Cato Institute v. SEC, 4 F.4th 91

Cato Institute sued the SEC challenging the agency’s practice of including "no-deny" (non‑disparagement) provisions in consent decrees, arguing they violate the First Amendment.
Cato itself has not entered a consent decree but alleges it contracted to publish a manuscript by an author who is bound by a no‑deny provision and that other individuals subject to similar decrees would speak or testify but for those provisions.
Cato sought declaratory and injunctive relief: a declaration that 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (as applied) and existing no‑deny provisions are unconstitutional and an injunction barring the SEC’s use/enforcement of those provisions.
The district court dismissed for lack of standing, finding Cato failed to allege an injury in fact or any specific threat to its publishing or event plans.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed on an alternative ground: Cato’s alleged injury was not redressable because the no‑deny provisions it challenges are contained in consent decrees enforceable by the courts that entered them, so enjoining the SEC would not prevent those courts from enforcing their decrees.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing — injury in fact	Cato cannot publish speech/testimony because third parties are barred by no‑deny clauses.	No concrete, imminent impediment to Cato’s publication; Cato hasn’t been directly restrained.	District court found lack of injury; D.C. Cir. affirms on redressability ground (assumes injury for analysis).
Redressability	Enjoining SEC from applying/using no‑deny policy would allow third parties to speak and Cato to publish.	Even if SEC is enjoined, courts that entered consent decrees can enforce them (including by contempt), so relief against SEC won’t remove the restraint.	Held for defendant: relief against SEC would not likely redress Cato’s injury because consent decrees remain enforceable by courts.
Scope of challenged provisions	Cato suggests some no‑deny provisions may exist outside court decrees.	Complaint alleges the provisions at issue are in consent decrees; SEC enforcement challenge targets consent‑decree practice.	Court construes complaint as challenging no‑deny provisions in consent decrees and declines to assume other forms.

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (consent decrees are judicial orders enforceable like other judgments).
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (violations of court orders may be punished by criminal contempt).
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (courts can enforce judgments even absent a party’s consent to enforcement steps).
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (discusses courts’ authority to enforce judicial orders).
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, 445 U.S. 375 (1980) (parties must obey court decrees until modified or reversed).
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (standing doctrines, including redressability, are jurisdictional and decide dismissal).
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (constitutional standing elements: injury, causation, redressability).
Overbey v. Mayor of Baltimore, 930 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2019) (contrast: plaintiffs found standing to challenge non‑disparagement clauses in settlements; did not analyze redressability).
Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354 (3d Cir. 2000) (contrast: plaintiffs’ alleged injury from enforcement of a law was redressable by enjoining that law).