Centro De La Comunidad Hispana De Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay
868 F.3d 104
2d Cir.2017Background
- Town of Oyster Bay enacted a 2009 ordinance making it unlawful for a person standing within or adjacent to a public right-of-way to stop or attempt to stop a motor vehicle to solicit employment; the ordinance exempted many service solicitations (taxis, buses, etc.).
- The ordinance was motivated by complaints about recurring gatherings of day laborers at a Forest Avenue “shape-up” site (safety, congestion, hygiene); it was adopted unanimously but never enforced or prosecuted.
- Plaintiffs Workplace Project (Workplace) and Centro sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to enjoin the ordinance as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments; the district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and permanently enjoined enforcement.
- On appeal the Second Circuit (majority) affirmed: it found Workplace had organizational standing and held the ordinance a content-based restriction on commercial speech that failed the Central Hudson intermediate-scrutiny test as not narrowly tailored.
- The court emphasized the ordinance reaches solicitation that could be lawful, that it burdens more speech than necessary (including core advocacy by Workplace), and that less-burdensome alternatives existed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing — organizational injury | Workplace: enforcement would perceptibly impair organizing (disperse laborers), force diversion of resources, and risk wrongful arrest of advocates. | Town: Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries are speculative, elective, or not imminent; Centro lacks a real organization. | Workplace has standing: demonstrated concrete, imminent, and traceable organizational injuries (perceptible impairment; resource diversion; risk of mistaken enforcement). Court did not decide Centro’s standing. |
| Is the ordinance subject to the First Amendment (content-based)? | Plaintiffs: ordinance targets solicitation speech and advocacy; content-based restriction. | Town: frames ordinance as a safety/regulatory rule not aimed at speech content. | Ordinance is content-based because it punishes stopping vehicles only when done "for the purpose of soliciting employment," requiring officials to inspect speakers’ message. |
| Classification of speech — commercial or political/advocacy? | Plaintiffs: activity includes ideological and political advocacy. | Town: targets commercial solicitation of employment. | Court treated the restricted activity as commercial speech (proposal to hire/work is classic commercial speech) and applied Central Hudson; decided the ordinance fails even under commercial-speech standards. |
| Central Hudson: narrowly tailored / more extensive than necessary? | Plaintiffs: ordinance overbroadly bans protected advocacy and will chill outreach; less-restrictive alternatives exist. | Town: ordinance serves substantial safety interest at the specific Forest Avenue site and exemptions (taxis, buses) are appropriate. | Ordinance fails Central Hudson’s fourth prong — it burdens substantially more speech than necessary, is underinclusive given exemptions, and less-burdensome, content-neutral alternatives (e.g., enforcement against obstruction, congestion rules) were available. Court affirmed permanent injunction against enforcement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (establishes four-part test for commercial speech restrictions)
- Police Dep’t of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (content-based speech restrictions implicate First Amendment)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (organization shows injury where its activities are perceptibly impaired and resources are diverted)
- Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (examples of commercial speech not protected where the underlying commercial activity is illegal)
- Davis v. F.E.C., 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (pre-enforcement standing: threatened injury can be imminent if real, immediate, and direct)
- Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2011) (organizational standing; perceptible impairment standard applied)
- Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011) (day-labor solicitation and organizational interests in outreach)
- Valle Del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2013) (solicitation of day labor concerns lawful activity; eligible for First Amendment protection)
- Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (narrowly drawn requirement under Central Hudson; courts should scrutinize whether stated interests are actual motivations)