Chamerda v. Opie
197 A.3d 982
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- Kimberly Chamerda inherited property (lot 19 west) from Elsie Nemeth; title was contested due to prior divisions and an open probate estate of Howard Kelsey.
- John Opie owned adjacent lot 15; after a 2003 survey suggested no land-record proof of Nemeth’s title to lot 19 west, Opie hired attorney Norbert Church who prepared a quitclaim deed (recorded April 28, 2005) and a survey conveying whatever interest Ruth Warner had to Opie.
- Nemeth died in 2006; her estate (and Chamerda as devisee) later sought recognition of Nemeth’s title to lot 19 west; Church filed probate motions and two appeals and recorded notices of lis pendens in 2008 and 2011; those appeals were later withdrawn and lis pendens released in 2012.
- Chamerda sued Opie and Church in 2013 for slander of title based on: the 2005 deed and survey, the lis pendens filings, and the probate appeals. Defendants moved for summary judgment (arguing privilege and statute of limitations) which were denied; later the trial court granted a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (relying on absolute immunity). Chamerda appealed.
- The Appellate Court held (1) Chamerda had standing and the 2005 deed/survey were not absolutely privileged, but (2) the slander-of-title claims based on the deed and survey were time-barred under the 3-year tort statute of limitations, so defendants were entitled to summary judgment; judgment of dismissal was reversed and remanded with direction to enter judgment for defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to sue for slander of title | Chamerda (as Nemeth’s devisee) had an interest in lot 19 west and showed prospective sale problems caused by defendants’ acts | Defendants argued Chamerda had no cognizable interest until after probate certificate of devise (2012) | Held: Chamerda had a salable, cognizable interest immediately on Nemeth’s death and thus standing existed |
| Absolute immunity for preparation/recording of deed & survey | The deed/survey were not part of protected judicial communications and were too remote and dissimilar to be privileged | Defendants argued those instruments were prepared to confer standing for probate litigation and thus absolutely privileged | Held: The deed and survey were not absolutely privileged (court had jurisdiction) |
| Statute of limitations applicable to slander of title | Plaintiff urged equitable tolling/continuing course of conduct; suggested limitations should run only after defendants ceased asserting claim | Defendants argued §52-577 (3-year tort statute) applies and begins running at occurrence (recording April 28, 2005) | Held: §52-577 governs; limitations began on recording (2005); claim brought in 2013 was time-barred; summary judgment for defendants warranted |
| Continuing course / tolling by later lis pendens and appeals | Chamerda argued later lis pendens and appeals tolled limitations until release or cessation | Defendants asserted no continuing duty or later wrongful conduct tied to 2005 recording; later actions were separate | Held: Tolling not available—no special relationship or continuing duty; failure to withdraw deed/survey was a single occurrence, so tolling doctrine does not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243 (discussing absolute privilege for communications in judicial proceedings)
- Simms v. Seaman, 308 Conn. 523 (expanding/defining limits of absolute immunity in litigation context)
- Rioux v. Barry, 283 Conn. 338 (purpose of absolute immunity to encourage candor in judicial proceedings)
- Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 284 Conn. 193 (analogizing slander of title to torts governed by §52-577)
- Bruno v. Travelers Cos., 172 Conn. App. 717 (absolute immunity implicates subject matter jurisdiction)
- Fountain Pointe, LLC v. Calpitano, 144 Conn. App. 624 (standing principles; interests cognizable for slander of title)
- PMG Land Associates, L.P. v. Harbour Landing Condominium Assn., Inc., 172 Conn. App. 688 (statute of limitations for ineffective lis pendens begins when instrument becomes ineffective)