Centurion v. Sessions
860 F.3d 69
2d Cir.2017Background
- Charles William Centurion, a lawful permanent resident since 1989, committed a Texas drug-related offense in 1990; he fled and the case remained unresolved until he pleaded nolo contendere in 2007 and the proceedings were later dismissed after probation.
- After AEDPA and IIRIRA (1996), Congress eliminated statutory § 212(c) relief and abrogated the Fleuti doctrine, changing admission/removal consequences for LPRs with certain crimes.
- Upon attempting reentry in 2007 after a short trip, DHS placed Centurion in removal proceedings under INA § 212(a)(2) for a controlled-substance conviction/admission.
- Centurion previously lost appeals concerning § 212(c) relief; he later moved to reopen based on the Supreme Court’s Vartelas v. Holder decision (Vartelas II), arguing Fleuti should protect him because his criminal conduct predated IIRIRA.
- The BIA denied reopening, reasoning Vartelas II applies only where the offense, plea, and conviction all predated IIRIRA; Centurion petitioned for review challenging that legal interpretation.
- The Second Circuit considered whether § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) attaches consequences at the time of commission (making application retroactive) or at conviction, and whether the presumption against retroactivity bars applying the statute to Centurion.
Issues
| Issue | Centurion's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) attaches its consequences at time of commission or conviction | § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) should be read like Vartelas II to avoid retroactive effect where the offense predated IIRIRA; Fleuti applies because conduct predates IIRIRA | The statute’s reference to § 1182(a)(2) (which mentions convictions) and BIA precedent support treating conviction/adjudication as the operative date; BIA interpretation deserves deference | The statute’s plain text (“has committed”) is unambiguous; consequences attach at commission (not conviction) |
| Whether applying § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) to pre-IIRIRA conduct is barred by the presumption against retroactivity | Vartelas II’s anti-retroactivity principle should protect those whose criminal conduct predated IIRIRA even if conviction was later | The statute can be applied because practical enforcement typically requires conviction; and Vartelas II did not decide commission vs. conviction issue | Applying § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) to Centurion would attach new legal consequences to pre-enactment events, so presumption against retroactivity bars application; Fleuti applies to Centurion’s 2007 trip |
| Whether the BIA’s refusal to reopen sua sponte is reviewable on this record | Centurion contends the BIA misread Vartelas II and thus reopening would not necessarily fail | Government defends BIA’s discretionary denial and its interpretation of Vartelas II | Court has jurisdiction to decide whether BIA misperceived Vartelas II; it held the BIA misinterpreted the temporal trigger and vacated the BIA order |
| Applicability of prior circuit precedent (Domond, Centurion I) | Centurion argued Vartelas II undermines Domond/Centurion I as applied here | Government argued those precedents control and foreclose relief | Court distinguished Domond/Centurion I (which concerned § 212(c) and conviction-triggered consequences) and found they do not control this § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (retroactivity framework; two-step inquiry and presumption against retroactive legislation)
- Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257 (2012) (held IIRIRA could not be applied retroactively to strip Fleuti protection for pre-IIRIRA convictions)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (predecessor holding about retroactivity and § 212(c) relief)
- Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (fair-notice principle on applying law to past conduct)
- Domond v. INS, 244 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2001) (held conviction date controlled retroactivity for § 212(c) relief)
- Centurion v. Holder, 755 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2014) (prior appeal addressing § 212(c) relief timing; distinguished here)
- Baraket v. Holder, 632 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2011) (stop-time rule interpretation: commission date triggers § 1229b(d)(1))
- United States v. Razmilovic, 419 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2005) (statutory-construction starting point: plain text)
- United States v. Messina, 806 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2015) (courts must follow unambiguous statutory text)