nor required provide subdivisions were system; however, a 911 the State has chosen to do so and to impose obligation on course, its subdivisions. Of when the choice was made to obligation, assume clear, the 911 we have it made carried with it obligation that obligation discharged, ensure is or executed, Ashburn, ain 631, reasonable manner. 306 Md. at Watson, 510 A.2d 160, at 1085. See v. 170-71, Scott 278 Md. 548, (1976); 555 R.R. v. Pennsylvania Yingling, Co. (1925). 169, Moreover, 148 Md. 129 36 system A. chosen invited, indeed, and, encouraged the citizens to utilize the system, holding promise out the that for help their calls would handled, be promptly efficiently with the result that the potential precipitating losses calls would be ameliorated or invitation, and, encouragement moderated. That impor most tant, promise timely an appropriate response provide predicate special a relationship from which a duty required All that flows. is to finalize relationship that is a call of, from a citizen need of, behalf of someone in need promised. assistance offered and City Austin v. Scotts dale, 579, 151, (failure (1984) 140 Ariz. 684 P.2d 154 to act call, immediately on an emergency even though anony was mous); Erie, DeLong 296, County v. 60 N.Y.2d 469 611, 717, (1983); 457 N.Y.S.2d N.E.2d 721-22 Bratton Welp, v. 572, 145 959, (2002); Wash.2d 39 961 George. P.3d St. v. Deerfield, 931, 568 (Fla.App.1990); So.2d 932 v. Hancock City York, 122, 164 New Misc.2d 63, 623 67 (N.Y.Sup. N.Y.S.2d Ct.1994); Merced, York, City Administratrix v. New 444, 60, Misc.2d 61 (Sup.Ct.1987). N.Y.S.2d See In J.B., (“A Interest (Fla.App.1993) So.2d 490-91 Of: until the And cry help. is to the authorities for 911 call emergency no reasonably that satisfied investigating officer in a investigate such calls exists, duty his legal he is within nature”). emergency with their manner consistent by the estate wrongful brought death action DeLong was she had called by burglar after of a woman who was killed being dispatched. help that was and received assurances and, so, processed negligently call was alleged It that by creating a responded to. The Court held negligently service, emergency assistance the call for accepting way established help was on assuring the caller to, with, the caller. N.Y.S.2d special relationship Appeals of New the Court of 457 N.E.2d at What is liability DeLong in say predicate York had about the for to particularly apropos this case: by municipali- made the

‘In this decision had been case the was special emergency service which provide ties to than normal proclaimed to be more efficient intended and emergency assistance were police seeking services. Those for the attempt general the number advised not call ironically might tragedy have avoided the police, local which case, encouraged to dial the in this but encountered were addition, In quicker response. number obtain not plea for assistance was significantly, most victim’s the help affirmatively assured that refused. Indeed she was Considering she ‘right away’. the fact that would be there station, police a half from the local merely was block and intruder, it cannot be yet mercy and was not at the the part no played matter of that this assurance said as a law not other home and seek her decision to remain her Unfortunately, only the risk to her it increased assistance. life.”

Id.8 Bratton, the of the intermediate reversing judgment court, Washington explained Supreme

appellate Court passage, majority portion quoted last that 8. The relies on the operator, speaking on the of the 911 to the victim’s reliance assurances State, application public rule in that with particular emphasis on the reliance element: [public duty] exception,

“To establish plaintiff must privity show that is form of plaintiff there some between the public entity and the that differentiates the plaintiff from general public, public entity that the an express made plaintiff, plaintiff justifiably assurance to the and that the on Privity relied the assurance. should be construed broad- and, ly, timely cases based failure the police to assistance, respond requests refers the relation- ship entity between and a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff.”

39 P.3d 961.9

Similarly, victims, respect with to incapacitated it is the foreseeability controls, of the harm and the victim that specifically of, whether that victim upon, relied or even knew Merced, York, call to 911. See v. New 142 Misc.2d 445-46, 62 (Sup.Ct.1987) N.Y.S.2d (“Realistically, an individual who is dire need of assistance is often too incapacitated It to call 911. is necessary therefore to broaden caller, general any so rule that who relies on the assur- municipality ances of the that they way, are on their created analysis. to support its “reliance factor” significant, as a What is but majority acknowledge, portion negated any fails argument that the issue in that could case be decided aas matter of law. Laskey County 9. Department, But see v. Martin So.2d 708 1013 Sheriff's case, (Fla.App.1998). recovery In that plaintiff's was denied in the against negligence failing action timely the sheriff for in a to forward call, plaintiff’s 911 where the husband was in killed a head-on collision proceeding with wrong way another vehicle the on a limited access highway interstate several minutes after an unidentified 911 caller reported heading that a vehicle was in south a lane northbound of that office, Rejecting plaintiff’s road. the contention that tire sheriffs service, operating duty the 911 had a to “dispatch” law enforcement personnel response duty to the call and by breached that not stated, following procedures, its "Any duty relay own the court calls regarding duty traffic a offenders is owed the aas whole and not any party may subsequently third who injured by be the act of the traffic offender.”

517 a required to hold munici- relationship’ ‘special requisite the 554 N.E.2d liable.”); City Indianapolis, v. Lewis pality of submit, system and 13(1990).10 is, to use the It I the invitation invita- should the holding promise out of the of assistance the Indeed, no there is accepted triggers that reliance. tion be certainly system, and emergency to be a 911 reason for there it, if it not that the citizens publicize was intended no reason rely it and on it. use special that “in for a relation- majority

The maintains order of assis- person need ship employee between a 911 the exist, employee that 911 tance to it must be shown individual, specific assist affirmatively protect acted to the individual, in like need group or a of individuals the specific indi- assistance, inducing specific reliance of the thereby it on that relies employee.” proposition, vidual on the For 631, Ashburn, 306 Md. at 510 A.2d at 1085.

Specifically, majority dispatch- concludes that “neither help emergency dispatch of a call for nor receipt er’s duty person in special assistance creates a to the need alone 498, at (quoting 370 Md. at 402-03 such assistance.” 448). Fried, Moreover, 260, A.2d at Md.App. at 13, (1990), 17, City Indianapolis, n. 4 there Lewis v. 554 N.E.2d There, liability part City. was that was no on the claim inability City emergency response untimely, premised primarily on was noted, however, that there operator quickly. to reach the The court any relationship nothing special was to indicate that victim had City giving special, with to a rise individualized part stepdaughter "was toward him and that the victim's defendant's operator, not into the 911 whom she never reached. lulled inaction Moreover, grandmother operator, assis- when reached a 911 Vanessa’s immediately dispatched tance was to the correct address.” acknowledging Special Appeals' 11. While the Court of use "specific public duty to mean “detrimental reliance” under test reliance,” holdings justifiable with the courts in other consistent 451, Fried, 265-66, jurisdictions, Md.App. 775 A.2d at definition, instead, majority adopt choosing "to did retain general case-by-case relationship preserve more test our analytical principles, approach to these issues” and note "that those reliance, others, along may assessing the provide with tools for useful transferred, particular case.” Md. at n. actual or A.2d at n. 31. that asserts “there is no indication operator’s] [the handling of Donte call markedly W’s exceeded or was different than handling her of other similar calls and situations.” Id. at 498-99, 805 A.2d at 403. majority rejects The also argu- the answering ment that the of 911 handling calls acts for are protection individuals, the or a specific group assistance of of i.e., plaintiffs. It foreseeable reasons: terms,

“By statutory its this scheme does not create an emergency system persons. group benefit discrete of Rather, services, for providing recognizes such broad it that, times, at of, in, any different all citizens or visitors Maryland may it neeessary find system to utilize that purposes. view, acting innumerable In our protect or individuals,’ a ‘specific group assist sufficient to create a special relationship, general involves more than actions tak- en to serve public large members the at in need of emergency telephone otherwise, To by equat- services. find ing provision act with general of a service, might jeopardize availability of those services in the first instance.” 498-500,

Id. at A.2d 403-04. Finally, majority points out that the victim in Fried did rely not the assistance sought directly from either actually, having neither been call informed or aware of and, event, in any she not was entitled to the transfer of reliance third party in that case because that third party act, was a perpetrator of presenting thus a scenario society unwilling accept is justifi “as reasonable or able.” For propositions, these various it relies on v. Wanzer Columbia, (“A District 580 A.2d 132 (D.C.App.1990) one-time call to 911 for help enough to establish a special relationship.... To give rise to a relationship, agency’s response private party must in some way demonstrable exceed response generally made other members of v. public”); Columbia, Hines District 133, 136 (D.C.1990) (“[T]he mere fact that an individ ual has emerged general public from the object and become an create a employees of does not special attention of the Morgan v. special legal duty”); relationship imposes which a (no (D.C.1983) A.2d 1313 Columbia 468 District of promise gratuitously to police “when the relationship by victimized Reassuring a citizen provide protection.... certainly help way on does not that is the criminal conduct inexorably must promised action that at all costs the mean (Ind.Ct. Dial, ....”); v. N.E.2d and Koher follow entity’s dispatch (“Standing alone, governmental a App.1995) duty.”). private not create a emergency of services does of real to this discus Ashburn contributes little substance it does easily distinguishable. Significantly, it is sion because There, police a emergency system. officer not involve the man, sitting upon a who was intoxicated behind the came truck, lights engine running was pickup wheel of a whose on, a the lot of 7-11 store. Rather than parking were done, driving, as he could have the arrest the man for drunk pull to his to the man to truck the officer elected instead tell driving evening. lot and to discontinue When side the left, lot, away man truck from the the officer the drove the who proceeded pedestrian, a short distance and collided with a 619-20, sued, negligence. the 306 Md. at claiming officer’s be had the officer analogy A.2d at 1079. The would closer neighborhood report of a drunk driver the received nothing. to interesting chosen do Another issue would have presented the drunk sued the officer. been had relies, majority to the other on which the Turning cases (D.C.1983), District 468 A.2d 1306 Morgan v. Columbia itself, acknowledges judiee: its case inappositeness sub case It important “it is state first what this is about. is police respond do not an not about a situation where danger urgent being call from citizen who is immediate others,12 it, any Id. at 1310. nor harmed.” Neither persuasive, any event. action, Dial, legislative be in the

12. Koher v. must read context 34-4-16.5-3, (18) granting gov- § passage subsection of Ind.Code entity immunity operation Act for the ernmental under Tort Claims reasoning The relies, the cases on which the majority fails completely to legislative take account of the purpose in enact- legislation ing Maryland similar to and, 911 legislation thereby, and potentially undermines 911 system renders the Indeed, meaningless and suggest useless. opera- system, mandated, financed, tors of a 911 call governed and State, directed it, has no deign those who to use taking government respond its word that it will to their emergency timely and appropriately, simply does not make seen, sense. As purpose we have for establishing emergency system requiring imple- the subdivisions to ment was create clearinghouse centralized for such calls, expectation being the that that would efficiency enhance expedition. and efficiency Increased expedition and was not sake, for simply desired their own but for the sake of the lives property and the of Maryland citizens. The General Assem- bly recognized paramount importance “the of safety the and well-being Maryland” of the citizens of and “that when the lives or property of its danger, citizens are imminent timely appropriate and rendered,” 18-101(a), § assistance must be expressed and concern “that delays avoidable reaching appropriate emergency aid occurring are to of jeopardy the 18-101(c). and property.” See § life system An emergency with the purpose of providing timely and appropriate response reporting to calls emergencies af- fecting lives property the simply of citizens has no point if purpose fulfilled, need not be charged if those with the responsibility of responding duty no owe to those who call or system those for whose benefit the was established. I can no see reason to have a system high with such ideals fulfill expressed in the legislation if there can be a failure to purpose without consequence. consequence The of a such emergency "an of enhanced system.” communication [or ’911’] Benton City City, (Ind.1999). v. Oakland N.E.2d 224 See Barnes v. Antich, ("a 700 N.E.2d 266 n. (Ind.Ct.App.1998) plain reading 34-4-16.5-3(18) Ind.Code inescapably leads to the conclusion that legislature immunity intended arising to afford from claims out a operation service]”). municipality's and use '911' [aof for no incentive no rational basis and system is with scenario a achieve, to, its up it it that live operating to demand those purpose. tells Wanzer, Appeals Court the District of Columbia help to establish call to 911 it more than one

us that takes requires relationship special that a special relationship and a in “some caller demonstrable agency’s response that the to other members generally made way response exceed “Even goes 132. It on to state: 580 A.2d at the public.” public period of time between over a contacts series enough not is injured endangered person or agency and an that the relationship, showing absent some establish duty than the duty person greater that agency assumed a sense. Id. does not make large.” at This owed to the and, Maryland, help 911 is for only anyone calls The reason given public is least, prompted by is the invitation the timely promise with of a system, along an effective use used, actually is system appropriate response. When it by to use system, invitation is existence i.e., it, flow from holding out that there are benefits results, response, from timely appropriate promise of special relationship; is the there flows. That which me, pertinent more observation need be no other. The avoid, the therefore, operator negate, not that the 911 did yet, telling answering, better special relationship, correct, if majority the truth the is the caller what would be and, duty consequently, the that or she did not owe caller he may not, forthcoming. help may, or be system as important, operate as if the 911 is Just intended, the generally each call will be response the respond to what- emergency, report caller will the same—the the dis- required are to allow for questions ever reasonable the will indicate what patch operator of assistance and the be, is neither help coming. that There will indicate response “demonstrably” that exceeds ought response to be a should needing all, public only those of the another. After members call, the thereby triggering will need emergency the assistance large, as comparison public is to the at response. for a If the be, it be, seems to then response always the to a caller will it hoped, greater is than that to public large, the at to whom not, to, operator simply the does no has occasion relate.13 Morgan in that reassuring The statement a crime victim help way must, costs, that is on the does not that all mean it arrive, difficulty is I true. The have is the The context. holds, if suggests, explicitly operator’s Court not that the negligence is an acceptable help arriving. excuse for the not help despite When not non negligent does arrive the action of operator, the 911 is thing. quite that one It is another when is help the sole reason arriving negligence the 911 operator. unacceptable, The latter is given statutory the holding system scheme the out of being in emergency. repeat, beneficial and efficient an I I believe special relationship is created when a report caller calls 911 to an emergency, responding being, to such calls in addition to legislative the expressed purpose, only purpose. It seems Columbia, (D.C.1990), In Hines v. District opines: court order, "Appellant argues regulations, Mayor's protocols that applicable Emergency District’s Ambulance Division create ‘persons such class of seriously injured who are ill or individuals— emergency who transportation receive medical by care and Emergency Appellant supports argument Ambulance Division.’ this Columbia, analogy duty source of the v. Turner[ District of (D.C.1987)], is, Act, 532 A.2d 662 the Child Abuse Prevention (1989 § § Repl.). D.C.Code 6-2101-2127 analogy We find the unper Virtually every suasive. citizen of the District could find himself or another; herself need assistance from the EAD at one time or if benefit, particular there is a 'class’ of citizens who its members are distinguished general only public they from the temporari are this, ly emergency they in need of services. do not differ from emergency citizens who find police themselves need of or fire Columbia, services. See supra, v. District 580 A.2d at 132- Wanzer may temporary 133. All of us be members of one or more these 'classes' at some time. There exists no 'class’ in the sense that would justify invoking relationship exception to the . doctrine.” court, If I saying understand potential that if one is a member class, of a reasonably even one that is differentiated from other mem- public, special relationship. bers of there can be no majority The discussion, engages in using "logic.” logic, similar similar I The confess, escapes me. to duty avoid a the caller the me to follow that to relationship by advising the operator negate special must that equivocate system promise help does not caller that the promise help. can general public us that a member of

Hines tells be yet still not special attention object become general If a member legal duty. to a special entitled emerged from duty not and one who has public is owed is not object of attention public and general become be duty. That would duty, no is owed perhaps owed a one exempted operators from suits if had Legislature fine as it employment, out of their simple negligence arising personnel. e.g. See regard emergency with has done other Volume) (1974, Replacement §§ of the 5-603 Md Code offer (exempting Proc. Article those who emer- & Jud. Courts from injury without a fee gency medical care at the scene § grossly negligent); 5-604 liability unless the actions are liability companies unless from (exempting fire rescue (law § 5-605 enforcement officer grossly negligent); willful or acting jurisdiction). outside sure, nor was

To the victim in Fried neither knew be her It is calling that someone was on behalf. informed familial or other close true that she did not have a likewise behalf, who who were relationship with those called 911 her resulting in the victim perpetrators of acts themselves the being duty no for those reasons. peril. majority The finds not agree. Many victims 911 service will I do not need able, not call physically phone or because near be either help incapacitated Those will not be aware who are by strangers, who sought. will be discovered has been Some few, as in the help will of 911 and nevertheless seek Why call. case, may make the present perpetrator have the not case not in the others is there would be a one foreseeable, victim is all to me. When the seems clear system how the 911 became consequence me to be of less does, required what it or is emergency than aware do, help if the victim does know respond. So what he or or that it is summoned someone has been summoned by she does not know even is culpable? someone who Focusing on how system is informed emergency point misses the emergency reports exists whoever —the and whoever knows of reporting perpetrates and whoever giving the offense rise to emergency. view,

In my is a duty operator there owed the 911 system to 911 plaintiffs callers and foreseeable when calls placed are with system’s consistent holding out of benefits, its merits and operators and the are informed of emergency requiring situations emergency assistance. Ac cordingly, I would reverse both of judgments and remand for new trials.14

I dissent. majority 14. The relationship does address test in Muthuk umarana, concluding that the circumstances demonstrate that the 911 case, operator negligent. agree. my was not I do not In opinion, operator whether negligent jury question. the 911 was is a To sure, majority's be permissible is a conclusion one for trier of fact evidence; however, considering to draw after all of the I am far from satisfied that all of the inferences drawn from the 911 recorded call fact, require that jury conclusion. I believe a could well decide on itself, recording light basis viewed in of the circumstances light and in the plaintiff, most favorable to the operator that the 911 negligent. was notes affirmative assurances Woodward.”

Case Details

Case Name: Muthukumarana v. Montgomery County

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Date Published: Aug 26, 2002

Citation: 805 A.2d 372

Docket Number: 83, 84, Sept. Term, 2001

Court Abbreviation: Md.