*1 (No. 88210.
THE PEOPLE OF THE OF ILLINOIS, STATE Appel-
lee, WOOLLEY, MARTIN M. Appellant. 22,
Opinion February 2002. filed HARRISON, C.J., KILBRIDE, J., concurring part part. dissenting in Kim Schiedel, Defender, M. Deputy
Charles Fawcett, Defender, of the Of- Appellate Robert Assistant Defender, of Appellate Chicago, ap- fice of the State pellant. *2 General, Ryan, Attorney Springfield,
James E. of (Joel Hamer, Ted D. Attorney, Cambridge R. State’s of Bertocchi, General, Solicitor and William L. Browers and O’Connell, General, M. of Margaret Attorneys Assistant counsel), of Chicago, People. for the the opinion JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered court:
Defendant,
Woolley,
Martin M.
was convicted in
(720
Henry County of six counts of murder
ILCS 5/9—
(a)(3) (West
1(a)(1), (a)(2),
1994)), one count of armed
(720
(West 1994)),
violence
ILCS
one count of
5/33A—2
(720
2(a) (West
armed robbery
1994)),
ILCS
one
5/18 —
(720
1(a) (West
robbery
count of
1994)),
ILCS
5/18 —
one count of
possession
unlawful
of a
a felon
weapon by
(720
1.1(a) (West 1994)).
ILCS
Defendant was
5/24 —
sentenced to death. On
appeal,
his direct
this court
vacated defendant’s conviction for armed violence and
vacated defendant’s death
People Woolley,
sentence.
Defendant appeal. raises issues on Because we agree with defendant that the trial court erred in inform- ing a panel prospective jurors that defendant had previously been sentenced to death in case and in this denying mistrial, defendant’s motion for a need we address remaining defendant’s issues. vacate defen- dant’s death sentence and remand this cause for a new
BACKGROUND
charged
shooting
Defendant was
with the
deaths of
Turley.
presented
Rane Baldwin and Diana
The evidence
fully
opinion
at defendant’s trial
forth in
set
our first
in this case.
On direct to this affirmed defen- we robbery, murder, dant’s convictions for armed and unlaw- possession weapon by felon, ful of a but vacated and remanded for a defendant’s capital sentencing hearing. sentence remand,
On the trial court hearing. conducted a The first second brought into the courtroom to hear introduc- During introductory tory by the trial court. remarks prospective remarks, the trial court informed the by jury previously that defendant had been convicted charges. the murder The trial court further told the panel: *3 gave to the pending,
“[A]s the trial was the State notice they seeking penalty the death from defense would be jury jury any guilty return of on should verdicts jury first-degree one or more of murder counts. The these of, on penalty came back with a return of the death these counts.” jurors that the Further, the trial court informed these appealed Supreme to the murder convictionswere Illinois degree the first murder Court and that the court affirmed jury’s imposition of death. convictions, vacated the but The trial court stated:
“They jury’s imposition penalty of the death vacated the they why to the death gave reasons that concluded as They remanded the case back penalty should be vacated. aspect for a trial on the Henry County new Court affirmed the convictions Supreme the case. The murder, degree penalty [and] reversed the death first *** it to remand it to this court for instructions for back *** penalty phase. Supreme errors that [T]he [szc] [sic] Court ascribed to reversal of the death repeated jury.” will not be before this The trial court admonished the not to consider jury the result from the first with the following state- ment: you you disregard
“I admonish at this time that are to by jury. may, the result that was rendered the first You your case, after consideration of this return the same may entirely verdict. You return a different verdict. That is you. up saying All I’m is do not be influenced jury. mere conclusion of the first You decide the case on the you merits evidence that hear in this court room. result, course, up you group will be as a of twelve jurors. jury county This was held in this and I don’t know you extent present what some of have recollections of that trial here first reading newspapers hand or from or hearing media accounts.” object during
Defense counsel did not the trial court’s introductory However, remarks. the next day, defense counsel moved for a mistrial and stated:
“[Y]esterday
spoke
when the court
to the
pool as a
to,
group,
object
to,
which I do not
object
and did not
I
may
inadvertently
think there
have
been a statement made
pool
may
be in error. I think that the court
explanation
stage
of what led us to this
proceeding
jury pool
original
mentioned to the
that the
Woolley
had sentenced Mr.
to death and the Illinois
Supreme Court vacated the death.”
Defense counsel
argument
cases,
based his
on two
(1986),
The trial to defense counsel’s cautionary an additional instruction at the conclu- sued sion of the 23, 1999, jury
On March selection continued and a to the courtroom and panel jurors brought second by the trial The trial introductory judge. issued remarks that defendant had been panel court advised the second guilty eligible penalty. found to receive concerning However, changed the trial court its remarks sentencing history: the prior yourself not to concern specifically “You are admonished original activity of the that held the with the speculate thought in our sentencing hearing. We are not to a brand processes because that has been vacated. This is ultimately jurors and the who will be proceeding required are to listen to all of the part proceeding of this independent assessment and evidence and make their own not the death of this case as to whether or conclusion any speculation or imposed should be without ninety procedures referral at all to the earlier ninety five or six.” selection, were
At the conclusion of the the first and 2 and 6 alternates panel selected from participate from the second where selected the case. instruc- following cautionary gave
The trial court sentencing hearing: tion the conclusion of the at any may consider for reason verdict “You sentencing hearing. first jury at the Defendant’s and should is null and void original jury sentence verdict during by you any reason not be considered sentencing hearing.”
301 Followingdeliberations, a the returned sentence directly appealed of death and defendant to this court.
ANALYSIS the Defendant maintains that trial court erred in informing the first that he had been previous hearing. sentenced to death at a State counters that no error occurred the because court’s merely history remarks were of the recitation the disagree case. We with the State. argument outset,
At the
we
the
address
State’s
that
by failing
contempora
defendant has waived the issue
to
neously object.
argues
pursuant
People
Defendant
that
to
Sprinkle,
(1963),
People
v.
Ill. 2d
Sims,
27
398
and
v.
192
required
Ill. 2d 592
contemporaneous objection.
he
not
make a
Sprinkle,
alleged
we noted that where the
error is
judge, making
contemporane
an act
of the
the
of a
objection
questions
by
judge
ous
or comments
the
poses practical problem
lawyer. Sprinkle,
for the trial
Sprinkle,
judge, during
Likewise, Sims, stage sentencing hearing, judge the trial made a grandmother comment to the that victim he was 302
sorry
Citing
for her
Defense
did not object.
loss.
counsel
we
that
Spritz,
rigidly
concluded
waiver rule is not
objection
where the basis
the conduct
applied
Sims,
636,
of the trial
192 Ill. 2d at
v.
judge.
citing People
Nevitt,
423,
(1990), citing
27 Ill.
Sprinkle,
Ill.
(1997);
400-01;
Smith,
2d at
v.
The the trial court informed the after sentence, counsel defendant’s death defense previous motion, a The court denied the moved for mistrial. trial area, a maintaining that, metropolitan unlike a large Henry County homicide in would be remembered double the every panel member was aware of probably and that that the death court concluded sentence. prior (1986), 265 in v. 2d precedent People Hope, set out factu Davis, v. Ill. 1 addressed a 97 The trial from the one this case. ally different scenario stated, judge ad-
“They intellectually address what I have didn’t the local you a double murder to [H]ow dressed. do remand any expect under circumstances area of the state of this at jury nobody a where has ever heard get complete *** impossibility It’s supposed What to do? an all? are we jury going that expect somebody on isn’t that I ultimately death sentence. believe prior know there was a high road to disclose procedurally it’s the intellectual nobody on naively expect that rather than and admonish *** County of Henry [T]he has ever heard this. case, I Hope from and Davis to the facts of our extension juris prudence [sz'c] is a of Illinois.” believe disservice extensively discussing possible options After State, both defense counsel and with the trial cautionary gave denied the motion for a a mistrial jury. instruction to the resolving us,
In
turn
to this
the issue before we
first
holding People Davis,
Ill. 2d 1
In
court’s
during
eligibility
phase
Davis,
hear
ing,
previ
was informed that
defendant had
ously
received the death
for the
murder
unrelated
person.
determining
another
whether such informa
stage
tion
in error,
we noted that at
first
sentencing hearing,
determines whether
defen
eligible
dant
sentence;
to receive the death
not whether
penalty.
he
Davis,
should receive this
“The possibility
jury may
that the
have found defendant
eligible
penalty]
[the
on the basis of an irrelevant
*7
prejudicial
nonstatutory aggravating factor should not
be tolerated.”
With Here, dispute facts in this case. there is no that of the jurors previously were that defendant was advised in the original sentenced Davis and improper This admonishment was under both jury’s at Hope was not relevant deliberations and. stage sentencing hearing. Although second history necessary explain of the case brief sentencing hearing, role it was not jurors their at previous necessary jurors to inform the of defendant’s death sentence. does
Contrary argument, to the State’s common sense known that jurors not would have dictate that previous had sentenced to death at a defendant been comments. judge’s without hearing earlier, and the nearly years five murders occurred sentencing hearing nearly occurred four trial and first have though jurors may heard years earlier. Even some homicide, a forgone it not or remembered the double have been aware conclusion would Further, if the even remembered imposed. sentence sentence, decision at the their previous the case and ad- not have aided resentencing hearing would been had reference fact ditional to death. Such information was sentenced defendant *8 necessary history. presenting find the case informing jurors original of defendant’s inflammatory. prejudicial sentence was both previously Furthermore, as we noted in may regarding previous information death sentence jury’s responsibility. Davis, diminish a Ill. 2d sense of jury at 26. The fact that the heard that another mitigated to sentenced defendant death could have consequences State, serious of their decision. The follow ing reasoning court, of the trial this maintains that not the was case because defendant was not under resentencing sentence of death at the time of the hear ing. unpersuasive. Despite reason, however, This death, fact that defendant merely hearing not was under sentence of only that another found him eligible imposed penalty may for death but also the death jury’s responsibility have diminished the sense of determining whether defendant should be sentenced death. denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial, the trial distinguished Hope on Davis the basis that second,
both cases involved a unrelated offensefor which previous imposed. death had been This case according different, court, to the trial because the previous imposed death sentence was in the same case appeal. and had Thus, been reversed on reasoned the likely court, because the would have known previous coupled sentence, about the death disclosure, cautionary intellectually with a instruction, was the most approach. honest
Although recognize we the difficult task that faced conducting stage resentencing the trial court in a second hearing determining impart which information jury panel, depart principles we decline to from the Hope regards set out in case, and Davis. With regarding previous information defendant’s death appeared it may unwarranted. While have sentence was at the time to inform the entire reasonable sentence, a history, including previous case given instruction could have been cautionary *9 fact that defendant mentioning without the explicitly by jury. option had to death This prior been sentenced actions in mak- clearly by was illustrated the trial court’s jurors. the of ing introductory panel remarks to second the admonishing In the second the trial court told panel, the activ- jurors prior [themselves] “not to concern with hearing.” ity original sentencing that held the not, however, did inform the The trial court This to death. defendant had been sentenced previously the case’s sufficiently informed option without to defendant. history causing prejudice has demon conclude, therefore, that defendant We reasonably a conclusion justifying circumstances strated him. against See juror improperly prejudiced that a was Bean, find that v. 137 Ill. 2d an first trial comments to the court’s reversible error. of discretion constitutes abuse obviates the need appeal of this disposition Our do,We parties. address other issues raised its however, reference to com the State with caution find Specifically, we during closing arguments. ments Christ was on troubling the comment: “When State’s him, forgave and he two thieves with there were cross next in the he him salvation promised thief and good Although the stay not the execution.” life, he did but largely is left scope argument character and (1993)), argu Tenner, 157 Ill. (People court solely passions designed to inflame ment (1987)). Johnson, 2d 119 prohibited (People v. making refrain from resentencing, the State should On penalty. for the death appeal any religious emotional such reasons, reverse defendant’s we forgoing For the resentencing and remand for consistent death sentence opinion. with this
Reversed and remanded. HARRISON, concurring CHIEF JUSTICE in part in dissenting part: I agree that this matter should be remanded to the my view, proceedings. circuit court further however, the remand should not be limited to a new Woolley granted should be trial on the He is entitled to underlying offenses. retrial original because the this case did proceedings comport requirements promulgated by our for the conduct of cases which the State is seek ing penalty. the death requirements Those are indispens able for achieving an accurate determination of innocence or guilt and are all applicable capital cases now com ing review, before us on including cases commenced *10 before the rules were People enacted. v. 204 Ill. Hickey, (2001) 585, (Harrison, 2d C.J., 631-36 dissenting); see Bakalis, also ex rel. People 510, Birkett v. 196 Ill. 2d 513 if Woolley Even trial, were not entitled to I a new regard would majority’s disposition as inadequate. remanding for resentencing, this court should impose present restriction its It opinion lacks. should bar the State from the death seeking penalty. my As set in forth partial concurrence in partial Bull, and dissent v. People 2d 185 Ill. 179 the Illinois death penalty law is void and unenforceable because it violates the and eighth fourteenth amendments the United States Constitu (U.S. XIV) Const., tion VIII, I, amends. and article sec (Ill. 2, tion 1970, I, Illinois Constitution Const. art. 2).§ Absent a new trial in conducted accordance with the rules, there is no for altering basis that conclusion. KILBRIDE, concurring part in
JUSTICE also dissenting part: in must majority in that this cause agree part
I with remanded for a new hear at a minimum be portion majority’s I in that narrow ing, and concur urge I Nonetheless, part I in also dissent judgment. trial. For the reasons that defendant should receive new 2d Hickey, in v. my People in dissents set forth (2001) J., v. 585, (Kilbride, dissenting), and People 636-40 (2001) (Kilbride, 536, J., dis Ill. 2d 581-85 Simpson, and sentence senting), I defendant’s convictions believe the trial proceedings be set aside because should also as minimum constitutional were conducted without court rules supreme the new surances established my I stated in dissents capital cases. As governing should I new rules Simpson, believe Hickey Caballero, Ill. retroactively. See applied be (1997). Thus, should be 205, 220-21 cause compliance a new trial conducted remanded for the new rules.
(No. 89220. ILLINOIS, Appel- THE STATE OF THE OF PEOPLE FULLER, lee, Appellant. v. TYRONE 22, February 2002. Opinion filed