United States v. Tomo Razmilovic, David E. Nachman, Kenneth Jaeggi, Movant-AppellantUnited States v. Tomo Razmilovic, David E. Nachman, Kenneth Jaeggi, Movant-Appellant
Kenneth Jaeggi appeals from Judge Wexler’s denial of his motion to vacate an
ex parte
pretrial order freezing assets claimed by the government to be forfeita-ble proceeds of alleged securities, mail, and wire fraud offenses. We hold that
BACKGROUND
Jaeggi was the Senior Vice President of Finance and the Chief Financial Officer of Symbol Technologies, Inc. (“Symbol”), a publicly traded company, from May 1997 to December 2002. An 87-page indictment, filed on May 28, 2004, charged Jaeg-gi and other Symbol officers and executives with,
inter alia,
securities fraud,
The indictment charged Jaeggi and his codefendants with two illegal schemes. First, it alleged that between 1999 and December 2002 they manipulated Symbol’s financial results to meet or exceed securities analysts’ performance forecasts. Second, it alleged that the defendants participated in a “look-back scheme” in which, when exercising their stock options, they backdated the exercise date to claim a lower stock price thereby reducing the taxable gains realized by the defendants. The two schemes are alleged to have involved conspiracy and substantive offenses of securities fraud, tax evasion, and mail and wire fraud.
Jaeggi moved to vacate or modify the restraining order, claiming,
inter alia,
that it was not authorized by
DISCUSSION
Whether
a) Language
In interpreting
If a forfeiture of property is authorized in connection with a violation of an Act of Congress, and any person is charged in an indictment or information with such violation but no specific statutory provision is made for criminal forfeiture upon conviction, the Government may include the forfeiture in the indictment or information in accordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and upon conviction, the court shall order the forfeiture of the property in accordance with the procedures set forth in [21 U.S.C. § 853 ], other than subsection (d) of that section.
In forfeiture-related actions, Subsection (e) of
[T]he court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other action to preserve the availability of property described in subsection (a) of this section for forfeiture under this section ... upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a violation of this subchapter or subchap-ter II of this chapter for which criminal forfeiture may be ordered under this section and alleging that the property with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction,be subject to forfeiture under this section ....
Whether
We hold that the language of
The language of
To the extent that any forfeiture-related procedures apply under
b) Other Forfeiture Statutes and Their Interpretation
The government’s strongest argument is not based on statutory language. Instead, it notes that “the enactment of a criminal forfeiture statute without a restraining order provision would have been regarded as oddly incomplete and uniquely deficient” because “all criminal forfeiture statutes that set forth the procedures to be followed in criminal cases have provided for the issuance and enforcement of pre-trial restraining orders.”
Although the factual premise of this argument is strictly true, the argument is misleading. There are four statutes that authorize criminal forfeiture and set forth the procedures to be followed. All authorize pretrial restraint of forfeitable assets.
See
That exception is the general criminal forfeiture statute,
The weight of these decisions for our purposes is considerably weakened by the fact that none of them has addressed the arguments presented in this case. Furthermore, Section 982 — along with every other criminal forfeiture statute that incorporates the procedures of Section 853— includes language to suggest that it incorporates more than just those procedures of
c) Intent and Policy
Given our conclusion that
The only explicit references to an intent to authorize pretrial restraint cited by the government are two isolated statements by representatives of the Department of Justice at Congressional hearings. The statements, given before House and Senate committees, were essentially identical, asserted that the law “should” permit criminal forfeiture as well as pretrial restraint in a variety of cases, and urged passage of proposed legislation similar to what became
These statements are evidence of what the Department wanted but not of what Congress intended. They made no attempt to alert Congress to the significance of incorporating
Finally, the government makes a policy argument posed in the guise of ineluctable logic, namely that it “would have made no sense” for Congress to enact a statute authorizing the use of criminal forfeiture but to omit a pretrial restraint provision, without which actual forfeiture might never be possible. In light of the statutory language, this is a complaint that should be addressed to Congress.
See United States v. Monsanto,
CONCLUSION
Because
Notes
. The government argues that
. See
. Besides
. There are several criminal statutes other than
. We have found no caselaw construing the "seizure''/related proceeding language of the statutes cited in Note 2, nor do the parties cite to any. Although an awkward way of accomplishing the purpose, it is possible that the "related judicial proceeding” language was intended to incorporate the pretrial restraint procedures of
If the court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the property to be seized would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture and that an order under subsection (e) of this section [the pretrial restraint provision] may not be sufficient to assure the availability of the property for forfeiture, the court shall issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of such property.
. Indeed, this precise argument was rejected in
Gotti
— there, for allowing pretrial restraint of substitute assets under Section 853 — because the plain language of the statute did not authorize such a restraint.
. The government also argues, in a footnote, that the All Writs Act,