Background

• Montgomery County Resolution 16-1252 required "limited service pregnancy resource centers" (no licensed medical professional on staff) to post a bilingual sign stating: (1) the center lacks a licensed medical professional, and (2) the County Health Officer encourages pregnant women to consult a licensed health care provider.
• Centro Tepeyac, a nonprofit pregnancy center that provides counseling, testing, and material support but not abortions or medical services, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming First and Fourteenth Amendment violations (compelled speech, vagueness, viewpoint discrimination).
• The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the second disclaimer (encouragement to consult a licensed provider) but left the first disclaimer (no licensed medical professional on staff) intact.
• The County and Centro cross-appealed: County challenged the injunction of the second sentence; Centro challenged the court’s refusal to enjoin the first sentence.
• The Fourth Circuit (en banc) reviewed the interlocutory injunction for abuse of discretion, applying the Winter four-factor test and treating the compelled message as content-based speech subject to strict scrutiny (because the record did not establish commercial or professional-speech categories).
• The court affirmed: it found Centro likely to succeed on the Second Amendment claim only as to the second sentence (unneeded, not narrowly tailored) but not as to the first sentence (neutral, factual disclosure plausibly narrowly tailored at this stage).

Issues

Key Cases Cited

• Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (compelled speech alters content; degree of scrutiny depends on commercial/professional context)
• Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (four-factor standard for preliminary injunctions)
• Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (disclosure requirements for misleading commercial speech may be upheld if reasonably related to preventing deception)
• Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (intermediate scrutiny for restrictions on nonmisleading commercial speech)
• United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (narrow tailoring requires less-restrictive alternatives when available)
• Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (vagueness scrutiny heightened when First Amendment interests implicated)
• Hurley v. Irish‑American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (First Amendment protects speaker’s choice of what factual statements to include)
• Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (regulation of speech must be last resort; consider less restrictive alternatives)
• Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state cannot compel private citizens to disseminate ideological messages)
• West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compelled ideological speech violates the First Amendment)
• United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (facial invalidation appropriate when a law’s unconstitutional applications substantially outnumber legitimate ones)
• Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013) (related Fourth Circuit pregnancy-center compelled-disclosure litigation; emphasized factual record and discovery issues)