Chad Kitchell v. State of Arkansas, 594 S.W.3d 848

In 1992 Chad Kitchell (then 17) pled guilty to capital murder and attempted capital murder and was sentenced to life without parole plus 30 years.
After Miller v. Alabama, Kitchell obtained habeas relief and the 1992 life-without-parole sentence was vacated; the case was remanded for resentencing.
At the 2018 resentencing, the circuit court allowed the jury to be informed that Kitchell had previously received a life-without-parole sentence and that the Supreme Court had found that sentence unconstitutional.
Victim-impact witnesses testified about the emotional harm caused by the vacatur and the need to relitigate the sentence; the State referenced the prior sentence in opening and closing.
The jury again imposed life (now parole-eligible under statutory changes), and Kitchell appealed, arguing the admission of his prior vacated sentence was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under Ark. R. Evid. 403.
The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, holding the prior vacated sentence was not relevant victim-impact evidence, was unduly prejudicial, and its admission was an abuse of discretion; the State’s harmless-error argument was rejected.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of prior vacated life-without-parole sentence at resentencing	Kitchell: Evidence irrelevant to sentencing factors and unduly prejudicial under Ark. R. Evid. 403; would improperly signal jury life was previously deemed appropriate	State: Probative as victim-impact/context for why resentencing occurred; transparency to jurors	Court: Evidence not relevant to sentencing or victim-impact statute, was inherently prejudicial, and admitting it abused discretion — exclusion required
Harmless-error from admission of prior sentence	Kitchell: Error likely affected jury’s decision; reversal required	State: Any error harmless because overwhelming evidence supported life and jury instructions minimized impact	Court: Harmless-error not established; cannot determine effect on jury; reversal and new sentencing ordered

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life without parole for juveniles)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller is retroactive; states may remedy by parole eligibility)
Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906 (Ark. 2013) (application of Miller on remand; discretionary sentencing range for juvenile offenders)
Kelley v. Gordon, 465 S.W.3d 842 (Ark. 2015) (Miller applies retroactively on collateral review)
Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (admission of prior sentence in later capital sentencing does not automatically render proceeding fundamentally unfair)
People v. Woolley, 793 N.E.2d 519 (Ill. 2002) (informing jury of previously imposed death sentence was prejudicial and warranted resentencing)
Hammond v. State, 776 So.2d 884 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (commenting on prior death sentence in later proceeding required new sentencing)
Buckley v. State, 341 Ark. 864 (Ark. 2000) (defendant may demonstrate prejudice where improperly admitted evidence led to maximum sentence)