UNITED STATES v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
Supreme Court of the United States
March 6, 1947
330 U.S. 258
Argued January 14, 1947.
Affirmed.
UNITED STATES v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA.
Argued January 14, 1947.—Decided March 6, 1947.
Welly K. Hopkins and Joseph A. Padway argued the cause for the United Mine Workers and John L. Lewis. With them on the brief were Edmund Burke, T. C. Townsend, Harrison Combs, M. E. Boiarsky, Henry Kaiser and James A. Glenn.
Briefs were filed as amici curiae by George Moskowitz and Carl Rachlin for the Workers Defense League; Robert W. Kenny, Joseph Forer, David Rein and Herman A. Greenberg for the National Lawyers Guild; Lee Pressman, Eugene Cotton and Frank Donner for the Congress of Industrial Organizations; and William L. Standard for the National Maritime Union of America, CIO, urging reversal.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
In October, 1946, the United States was in possession of, and operating, the major portion of the country‘s bituminous coal mines.1 Terms and conditions of employment
Captain N. H. Collisson, then Coal Mines Administrator, answered for Secretary Krug. Any contractual basis for requiring negotiations for revision of the Krug-Lewis agreement was denied.7 In the opinion of the Government, § 15 of the 1945 agreement had not been preserved by the Krug-Lewis agreement; indeed, § 15 had been expressly nullified by the clause of the latter contract providing that the terms contained therein were to cover the period of Government possession. Although suggesting that any negotiations looking toward a new agreement be carried on with the mine owners, the Government expressed willingness to discuss matters affecting the operation of the mines under the terms of the Krug-Lewis agreement.
Secretary Krug again notified the defendant Lewis that he had no power under the Krug-Lewis agreement or under the law to terminate the contract by unilateral declaration.10 The President of the United States announced his strong support of the Government‘s position and requested reconsideration by the union in order to avoid a national crisis. However, the defendant Lewis, as union president, circulated to the mine workers copies of the November 15 letter to Secretary Krug. This communication was for the “official information” of union members.
The United States on November 18 filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia against
The court, immediately and without notice to the defendants, issued a temporary order12 restraining the
A gradual walkout by the miners commenced on November 18, and, by midnight of November 20, consistent with the miners’ “no contract, no work” policy, a full-blown strike was in progress. Mines furnishing the major part of the nation‘s bituminous coal production were idle.
On November 21 the United States filed a petition for a rule to show cause why the defendants should not be punished as and for contempt, alleging a willful violation of the restraining order. The rule issued, setting November 25 as the return day and, if at that time the contempt was not sufficiently purged, setting November 27 as the day for trial on the contempt charge.
On the return day, defendants, by counsel, informed the court that no action had been taken concerning the November 15 notice, and denied the jurisdiction of the court to issue the restraining order and rule to show cause. Trial on the contempt charge was thereupon ordered to begin as scheduled on November 27. On November 26 the defendants filed a motion to discharge and vacate the rule to show cause. Their motion challenged the jurisdiction of the court, and raised the grave question of
After extending the temporary restraining order on November 27, and after full argument on November 27 and November 29, the court, on the latter date, overruled the motion and held that its power to issue the restraining order in this case was not affected by either the Norris-LaGuardia Act or the Clayton Act.15
The defendants thereupon pleaded not guilty and waived an advisory jury. Trial on the contempt charge proceeded. The Government presented eight witnesses, the defendants none. At the conclusion of the trial on
On December 5 the defendants filed notices of appeal from the judgments of contempt. The judgments were stayed pending the appeals. The United States on December 6 filed a petition for certiorari in both cases. Section 240 (a) of the Judicial Code authorizes a petition for certiorari by any party and the granting of certiorari prior to judgment in the Circuit Court of Appeals. Prompt settlement of this case being in the public interest, we granted certiorari on December 9, and subsequently, for similar reasons, granted petitions for certiorari filed by the defendants, 329 U. S. 708, 709, 710. The cases were consolidated for argument.
I.
Defendants’ first and principal contention is that the restraining order and preliminary injunction were issued in violation of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. We have come to a contrary decision.
It is true that Congress decreed in
Moreover, it seems never to have been suggested that the proscription on injunctions found in the Clayton Act is in any respect broader than that in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Defendants do not suggest in their argument that it is. This Court, on the contrary, has stated that the Norris-LaGuardia Act “still further ... [narrowed] the circumstances under which the federal courts could grant injunctions in labor disputes.”17 Consequently, we would feel justified in this case to consider the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act alone. If it does not apply, neither does the less comprehensive proscription of the Clayton Act;18 if it does, defendants’ reliance on the Clayton Act is unnecessary.
By the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested the federal courts of jurisdiction to issue injunctions in a specified class of cases. It would probably be conceded that the characteristics of the present case would be such
Even if our examination of the Act stopped here, we could hardly assent to this conclusion. There is an old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.20 It has been stated, in cases in which there were extraneous
But we need not place entire reliance on this exclusionary rule. Section 2,24 which declared the public policy of
If we examine §§ 4 and 13, on which defendants rely, we note that they do not purport to strip completely from the federal courts all their pre-existing powers to issue injunctions, that they withdraw this power only in a speci-
Those clauses in § 13 (a) and (b) spelling out the position of “persons” relative to the employer-employee relationship affirmatively suggest that the United States, as an employer, was not meant to be included. Those clauses require that the case involve persons “who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation,” who “have direct or indirect interests therein,” who are “employees of the same employer,” who are “members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees,” or who stand in some one of other specified positions relative to a dispute over the employer-employee relationship. Every one of these qualifications in § 13 (a) and (b) we think relates to an economic role ordinarily filled by a private individual or corporation, and not by a sovereign government. None of them is at all suggestive of any part played by the United States in its relations
In the type of case to which the Act applies, § 7 requires certain findings of fact as conditions precedent to the issuance of injunctions even for the limited purposes recognized by the Act. One such required finding is that “the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant‘s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.” Obviously, such finding could never be made if the complainant were the United States, and federal property were threatened by federal employees, as the responsibility of protection would then rest not only on state officers, but also on all federal civil and military forces. If these failed, a federal injunction would be a meaningless form. This provision, like those in §§ 2, 4 and 13, already discussed, indicates that the Act was not intended to affect the relations between the United States and its employees.
Defendants maintain that certain facts in the legislative history of the Act so clearly indicate an intent to restrict the Government‘s use of injunctions that all the foregoing arguments to the contrary must be rejected.
Representative Beck of Pennsylvania indicated in the course of the House debates that he thought the Government would be included within the prohibitions of the Act.26 Mr. Beck was not a member of the Judiciary Committee which reported the bill, and did not vote
Representative Blanton of Texas introduced an amendment to the bill which would have made an exception to the provision limiting the injunctive power “where the United States Government is the petitioner,” and this amendment was defeated by the House.27 But the first comment made on this amendment, after its introduction, was that of Representative LaGuardia, the House sponsor of the bill, who opposed it, not on the ground that such an exception should not be made, but rather on the ground that the express exception was unnecessary. Mr. LaGuardia read the definition of a person “participating or interested in a labor dispute” in § 13 (b), referred to the provisions of § 13 (a), and then added: “I do not see how in any possible way the United States can be brought in under the provisions of this bill.” When Mr. Blanton thereupon suggested the necessity of allowing the Government to use injunctions to maintain discipline in the army and navy, Mr. LaGuardia pointed out that these services are not “a trade, craft, or occupation.” Mr. Blanton‘s only answer to Mr. LaGuardia‘s opposition was that the latter “does not know what extensions will be made.” A vote was then taken and the amendment defeated.28 Obviously this incident does not reveal a Congressional intent to legislate concerning the relationship between the United States and its employees.
In the debates in both Houses of Congress numerous references were made to previous instances in which the United States had resorted to the injunctive process in labor disputes between private employers and private em-
ployees,29 where some public interest was thought to have become involved. These instances were offered as illustrations of the abuses flowing from the use of injunctions in labor disputes and the desirability of placing a limitation thereon. The frequency of these references and the attention directеd to their subject matter are compelling circumstances. We agree that they indicate that Congress, in passing the Act, did not intend to permit the United States to continue to intervene by injunction in purely private labor disputes.
But whether Congress so intended or not is a question different from the one before us now. Here we are concerned only with the Government‘s right to injunctive relief in a dispute with its own employees. Although we recognize that Congress intended to withdraw such remedy in the former situation, it does not follow that it intended to do so in the latter. The circumstances in which the Government sought such remedy in 1894 and 1922 were vastly different from those in which the Government is seeking to carry out its responsibilities by taking legal action against its own employees, and we think that the references in question have only the most distant and uncertain bearing on our present problem. Indeed, when we look further into the history of the Act, we find other events which unequivocally demonstrate that injunctive relief was not intended to be withdrawn in the latter situation.
When the House had before it a rule for the consideration of the bill, Representative Michener, a ranking minority member of the Judiciary Committee and spokesman for the minority party on the Rules Committee, made a general statement in the House concerning the subject matter of the bill and advocating its immediate consideration. In this survey he clearly stated that the Gov-
“Be it remembered that this bill does not attempt to legislate concerning Government employees. I do not believe that the enactment of this bill into law will take away from the Federal Government any rights which it has under existing law, to seek and obtain injunctive relief where the same is necessary for the functioning of the Government.”
In a later stage of the debate, Representative Michener repeated this view in the following terms:31
“This deals with labor disputes between individuals, not where the Government is involved. It is my notion that under this bill the Government can function with an injunction, if that is necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the Government. I should like to see this clarified, but I want to go on record as saying that under my interpretation of this bill the Federal Government will not at any time be prevented from applying for an injunction, if one is necessary in order that the Government may function.”
Representatives Michener and LaGuardia were members of the Judiciary Committee which reported and recommended the bill to the House. They were the most active spokesmen for the Committee, both in explaining the bill and advocating its passage. No member of the House who voted for the bill challenged their explanations. At least one other member expressed a like understanding.32 We cannot but believe that the House ac-
If we were to stop here, there would be little difficulty in accepting the decision of the District Court upon the scope of the Act. And the cases in this Court express consistent views concerning the types of situations to which the Act applies.35 They have gone no farther than to follow Congressional desires by regarding as beyond the jurisdiction of the District Courts the issuance of injunctions sought by the United States and directed to persons who are not employees of the United States. None of these cases dealt with the narrow segment of the employer-employee relationship now before us.
We have considered these opiniоns, but cannot accept them as authoritative guides to the construction of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. They were expressed by Sena-
It has been suggested, however, that Congress, in passing the War Labor Disputes Act, effectively restricted the theretofore existing authority of the courts to issue injunctions in connection with labor disputes in plants seized by the United States. Chief reliance is placed upon the rejection by the Senate of § 5 of the Connally substitute bill.43 But it is clear that no com-
Nor can the action of the conference committee be construed as a Congressional proscription of issuing injunctions to aid the United States in dealing with employees in seized plants. Neither the House nor Senate version, as these bills went to conference, in any way placed this issue before the conferees. The conference committee simply struck the broader provisions of the House bill allowing injunctions to issue in private labor disputes and
The defendants contend, however, that workers in mines seized by the Government are not employees of the Federal Government; that in operating the mines thus seized, the Government is not engaged in a sovereign function; and that, consequently, the situation in this case does not fall within the area which we have indicated as lying outside the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It is clear, however, that workers in the mines seized by the Government under the authority of the War Labor Disputes Act stand in an entirely different relationship to the Federal Government with respect to their employment from that which existed before the seizure was effected. That Congress intended such to be the case is apparent both from the terms of the statute and from the legislative deliberations preceding its enactment. Section 3 of the War Labor Disputes Act calls for the seizure of any plant, mine, or facility when the President finds that the operation thereof is threatened by strike or other labor disturbance and that an interruption in production will unduly impede the war effort. Congress intended that by virtue of Government seizure, a mine should become, for purposes of production and operation, a Government facility in as complete a sense as if the Government held full
Executive Order 9728, in pursuance of which the Government seized possession of the mines, authorized the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with the representatives of the miners, and thereafter to apply to the National Wage Stabilization Board for appropriate changes in terms and conditions of employment for the period of governmental operation.50 Such negotiations were undertaken and resulted in the Krug-Lewis agreement. That agreement contains many basic departures from the earlier contract entered into between the mine workers and the private operators on April 11, 1945, which, except as amended and supplemented by the Krug-Lewis agreement, was continued in effect for the period of Government possession. Among the terms of the Krug-Lewis agreement were provisions for a new mine safety code. Operating managers were directed to provide the mine employees with the protection and benefits of Workmen‘s Compensation and Occupational Disease Laws. Provision was made for a Welfare and Retirement Fund and a Medical and Hospital Fund. The agreement granted substantial wage increases and contained terms relating to vacations and vacation pay. Included were provisions calling for changes in equitable grievance procedures.
It should be observed that the Krug-Lewis agreement was one solely between the Government and the union.
It is descriptive of the situation to state that the Government, in order to maintain production and to accomplish the purposes of the seizure, has substituted itself for the private employer in dealing with those matters which formerly were the subject of collective bargaining between the union and the operators. The defendants by their conduct have given practical recognition to this fact. The union negotiated a collective agreement with the Government and has made use of the procedures provided by the War Labor Disputes Act to modify its terms and conditions. The union has apparently regarded the Krug-Lewis agreement as a sufficient contract of employment to satisfy the mine workers’ traditional demand of a contract as a condition precedent to their work. The defendant Lewis, in responding to a suggestion of the Secretary of the Interior that certain union demands should be taken to the private operators with the view of making possible the termination of Government possession, stated in a letter dated November 15, 1946: “The Government of the United States seized the mines and entered into a contract. The mine workers do not propose to deal with parties who have no status under that contract.” The defendant Lewis in the same letter referred to the operators as “strangers to the Krug-Lewis Agreement” and to the miners as the “400,000 men who now serve the Government of the United States in the bituminous coal mines.”
The defendants also point to the regulations which provide that none of the earnings or liabilities resulting from the operation of the mines, while under seizure, are for the account or at the risk or expense of the Government;53 that the companies continue to be liable for all Federal, State, and local taxes;54 and that the mining companies remain subject to suit.55 The regulations on which defendants rely represent an attempt on the part of the Coal Mines Administrator to define the respective powers and obligations of the Government and private operators during the period of Government control. We do not at this time express any opinion as to the validity of these regulations. It is sufficient to state that, in any event, the matters to which they refer have little persuasive weight in determining the nature of the relation existing between the Government and the mine workers.
II.
Although we have held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not render injunctive relief beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court, there are alternative grounds which support the power of the District Court to punish violations of its orders as criminal contempt.
Attention must be directed to the situation obtaining on November 18. The Government‘s complaint sought a declaratory judgment in respect to the right of the de-
The temporary restraining order was served on November 18. This was roughly two and one-half days before the strike was to begin. The defendants filed no motion to vacate the order. Rather, they ignored it, and allowed a nationwide coal strike to become an accomplished fact. This Court has used unequivocal language in condemning such conduct,56 and has in United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563 (1906), provided protection for judicial authority in situations of this kind. In that case this Court had allowed an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court of Tennessee. The petition had been filed by Johnson, then confined under a sentence of death imposed by a state court. Pending the appeal, this Court issued an order staying all proceedings against
“We regard this argument as unsound. It has been held, it is true, that orders made by a court having no jurisdiction to make them may be disregarded without liability to process for contempt. In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713; Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604. But even if the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction to entertain Johnson‘s petition, and if this court had no jurisdiction of the appeal, this court, and this court alone, could decide that such was the law. It and it alone necessarily had jurisdiction to decide whether the case was properly before it. On that question, at least, it was its duty to permit argument and to take the time required for such consideration as it might need. See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 387. Until its judgment declining jurisdiction should be announced, it had authority from the necessity of the case to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the petition, just as the state court was bound to refrain from further proceedings until the same time. Rev. Stat. § 766; act of March 3, 1893, c. 226, 27 Stat. 751. The fact that the petitioner was entitled to argue his
case shows what needs no proof, that the law contemplates the possibility of a decision either way, and therefore must provide for it.” 203 U. S. 573.
If this Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal in the Shipp case, its order would have had to be vacated. But it was ruled that only the Court itself could determine that question of law. Until it was found that the Court had no jurisdiction, “. . . it had authority from the necessity of the case to make orders to preserve the existing conditions and the subject of the petition . . . .”
Application of the rule laid down in United States v. Shipp, supra, is apparent in Carter v. United States, 135 F. 2d 858 (1943). There a district court, after making the findings required by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, issued a temporary restraining order. An injunction followed after a hearing in which the court affirmatively decided that it had jurisdiction and overruled the defendants’ objections based upon the absence of diversity and the absence of a case arising under a statute of the United States. These objections of the defendants prevailed on appeal, and the injunction was set aside. Brown v. Coumanis, 135 F. 2d 163 (1943). But in Carter, a companion case, violations of the temporary restraining order were held punishable as criminal contempt. Pending a decision on a doubtful question of jurisdiction, the District Court was held to have power to maintain the status quo and punish violations as contempt.57
Although a different result would follow were the question of jurisdiction frivolous and not substantial, such contention would be idle here. The applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to the United States in a case such as this had not previously received judicial consideration, and both the language of the Act and its legislative history indicated the substantial nature of the problem with which the District Court was faced.
Proceeding further, we find impressive authority for the proposition that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.58 This is true without regard even for the constitutionality of the Act under which the order is issued. In Howat v. Kansas, 258 U. S. 181, 189-90 (1922) this Court said:
“An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity powers upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served upon persons made parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must jurisdiction, which is often a close question, the federal court may either have to determine the facts, as in contested citizenship, or the law, as whether the case alleged arises under a law of the United States.”
be obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a seeming but void law going to the merits of the case. It is for the court of first instance to determine the question of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be punished.”59
Violations of an order are punishable as criminal contempt even though the order is set aside on appeal, Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14 (1887),60 or though the basic action has become moot, Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
We insist upon the same duty of obedience where, as here, the subject matter of the suit, as well as the parties, was properly before the court; where the elements of federal jurisdiction were clearly shown; and where the authority of the court of first instance to issue an order ancillary to the main suit depended upon a statute, the scope and applicability of which were subject to substantial doubt. The District Court on November 29 affirmatively decided that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was of no force in this case and that injunctive relief was therefore authorized. Orders outstanding or issued after that date were to be obeyed until they expired or were set aside by appropriate proceedings, appellate or otherwise. Convictions for criminal contempt intervening before that time may stand.
It does not follow, of course, that simply because a defendant may be punished for criminal contempt for dis-
Assuming, then, that the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to this case and prohibited injunctive relief at the request of the United States, we would set aside the preliminary injunction of December 4 and the judgment for civil contempt; but we would, subject to any infirmities in the contempt proceedings or in the fines imposed, affirm the judgments for criminal contempt as validly punishing violations of an order then outstanding and unreversed.
III.
The defendants have pressed upon us the procedural aspects of their trial and allege error so prejudicial as to require reversal of the judgments for civil and criminal contempt. But we have not been persuaded.
However,
Nevertheless, the defendants were quite aware that a criminal contempt was charged.64 In their motion to discharge and vacate the rule to show cause, the contempt charged was referred to as criminal.65 And in argument on the motion the defendants stated and were expressly informed that a criminal contempt was to be tried. Yet it is now urged that the omission of the words “criminal contempt” from the petition and rule to show cause was prejudicial error.
Not only were the defendants fully informed that a criminal contempt was charged, but we think they enjoyed during the trial itself all the enhanced protections accorded defendants in criminal contempt proceedings.67 We need not treat these at length, for defendants, in this respect, urge only their right to a jury trial as provided in § 11 of the
If the defendants were thus accorded all the rights and privileges owing to defendants in criminal contempt cases, they are put in no better position to complain because their trial included a proceeding in civil contempt and was carried on in the main equity suit. Common
Lastly, the defendants have assigned as error and argued in their brief that the District Court improperly extended the restraining order on November 27 for another ten days. There was then in progress argument on defendants’ motion to vacate the rule to show cause, a part of the contempt proceedings. In the circumstances of this case, we think there was good cause shown for extending the order.77
IV.
Apart from their contentions concerning the formal aspects of the proceedings below, defendants insist upon the inability of the United States to secure relief by way
V.
It is urged that, in any event, the amount of the fine of $10,000 imposed on the defendant Lewis and of the fine of $3,500,000 imposed on the defendant Union were arbitrary, excessive, and in no way related to the evidence adduced at the hearing.
Sentences for criminal contempt are punitive in their nature and are imposed for the purpose of vindicating the authority of the court. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra, at 441. The interests of orderly government demand that respect and compliance be given to orders issued by courts possessed of jurisdiction of persons and subject matter. One who defies the public authority and willfully refuses his obedience, does so at his peril. In imposing a fine for criminal contempt, the trial judge may properly take into consideration the extent of the willful and deliberate defiance of the court‘s order, the seriousness of the consequences of the contumacious behavior, the necessity of effectively terminating the defendant‘s defiance as required by the public interest, and the importance of deterring such acts in the future. Because of the nature of these standards, great reliance must be placed upon the discretion of the trial judge.
The trial court properly found the defendants guilty of criminal contempt. Such contempt had continued for 15 days from the issuance of the restraining order until the finding of guilty. Its willfulness had not been qualified by any concurrent attempt on defendants’ part to challenge the order by motion to vacate or other appropriate procedures. Immediately following the finding of guilty, defendant Lewis stated openly in court that defendants would adhere to their policy of defiance. This policy, as the evidenсe showed, was the germ center of an economic paralysis which was rapidly extending itself from the bituminous coal mines into practically every other major industry of the United States. It was an attempt to repudiate and override the instrument of lawful government in the very situation in which governmental action was indispensable.
The trial court also properly found the defendants guilty of civil contempt. Judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the court‘s order, and to compensate
But where the purpose is to make the defendant comply, the court‘s discretion is otherwise exercised. It must then consider the character and magnitude of the harm threatened by continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired.82
It is a corollary of the above principles that a court which has returned a conviction for contempt must, in fixing the amount of a fine to be imposed as a punishment or as a means of securing future compliance, consider the amount of defendant‘s financial resources and the consequent seriousness of the burden to that particular defendant.
In the light of these principles, we think the record clearly warrants a fine of $10,000 against defendant Lewis for criminal contempt. A majority of the Court, however, does not think that it warrants the unconditional imposition of a fine of $3,500,000 against the defendant union. A majority feels that, if the court below had assessed a fine of $700,000 against the defendant union, this, under the circumstances, would not be
We well realize the serious proportions of the fines here imposed upon the defendant union. But a majority feels that the course taken by the union carried with it such a serious threat to orderly constitutional government, and to the economic and social welfare of the nation, that a fine of substantial size is required in order to emphasize the
We are aware that the defendants may have sincerely believed that the restraining order was ineffective and would finally be vacated. However, the Government had sought a declaration of its contractual rights under the Krug-Lewis agreement, effective since May 29, 1946, and solemnly subscribed by the Government and the defendant union. The restraining order sought to preserve conditions until the cause could be determined, and obedience by the defendants would have secured this result. They had full opportunity to comply with the order of the District Court, but they deliberately refused obedience and
We have examined the other contentions advanced by the defendants but have found them to be without merit. The temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction were properly issued, and the actions of the District Court in these respects are affirmed. The judgment against the defendant Lewis is affirmed. The judgment against the defendant union is modified in accordance with this opinion, and, as modified, that judgment is affirmed.
So ordered.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON joins in this opinion except as to the
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring in the judgment.
The historic phrase “a government of laws and not of men” epitomizes the distinguishing character of our political society. When John Adams put that phrase into the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights he was not indulging in a rhetorical flourish. He was expressing the aim
But from their own experience and their deep reading in history, the Founders knew that Law alone saves a society from being rent by internecine strife or ruled by mere brute power however disguised. “Civilization involves subjection of force to reason, and the agency of this subjection is law.”1 The conception of a government by laws dominated the thoughts of those who founded this Nation and designed its Constitution, although they knew as well as the belittlers of the conception that laws have to be made, interpreted and enforced by men. To that end, they set apart a body of men, who were to be the depositories of law, who by their disciplined training and character and by withdrawal from the usual temptations of private interest may reasonably be expected to be “as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit.” So strongly were the framers of the Constitution bent on securing a reign of law that they endowed the judicial office with extraordinary safeguards and prestige. No one, no matter how exalted his public office or how righteous
Even when a statute deals with a relatively uncomplicated matter, and the “words in their natural sense as they would be read by the common man” would appear to give an obvious meaning, considerations underlying the statute have led this Court to conclude that “the words cannot be taken quite so simply.” See Milburn Co. v. Davis Co., 270 U.S. 390, 400. How much more true this is of legislation like the
The Government here invoked the aid of a court of equity in circumstances which certainly were not covered by the Act with inescapable clarity. Colloquially speaking, the Government was “running” the mines. But it was “running” them not as an employer, in the sense that the owners of the coal mines were the employers of the men the day before the Government seized the mines. Nor yet was the relation between the Government and the men like the relation of the Government to the civil service employees in the Department of the Interior. It would be naive or wilful to assert that the scope of the
To be sure, an obvious limitation upon a court cannot be circumvented by a frivolous inquiry into the existence of a power that has unquestionably been withheld. Thus, the explicit withdrawal from federal district courts of the power to issue injunctions in an ordinary labor dispute between a private employer and his employees cannot be defeated, and an existing right to strike thereby impaired, by pretending to entertain a suit for such an injunction in order to decide whether the court has jurisdiction. In such a case, a judge would not be acting as a court. He would be a pretender to, not a wielder of, judicial power.
That is not this case. It required extended arguments, lengthy briefs, study and reflection preliminary to adequate discussion in conference, before final conclusions could be reached regarding the proper interpretation of the legislation controlling this case. A majority of my brethren find that neither the
It does not mitigate such defiance of law to urge that hard-won liberties of collective action by workers were at stake. The most prized liberties themselves presuppose an independent judiciary through which these liberties may be, as they often have been, vindicated. When in a real controversy, such as is now here, an appeal is made to law, the issue must be left to the judgment of courts and not the personal judgment of one of the parties. This principle is a postulate of our democracy.
And so I join the opinion of the Court insofar as it sustains the judgment for criminal contempt upon the broad ground of vindicating the process of law.2 The records of this Court are full of cases, both civil and criminal, involving life or land or small sums of money, in which the Court proceeded to consider a federal claim that was not obviously frivolous. It retained such cases under its power until final judgment, though the claim eventually turned out to be unfounded and the judgment was one denying the jurisdiction either of this Court or of the court from which the case came. In the case before us, the District Court had power “to preserve the existing conditions” in the discharge of “its duty to permit argument and to take the time required for such consideration as it might need” to decide whether the controversy involved a labor dispute to which the
It only remains to state the basis of my disagreement with the Court‘s views on the bearing of the
“The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment . . . regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.”
That the controversy before the district court comes within this definition does not need to be labored. The
The
“A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; . . . .”
As already indicated, the Court now finds an exception to the limitation which the
Moreover, the rule proves too much. If the United States must explicitly be named to be affected, the limitations imposed by the
It is urged, however, that legislative history cuts down what might otherwise be the scope of the Act. Reliance is placed on statements by two Representatives during the House debates on the Bill, calculated to show that Congress purposed to exclude from the limitation of the jurisdiction of the district courts labor disputes involving “employees” of the Government, at least where injunctions are sought by the Attorney General. Since both statements came from spokesmen for the Bill, they carry weight. The nature of these remarks, the circumstances under which they were delivered, as well as their setting, define their meaning and the significance to be given them as a gloss upon the Act.
There was before the House an Amendment by Representative Blanton which would have made the Act applicable “except where the United States Government is the petitioner.” (75 Cong. Rec. 5503.) Representative LaGuardia opposed the Amendment, remarking “I do not see how in any possible way the United States can be brought in under the provisions of this bill.” If this is to be read apart from the meaning afforded by the context of the debates and the whole course of the legislation, it would mean that the jurisdiction to grant a Debs injunction continued unaffected. No one would have been more startled by such a conclusion than Mr. LaGuardia. The fact is that a situation like the present, where the Government for a time has some relation to a labor dispute in an essentially private industry, was evidently not in the thought of Congress. Certainly it was not discussed. Mr. LaGuardia‘s statement regarding the position of the United States under the Act followed his reading of § 13 (b) under which a person is to be deemed interested in a labor dispute only if “engaged in the same industry, trade,
The second Representative upon whom the Court relies is Mr. Michener. He said, “Be it remembered that this bill does not attempt to legislate concerning Government employees. I do not believe that the enactment of this bill into law will take away from the Federal Government any rights which it has under existing law, to seek and obtain injunctive relief where the same is necessary for the functioning of the Government.” (75 Cong. Rec. 5464.) Later he added “. . . This deals with labor disputes between individuals, not where the Government is involved. It is my notion that under this bill the Government can function with an injunction, if that is necessary in order to carry out the purpose of the Government. I should like to see this clarified, but I want to go on record as saying that under my interpretation of this bill the Federal Government will not at any time be prevented from applying for an injunction, if one is necessary in order that the Government may function.” (Id. at 5509.) What Mr.
It is to be noted that the discussion in the House followed passage in the Senate of that which subsequently became the Act. It is a matter of history that the Senate Judiciary Committee was the drafting and driving force behind the Bill. The Bill had extended consideration by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee followed by weighty reports and full discussion on the Senate floor. We are not pointed to a suggestion or a hint in the Senate proceedings that the withdrawal of jurisdiction to issue
But even if we assume that the Act was not intended to apply to labor disputes involving “employees” of the United States, are the miners in the case before us “employees” of the United States within the meaning of this interpolated exception? It can hardly be denied that the relation of the miners to the United States is a hybrid one. Clearly, they have a relation to the Government other than that of employees of plants not under Government operation. Equally clearly, they have a relation and a status different from the relation and status of the clerks at the Treasury Department. Never in the country‘s history have the terms of employment of the millions in Government service been established by collective bargaining. But the conditions of employment—hours, wages, holi-
private plants indicates that the employees of these plants were to be considered employees of the United States in the usual and natural meaning of the term. In the full debates on bills providing for Government seizure of plants, Congressional leaders clearly indicated their understanding that as the law then stood there could be no injunctions in labor disputes in seized plants.7
But not only was such the understanding when the legal question emerged in the course of considering the need of war legislation. Recent legislation and its history
By the
The bill then went to conference. What came out was, so far as here material, the bill that had passed the Senate. The United States was granted power to seize and oper-
“Mr. President, I ask the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. Hatch], the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Danaher], and the Senator from Texas [Mr. Connally], the sponsor of the bill, whether there is a unanimous opinion on the part of those three great lawyers that there will not be a reopening of the district courts to industry-labor disputes? . . . I should like that point to be made so firmly and so strongly that no lawyer in the land who would like to take advantage of the situation created by the mere mention of the words ‘district court’ will resort to the court in order to confuse our industry-labor relations.”
Mr. Connally answered:
“Mr. President, . . . I think I speak for the Senator from Vermont and the Senator from New Mexico and the Senator from Connecticut and also the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Van Nuys], although he is not present, when I say that there is no jurisdiction whatever conferred by this bill providing for resort to the United States district court, except the one mentioned by the Senator from Connecticut, which is merely the right to go there for a civil action for damages, and
no jurisdiction whatever is given over labor disputes. Does that answer the Senator?” “MR. THOMAS of Utah. I thank the Senator for making that statement and I hope it will satisfy the lawyers of the country.”
“MR. CONNALLY. I am sure it will.”16
Under these circumstances the Bill became law, and the seizure giving rise to this controversy was made under that law. The separate items of this legislative history cannot be judged in isolation. They must be considered together, and as part of the course of legislation dealing with injunctions in labor disputes. To find that the Government has the right which Senator Connally‘s amendment sought to confer but which the Congress withheld is to say that voting down the amendment had the same effect as voting it up.
Events since the passage of the Act underscore what would appear to be the controlling legislative history of the
As is well known, as the debates clearly show, as Senator Connally admitted, the
I concur in the Court‘s opinion insofar as it is not inconsistent with these views, and, under the compulsion of the ruling of the majority that the court below had jurisdiction to issue its orders, I join in the Court‘s judgment.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For the reasons given in the Court‘s opinion, we agree that neither the
We have no doubt that the miners became Government employees when the Government took over the mines. It assumed complete control over the mines and their operation. The fact that it utilized the managerial forces of the private owners does not detract from the Government‘s complete authority. For whatever control Government agents delegated to the private managers, those agents had full power to take away and exercise themselves. If we thought, as is here contended, that the Government‘s possession and operation of the mines were not genuine, but merely pretended, we should then say that the
Since the
We agree that the court had power summarily to coerce obedience to those orders and to subject defendants to such conditional sanctions as were necessary to compel obedience. And we agree that in such civil contempt proceedings to compel obedience, it was not necessary for the court to abide by all the procedural safeguards which surround trials for crime. Without such coercive powers, courts could not settle the cases and controversies before them. Courts could not administer justice if persons were left free pending adjudication to engage in conduct which would either immediately interrupt the judicial proceedings or so change the status quo of the subject matter of a controversy that no effective
The Gompers decision and many others have pointed out that the object of such coercive contempt proceedings is not to punish for an offense against the public, but to compel obedience to valid court orders. Yet the decision of this Court also approves unconditional fines as criminal punishment for past disobedience. We cannot agree to this aspеct of the Court‘s judgment. At a very early date this Court declared, and recently it has reiterated, that in contempt proceedings courts should never exercise more than “the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.” Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (1821); In re Michael, 326 U. S. 224, 227 (1945).
In determining whether criminal punishment or coercive sanction should be employed in these proceedings, the question of intent—the motivation of the contumacy—becomes relevant. Difficult questions of law were presented by this case. It is plain that the defendants acted
We think it significant that the conduct which was prohibited by the restraining order for violation of which these defendants have been punished for contempt is also punishable under the
We should modify the District Court‘s decrees by making the entire amount of the fines payable conditionally. On December 7, 1946, Mr. Lewis directed the mine workers to return to work until midnight, March 31, 1947. But, so far as we are aware, the notice which purported to terminate the contract has not been withdrawn. Thus, therе has been, at most, only a partial compliance with the temporary injunction.
Hence our judgment should provide that the defendants pay their respective fines only in the event that full and unconditional obedience to the temporary injunction, including withdrawal of the notice which purported to terminate the contract, is not had on or before a day certain.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, dissenting.
An objective reading of the
Due recognition must be given to the circumstances that gave rise to this case. The Government was confronted with the necessity of preserving the economic health of the nation; dire distress would have eventuated here and abroad from a prolonged strike in the bituminous coal mines. It was imperative that some effective action be taken to break the stalemate. But those factors do not permit the conversion of the judicial process into a weapon for misapplying statutes according to the grave exigencies of the moment. That can have tragic consequences even more serious and lasting than a temporary dislocation of the nation‘s economy resulting from a strike of the miners.
The whole thrust of the
The crux of this case is whether the fact that the Government took over the possession and operation of the mines changed the private character of the underlying labor dispute between the operators and the miners so as to make inapplicable the
The important point, and it cannot be overemphasized, is that Congress has decreed that strikes and labor disturb-
The Government‘s seizure of the coal mines thus be-
comes irrelevant to the issue. The federal equity power
to issue restraining orders and injunctions simply cannot
be invoked in this case, since it grows out of a private labor
dispute. And it makes no difference that the party seek-
ing the proscribed relief is the Government rather than
a private employer. The touchstone of the
Since in my view the restraining order and the tem-
porary injunction in this case are void and without
effect, there remains for me only the contention that the
defendants are guilty of criminal contempt for having
willfully ignored the void restraining order. It is said
that the District Court had the power to preserve exist-
ing conditions while it was determining its own authority
to grant injunctive relief; hence the defendants acted
at their own peril in disobeying the restraining order.
Eloquent pleas are made for the supremacy of the judi-
ciary over the individual and the requirement that a per-
These arguments have a seductive attractiveness here.
Ordinarily, of course, it is better policy to obey a void
order than run the risk of a contempt citation. And as a
general proposition, individuals cannot be allowed to be
the judges of the validity of court orders issued against
them. But the problem raised by the violation of the
restraining order in this case must be viewed against the
background and language of the
Unlike most other situations, this Act specifically pro-
hibits the issuance of restraining orders except in situa-
tions not here involved. There is no exception in favor
of a restraining order where there is some serious doubt
about the court‘s jurisdiction; indeed, the prohibition
against restraining orders would be futile were such an
exception recognized, for the minds of lawyers and judges
are boundless in their abilities to raise serious jurisdic-
tional objections. And so Congress has flatly forbidden
the issuance of all restraining orders under this Act. It
follows that when such an order is issued despite this clear
prohibition, no man can be held in contempt thereof,
however unwise his action may be as a matter of policy.
When he violates the void order,
This absolute outlawry of restraining orders in cases
involving private labor disputes is not without reason.
The issuance of such orders prior to the adoption of the
Congress was well aware of this use of restraining orders to break strikes. After full consideration, it intentionally and specifically prohibited their use, with certain excep- tions not here relevant. We are not free to disregard that prohibition. Hence the doctrine of the Shipp case has no relation whatever to our present problem. That case dealt with an order of this Court staying the execution of a convicted felon, an order which lay within the recog- nized power of this Court and which had not been validly prohibited by Congress. Naturally, no man could violate that order with impunity. But we are acting here in the unique field of labor relations, dealing with a type of order which Congress has definitely proscribed. If we are to hold these defendants in contempt for having violated a void restraining order, we must close our eyes to the ex- pressed will of Congress and to the whole history of equi- table restraints in the field of labor disputes. We must disregard the fact that to compel one to obey a void re- straining order in a case involving a labor dispute and to require that it be tested on appeal is to sanction the use of the restraining order to break strikes—which was precisely what Congress wanted to avoid. Every reason support- ing the salutary principle of the Shipp case breaks down when that principle is applied in this setting. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court in toto.
It has been said that the actions of the defendants
threatened orderly constitutional government and the
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, dissenting.
This case became a cause célèbre the moment it began. No good purpose can be served by ignoring that obvious fact. But it cannot affect our judgment save only perhaps to steel us, if that were necessary, to the essential and ac- customed behavior of judges.1 In all cases great or small this must be to render judgment evenly and dispassion- ately according to law, as each is given understanding to ascertain and apply it.
I.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER has shown conclusively, I
think, that the policy of the
That Act expressly provides the remedies for its enforce- ment. Beyond seizure of plants, mines and facilities for temporary2 governmental operation, they are exclusively
The Senate thoroughly considered and debated various proposals for authorizing equity to intervene in labor dis- putes, one by the Act‘s sponsor in that body. Positively, repeatedly and unwaveringly it rejected all of them. They were likewise rejected in conference, where the Senate‘s view prevailed over that of the House. The latter body had not been inattentive to the problem. It sought and failed to secure the very thing this Court now says, in effect, was included.4 That issue and that policy were indeed the main thrust and focus of the legislative struggle, and the outcome was not negative; it was positive and conclusive against using or giving the equitable remedies.
This means to me that Congress, in that action, did not
simply confirm the
The Senate, and at the end the Congress, were not de- clining expressly to authorize labor injunctions only to turn squarely about and nullify that refusal in the same breath, merely by virtue of the fact that the employees of seized plants necessarily were made subject temporarily to ultimate governmental operating direction and con- trol.5 We cannot attribute to Congress an intent so du-
Whether Congress acted wisely in this refusal is not our
concern. But it is not irrelevant to the Act‘s meaning,
purpose and effect that there were good reasons, indeed
strong ones, for Congress to continue to follow the
imputing to Congress the purpose to do with one hand what the other denied was being done, the identification of these two very distinct things serves only to confuse and make obscure the real question. This is simply whether Congress intended to abrogate for seized plants or to continue in force the established policy against labor injunctions as a method of exercising the powers of ultimate control conferred upon the Government.
Congress was thoroughly familiar with the history and
effects of injunctions in labor disputes, with the long set-
tled national policy against them, and with the universal
abhorrence in the ranks of labor, however otherwise di-
vided, towаrd them. In view of all these things Congress
well may have felt and I think did feel, as my brother‘s
recital of the history shows, that it was both unnecessary
and unwise, perhaps would even be harmful to further-
ance of the war effort, in substance to repeal the
It is important in this connection that 1943, rather than
1945 or 1946, was the year in which the
It was in this setting and to meet the problems it had
thrown up, not the later one out of which this controversy
arose, that the
In view of all these considerations, I cannot believe that Congress, in effect and by indirection, was exerting its war power to the greatest possible extent or was there- by either repealing or suspending the nation‘s settled pol- icy against injunctions in labor disputes. Rather, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress was relying exclu- sively upon the added powers of enforcement expressly conferred by the Act, namely, the power of seizure and the force of the criminal sanction, to accomplish the needed results.11
These were in themselves powerful sanctions. They carried with them the added and very great sanction of
of six months after the termination of such hostilities as so pro- claimed.”
It may be noted that on December 31, 1946, the President by proc- lamation announced the end of hostilities. 12 Fed. Reg. 1. The emergency powers conferred by the Act terminate six months thereafter.
Accordingly, upon the specific terms of the
II.
This conclusion substantially compels the further one that United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, has no valid application to the situation presented by this case.
This Court has not yet expressly denied, rather it has
repeatedly confirmed Congress’ power to control the juris-
diction of the inferior federal courts and its own appellate
jurisdiction.
If that were the law, the result could only be to nullify
the congressional power over federal jurisdiction for a
great volume of cases. And if it should become the law,
for every case raising a question not frivolous concerning
the court‘s jurisdiction to enter an order or judgment, that
punishment for contempt may be imposed irrevocably
simply upon a showing of violation, the consequences
would be equally or more serious. The force of such a
rule, making the party act on pain of certain punishment
regardless of the validity of the order violated or the court‘s
This would be true, for instance, wherever the substan-
tive rights asserted or the opportunity for exercising them
would vanish with obedience to the challenged order. Cf.
Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713. The
Indeed it was because these were so often the effects, not
simply of final orders entered after determination upon the
merits, but of interlocutory injunctions and ex parte re-
straining orders, that the
Indeed the Shipp doctrine thus broadly conceived would go far toward nullifying the historic jurisdiction of this Court and others in habeas corpus, for it would do this in the many situations where the cause of commit- ment is violation of a doubtfully valid court order and the ground asserted for release is the court‘s lack of juris- diction to enter it. Thus, in this case, if the party Lewis had been imprisoned rather than fined, the broad applica- tion now made of the Shipp decision would dictate that he could not be released by habeas corpus, even though it were now held here that the restraining orders were be- yond the District Court‘s jurisdiction to issue.16 If those
by the plain language and the equally plain purpose of the acts of Congress . . . The Circuit Court was, therefore, without authority to make the orders for the examination of petitioner in this case, and equally without authority to enforce these orders by process for contempt.” Pp. 724, 726. Had Fisk submitted, as Shipp is now said to require should be done, not only would the specific commands of Congress have been nullified. His right, secured by those com- mands, could never have been vindicated. The statutes would have been made dead letters.
I cannot believe that the historic powers of our courts in habeas corpus or the rights of citizens, confirmed as these have been for so long by an unbroken line of de- cisions,19 have been or can be overthrown and subverted,
stated this to be his view of the law (see however note 19), as appar- ently also it was of Waite, C. J. P. 223. See Reid v. Independent Union, 200 Minn. 599 (certiorari), but see the dissenting opinion, 200 Minn. at 612; Collateral Attack Upon Labor Injunctions Issued in Disregard of Anti-Injunction Statutes (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1136; People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of Kings County, 164 Misc. 355.
Certainly if its purpose had been to overrule the de cisions so thoroughly established, and to trench so heavily upon the historic liberties they and the Constitution itself secure, some note would have been taken of that fact. So great a revolution hardly could have been wrought unanimously or without attentive recognition of what was being done. There was indeed reference in the opinion to the previous decisions. The Court stated: “It has been held, it is true, that orders made by a court having no jurisdiction to make them may be disregarded without liability to process for contempt,” citing the Sawyer, Fisk, and Rowland cases.20 203 U. S. at 573. But there was not the slightest suggestion, by this reference or otherwise, that the Court had any purpose whatever to impair the force of those decisions, much less to overrule them. Nor in fact was this its intent. It mentioned them only to put them aside as inapplicable to the situation before it.
Indeed, in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co., 221 U. S. 418, decided five years after the Shipp decision, a unani mous Court joined in citing Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. S. 604, in context consistent only with the view that its doc trine, and therefore that of others like it decided prior to the Shipp case, remained fully effective. P. 436. There was no intimation, as otherwise necessarily would have been given, that the Shipp decision had reversed or modi fied the Rowland case, or any like it, in any way. And in
Waite, C. J., and Harlan, J., wrote separate dissents taking the posi tion which the Court now accepts for this case. See note 16 supra. Harlan, J., however, receded from his view in Ex parte Young, supra, where he dissented on other grounds. 209 U. S. at 169, 174.
The Court in Shipp was dealing with a situation quite different from the ones presented in the previous decisions and in this case. In none of them was the action which violated the court‘s order such as would have defeated its jurisdiction not only to enter the order but also to proceed with the cause before it in any manner, except to deal with the matter of contempt.21 In them the Court was not
But exactly such a situation was presented in the Shipp case. The conduct there held to be contempt not only was in itself criminal and in violation, as it turned out, of this Court‘s lawful order for taking the appeal in Johnson‘s case. It ousted this Court altogether of jurisdiction to take any action in that cause. It rendered the cause moot, thereby putting an end to any proceedings concerning it here or elsewhere. Shipp‘s alleged conduct constituted therefore the most serious possible interference with the due and orderly course of administering justice. It utterly destroyed the power of all courts to act. Further, the order violated was not made directly in contravention of an act of Congress, as was true in the Fisk case and, as I think, in this one. It rather was made in complete conformity with the statutes conferring authority on this Court to take jurisdiction of and hear such causes. Nothing in it violated either a congressional mandate and policy or the rights of any party.
Moreover the decision was not effective, as its doctrine is now said to be, to put Shipp to any choice of obedience on pain of certain punishment regardless of the violated order‘s validity or invalidity as ultimately determined on review. No such situation was presented on the facts, and no such ruling could properly have been made. Shipp had not been convicted. The case came here upon a challenge in limine, not after the event, made upon the plead-though improperly the Court held, to determine whether the child was properly in their custody or in the custody of the father. As the contempt order was held void, habeas corpus was granted.
Moreover in none of these cases did the disobedience destroy the jurisdiction of the trial and appellate courts to determine jurisdiction.
The basis of counsel‘s contention was that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction and therefore that this Court also lacked jurisdiction. His brief stated: “The only question, therefore, is whether Johnson‘s proceeding in habeas corpus in the Circuit Court did or did not in fact constitute a ‘case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States.’ If it did, this Court had appellate jurisdiction of it and should proceed to inquire whether its order has been disobeyed. If it did not, this Court had no jurisdiction of it and should now so hold for the purposes of this proceeding . . . .” (Emphasis added.) And elsewhere the brief stated: “We assume that it will hardly be contended that the mere allowance of an appeal is sufficient to give the court jurisdiction of a case which from its nature is not appealable. Such action is pro forma only, and as it is necessarily had in every case the jurisdiction of the court would always be established by an ex parte order.”
In answer to these arguments the Government‘s brief said: “Certainly no one would challenge the jurisdiction of this court if the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, and accordingly the defendants here
From that ruling and from it alone the consequence followed that Shipp could be held in contempt on proof, still to be made, that he had done acts in violation of the order as thus conclusively determined to be valid by the court of last resort. This was a far cry from holding that punishment in contempt can be laid irrevocably, regardless of the outcome on review concerning the order‘s validity. The Court by its ruling was not making void orders valid for purposes of punishment by way of contempt. Only if the Court has held its own order which Shipp violated invalid would such a question have been presented.
The Shipp decision therefore was in fact simply an application of the long established rule that punishment in contempt may be inflicted on proof of violation of a valid order of court as determined finally on review. It did not overrule, nor was it in any way inconsistent with the long prior course of decisions holding that when an order is void for want of jurisdiction it may be disobeyed with impunity pending but depending upon determination of its invalidity by appeal, habeas corpus, or other mode deny the jurisdiction of this court simply as a corollary to their contention that the Circuit Court did not possess jurisdiction. But the jurisdiction of this court is not dependent upon contentions, and it has jurisdiction to take the case and retain it for final determination whether it turns out that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction or not.”
In my judgment this is the rule properly applicable in this case, the only one consistent with the settled and unvaried course of decision, with the commands of the
Apart from immediate and other interferences with judicial proceedings not presented here, that section authorizes punishment for contempt only for disobedience of a “lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts.” (Emphasis added.) The section by its terms, apart from the exceptions not here applicable, limits power to punish for contempt to violations of lawful orders, thereby necessarily excluding others. Nor did it purport to make lawful for that purpose interlocutory orders issued without jurisdiction as determined finally upon review.26
This case, unlike the Shipp case, in no way involves interference with any of the legal proceedings or the due
Since in my opinion the order was jurisdictionally invalid when issued, by virtue of the
On the contrary that view has been long rejected, and I do not think we should disturb or depart from that settled course of decision now. “If the command of the writ [of mandamus] was in excess of jurisdiction, so neces-
III.
The issues concerning the manner in which the contempt proceeding was conducted are in themselves of great moment, apart from the foregoing conclusions which I think are dispositive of the controversy. And the Court‘s rulings upon them are of such a character that I cannot accede by silence.
At times in our system the way in which courts perform their function becomes as important as what they do in the result. In some respects matters of procedure constitute the very essence of ordered liberty under the Constitution. For this reason, especially in the Bill of Rights, specific guaranties have been put around the manner in which various legal proceedings shall be conducted. They differentiate sharply between the procedures to be followed in criminal proceedings and in civil ones. These differences mark one of the great constitutional divides.28 They separate the zone of punishment for crime, with all its odious consequences, from that of giving civil relief, where no such consequences attend, not partially but completely.
I do not think the Constitution contemplated that there should be in any case an admixture of civil and criminal proceedings in one. Such an idea is altogether foreign to its spirit. There can be no question that contempt power was conferred adequate to sustain the judicial function, in both civil and criminal forms. But it does not follow that the Constitution permits lumping the two together or discarding for the criminal one all of the procedural safeguards so carefully provided for every other such proceeding.
The founders did not command the impossible. They could not have conceived that procedures so irreconcilably inconsistent in many ways30 could be applied simultane-
In my opinion, our system does not comprehend a power so unconfined anywhere within its broad borders, and it is time the large confusion about this were swept away.32 It
This case is characteristic of the long-existing confusion concerning contempts and the manner of their trial, among other things, in that most frequently the question of the nature and character of the proceeding, whether civil or criminal, is determined at its end in the stage of review rather than, as it should be and as in my opinion it must be, at the beginning. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444. And this fact in itself illustrates the complete jeopardy in which rights are placed when the nature of the proceeding remains unknown and unascertainable until the final action on review.
Not only is one thus placed in continuing dilemma throughout the proceedings in the trial court concerning which set of procedural rights he is entitled to stand upon, whether upon the criminal safeguards or only on the civil. He also does not and cannot know until it is too late, that is, until the appellate phase is ended, whether one group or the other of appellate jurisdictional and procedural rules applies. Indeed he may find that his right of review has been taken either prematurely or too late depending entirely on whether the appellate court finally concludes that the proceeding has been civil or criminal in character.35
Precisely for these reasons this Court, when confronted in the Gompers case, supra, with a proceeding commingling civil and criminal features, such as we have here, refused to countenance such a mixture and, finding that the proceedings had been civil, held the criminal penalty of fixed terms of imprisonment to be invalid.36 The Court said:
“There was therefore a departure—a variance between the procedure adopted and the punishment imposed, when, in answer to a prayer for remedial relief, in the equity cause, the court imposed a punitive sentence appropriate only to a proceeding at law for criminal contempt. The result was as fundamentally erroneous as if in an action of ‘A. vs. B. for assault and battery,’ the judgment entered had been that the defendant be confined in prison for twelve months.” 221 U.S. at 449.
This, the Court said, “is not a mere matter of form, for manifestly every citizen, however unlearned in the law, by a mere inspection of the papers in contempt proceedings ought to be able to see whether it was instituted for private litigation or for public prosecution . . . . He should not be left in doubt as to whether relief or punishment was the object in view. He is not only entitled to be informed of the nature of the charge against him, but to know that it is a charge and not a suit. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559.” 221 U.S. at 446.
This rule has now been incorporated also in
See also Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 42-43. But it flatly incorporates the effect of the decision in the Gompers case, supra.
The language used by the Court was language of the Constitution, reinforced by citation of the Cruikshank case. Careful as it was about expressly overruling prior decisions46 where the Sixth Amendment‘s requirement47 had not been observed, there can be no doubt that the Court was announcing for the future that the constitutional requirement must be complied with. And the
One who does not know until the end of litigation what his procedural rights in trial are, or may have been, has no such rights. He is denied all by a hide-and-seek game between those that are criminal and those that are civil. The view which would seem to be the only one consistent with the whole spirit of the Constitution, and with the nature of our free institutions, is that all of the constitutional guaranties applicable to trials for crime should apply to such trials for contempt, excepting only those which may be wholly inconsistent with the nature and execution of the function the court must perform.49 As has been said, courts in performing this function are not above the Constitution; rather they are empowered to perform it in order to make the Constitution itself operative.50 Accordingly, not the least but the greatest possible application of it to this phase of their work is the only rule consistent with their place in the constitutional scheme. In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227.
Hence, whatever may be true of indictment and jury trials, I see no compelling reason whatever for not apply-
Surely the rights to a speedy and public trial, to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor, to have the assistance of counsel for his defense, and, as the Gompers case held, to be informed of the nature as well as the cause of the accusation, cannot be denied
When the assertion and securing of all other rights depends upon one, that one is the core of all. Here the right “to know that it was a charge, and not a suit” comprehended all other procedural rights in the trial and appellate courts. Without this, none could be asserted or maintained. The denial of that right, deferring it until the decision here is handed down, is in my opinion not only a denial of all. It is a violation both of the Constitution and of
But we are told that this, and all that followed or may have followed from it, make no difference because there was no prejudice. There are at least two answers. This Court has held that the denial of constitutional guaranties in trials for crime is in itself prejudice. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, and cases cited in n. 19. The other, there was prejudice and in the most important thing beyond knowing the nature of the proceeding in advance of trial, namely, in the penalty itself.
IV.
Not only was the penalty against the union excessive, as the Court holds. Vice infected both “fines” more deeply. As the proceeding itself is said to have been both civil and criminal, so arе the two “fines.” Each was imposed in a single lump sum, with no allocation of specific portions as among civil damages, civil coercion and criminal punishment. The Government concedes that some part of each
This was in the teeth of the Gompers and other previous decisions here. The law has fixed standards for each remedy, and they are neither identical nor congealable. They are, for damages in civil contempt, the amount of injury proven and no more, Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co., supra, at 444; for coercion, what may be required to bring obedience and not more, whether by way of imprisonment or fine;52 for punishment, what is not cruel and unusual or, in the case of a fine, excessive within the
Obviously, however, when all these distinct types and functions of relief are lumped together, in a single so-called ment, as such, in criminal contempts where the penalty is undefined by statute. The only crime for which the amount of the fine has no maximum is treason, where the fine authorized is not less than $10,000.
In this state of things, it is utterly impossible to perform our function of review in the manner heretofore required, even within the broad limits prescribed for cases of civil and criminal contempt. This commingling of the various forms of relief, like that of the proceedings themselves, deprives these contemnors of any possibility for having the scope of the relief given against them measured according to law.
That is no insubstantial deprivation. When hybrid proceedings can produce hybrid penalties, concealing what is for punishment and what remedial, what criminal and what civil, and in the process can discard constitutional procedural protections against just such consequences, as convenience or other wholly discretionary impulse may command, then indeed to the extent we allow this will we have adopted the continental tradition of the civilians and rejected our own. No casе in this Court heretofore has ever sustained such conglomerate proceedings and penalties.57
That the Government is complainant here, both as “employer” seeking remedial relief and in sovereign capac-
These are the limitations the law has prescribed. They apply equally when the Government is complainant, and whether in one capacity or the other, or both, as when others are.59 They cannot be dispensed with, separately or by conglomerating all into a single indiscriminate lump, at the suit of the Government or another, in this case or for others. To permit this would be to throw overboard the limitations prescribed by law and make the courts purely discretionary arbitrators of controversies. That cannot be done in our system.
The Court thus purports to make separate the distinct items of relief commingled in the District Court‘s action. But in doing so, in my opinion, it wholly disregards the established standard for measuring criminal fines and its own as well as the District Court‘s function relating to them. If Lewis and the union had been convicted on indictment and jury trial in a proceeding surrounded by all the constitutional and other safeguards of criminal prosecution for violating the
In my opinion, when Congress prescribes a maximum penalty for criminal violation of a statute, that penalty fixes the maximum which can be imposed whether the conviction is in a criminal proceeding as such for its violation or is for contempt for violating an order of court to observe it temporarily. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 612. If the fine or other penalty in such a case can be multiplied twice or any other number of times, merely by bringing a civil suit, securing a temporary restraining order and then convicting the person who violates
But it is in relation to the flat criminal fine of $700,000 against the union that the Court‘s disregard of the constitutional and other standards is most apparent. By what measuring rod this sum has been arrived at as the appropriate and lawful amount, I am unable to say, unless indeed it is simply by a rough estimate of what the union should be forced to pay on all counts. Never has a criminal fine of such magnitude been heretofore laid and sustained, so far as I am able to discover. And only for treason, with one other possible exception,61 has Congress authorized one so large. Moreover, the Court‘s enumeration of factors to be taken into account indicates expressly, as I read the opinion, that one is the coercive effect of the imposition for the future, though it is thoroughly settled that in contempt criminal punishment is to be laid only for past conduct.62 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & R. Co., supra, and authorities cited.
Thus, the Court in effect imposes double coercive penalties, in view of the additional contingent award of $2,800,000 for that specific and sole purpose. I think the criminal fine of $700,000 not only constitutionally excessive, far beyond any heretofore sustained for violation of any statute or order of court. It is also an unlawful commingling of civil coercive and criminal penalties, without the essential contingent feature in the coercive phase, under our prior decisions.
In its revision of the penalties therefore the Court in my opinion not only fails to unscramble the coercive and criminal elements, as the prior decisions here require to be done.63 It imposes grossly excessive criminal penalties, determined in amount by wholly arbitrary estimate related to no previously established standard legislatively or judicially fixed. And in doing so, it usurps the District Court‘s function. All this flows in part at least from its basic error, which is its failure to follow the rule of the Gompers and other cases that not only civil and criminal penalties, but also civil and criminal proceedings are altogether different and separate things, and under the Constitution must be kept so.
Much more is involved in this controversy than the issues which have been discussed. The issues in the main suit have not been determined and it would be beyond our function to intimate opinion concerning them now. But
No right is absolute. Nor is any power, governmental or other, in our system. There can be no question that it provides power to meet the greatest crises. Equally certain is it that under “a government of laws and not of men” such as we possess, power must be exercised according to law; and government, including the courts, as well as the governed, must move within its limitations.
This means that the courts and all other divisions or agencies of authority must act within the limits of their respective functions. Specifically it means in this case that we are bound to act in deference to the mandate of Congress concerning labor injunctions, as in judgment and conscience we conceive it to have been made. The crisis here was grave. Nevertheless, as I view Congress’ action, I am unable to believe that it has acted to meet, or authorized the courts to meet, the situation which arose in the manner which has been employed.
No man or group is above the law. All are subject to its valid commands. So are the government and the courts. If, as I think, Congress has forbidden the use of labor injunctions in this and like cases, that conclusion is the end of our function. And if modification of that policy is to be made for such cases, that problem is for Congress in the first instance, not for the courts.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY joins in this opinion.
Notes
“(b) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this section
shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000, or to imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both.”
The analogy of equity receivership is not inapt. In a limited sense, employees of plants in receivership in a federal court may be considered employees of the United States, since the operation of the plant is under the jurisdiction and control of a United States officer. But no one aware of the background of mischief which the Act was intended to remedy could find an intention in Congress to allow injunctions in labor disputes involving plants in receivership. Compare Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U. S. 50, 55, 58-61 (1944). No series of cases contributed more to the feeling that the federal courts abused their equity jurisdiction than those involving employees of
See also In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 610, 611 (1914); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87 (1925); Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378, 383 (1919); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 440 (1932); Nye v. United States, 313 U. S. 33 (1941); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 264 (1941); Pendergast v. United States, 317 U. S. 412 (1943); In re Bradley, 318 U. S. 50 (1943). Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in “Inferior” Federal Courts, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1043-1045 (1924) and authorities there collected; Nelles and King, Contempt by Publication in the United States, 28 Col. L. Rev. 401 (1928). 6 Section 2 (c) excludes carriers as defined in Title I of the“MR. CONNALLY. . . . The provision is limited to plants which the Government takes over. It would not change the Norris-LaGuardia Act in any respect, except in the one particular case . . .
“MR. LANGER. Mr. President, is it not true that unless section 5 is stricken from the bill that a portion of the Norris-LaGuardia Act will be repealed?
“MR. DANAHER. It would certainly be overridden; . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) 89 Cong. Rec. 3988-89.
See also the statements of Senators Taft, Vandenberg, and Wagner, and compare those of Senators Revercomb and Barkley; and see the colloquy between Senators Connally and Vandenberg, id. at 3906, quoted infra note 10.
7 The available statistics speak in terms of “strikes” for 1943 and “work stoppages arising from labor-management disputes” for 1945 and 1946. For 1943, 13,500,529 man-days were lost through strikes. For 1945, 38,025,000 man-days were lost through work stoppages, and 113,000,000 man-days were so lost in 1946. In 1943 there were 3,752 strikes. In 1945 there were 4,750 work stoppages and in 1946, 4,700. See Strikes in 1943, Bull. No. 782, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; Work Stoppages Caused by Labor-Management Disputes in 1945, Bull. No. 878, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; Review of Labor- Management Disputes, 1946, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Re- lease, January 11, 1947.The number of War Labor Board cases resulting in plant seizures by
the United States, so far as statistics are available, is as follows:
Four cases from June 25, 1943, the date of the passage of the
“MR. VANDENBERG. . . .
“I am very anxious that there shall be additional statutory protection to the uninterrupted production of war necessities, but I am wondering whether in order to achieve that purpose it is necessary for me to impinge upon a very profound hostility I have always had to the use of injunctions in labor disputes. I voted for the original Norris-LaGuardia Act, and I have always felt that one of the most useful things we ever did, not only as a matter of fair play, but in respect to the status of the courts was substantially to separate from court jurisdiction the responsibility of, in effect, umpiring labor disputes.
“What I wish to ask the able Senator from Texas, if I may, is this: In his proposal, on page 4, it is provided that any person who willfully violates any provision of the act is to be guilty of a felony, and subject to a fine or imprisonment. Is not that a conclusive penalty? Is it not necessary in addition to go back into all the old injunctive process in connection with labor disputes?
“MR. CONNALLY. That is not a legal inquiry really. Of course, it might be that we could get along without the provision. Like the Senator, I voted for the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and I favored the policy embodied therein. This provision, however, applies only to plants taken over by the Government. It seems to me that if the Government is to operate a plant, it should have the widest and the fullest authority to operate it as it wants to do and to prevent interruption. Therefore, because of the attitude of some who were interested in the bill, I inserted section 5. I do not think the bill would be very seriously crippled if it were eliminated, but I think it is improved by its remaining in. I do not think it would be fatal to strike out that provision, but I hope that will not be done.
“MR. VANDENBERG. I thank the Senator for his frank statement. When the Government has taken over the operation of a plant and it becomes in essence a Government operation, it is rather difficult to resist the argument that the Government should not be deprived of any instrumentality in the enforcement, virtually, of its sovereignty.
“MR. CONNALLY. That is true.
“MR. VANDENBERG. Nevertheless, I apprehend that the very fact that the injunctive process is restored in the Senator‘s bill is the reason why it appears in the additional amendment offered by the able Senator from Ohio, where, it seems to me, it becomes decidedly more offensive, using that word in the sense in which I have used it.”
The reference is to an amendment proposed by Senator Taft
10 Section 3 provides: “Provided further, That possession of any plant, mine, or facility shall not be taken under authority of this sec- tion after the termination of hostilities in the present war, as pro- claimed by the President, or after the termination of the“Time is the essence of the strike. Keeping the injunction alive by dilatory tactics blunts the edge of the only effective instrument that labor possesses, namely, the strike.
“The bill now before us makes it well-nigh impossible to secure a restraining order except under the well-defined and limited conditions set out in sections 7 and 8.” 75 Cong. Rec. 5489. See also People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of Kings County, 164 Misc. 355, 359.
This Court held void both the order for examination and the order of commitment, as beyond the Circuit Court‘s jurisdiction, and granted petitioner‘s release from custody. The Court said: “Not only is no such power [of examination] conferred, but it is prohibited
In the Sawyer case, supra, the Court said: “The case cannot be distinguished in principle from that of a judgment of the Common Bench in England in a criminal prosecution, which was coram non judice; or the case of a sentence passed by the Circuit Court of the United States upon a charge of an infamous crime, without a present- ment or indictment by a grand jury. Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Rep. 68, 76; Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417; Ex parte Bain, 121 U. S. 1.” 124 U. S. at 221. Hardly can it be said that the Sawyer decision went on the ground that the question of jurisdiction to enter the order was not substantial, in view of the length and detail of the Court‘s opinion, which gave no hint of such a suggestion, and in view also of the fact that Field, J., concurred in a separate opinion and
The disobedience of the petitioner in Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, deprived the plaintiff in the suit against him of the use of his testimony but did not defeat this suit or the ability of the courts to decide whether he could be forced to submit to examination. See note 19 supra.
In In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, the refusal of the city officials to obey an order enjoining them from removing a police judge did not vitiate judicial power to decide the issue whether the city officials possessed the removal power. The controversy remained and, as this Court pointed out, it was determinable by mandamus or quo warranto. This Court held the order invalid and the officials not guilty of contempt.
In In re Burrus, 136 U. S. 586, the refusal of the grandparents to give up the child upon order issued by a federal court did not destroy the power of the court, which had already been exercised,
“(a) Whenever any plant, mine, or facility is in the possession of the United States, it shall be unlawful for any person (1) to coerce, instigate, induce, conspire with, or encourage any person, to interfere, by lock-out, strike, slow-down, or other interruption, with the operation of such plant, mine, or facility, or (2) to aid any such lock-out, strike, slow-down, or other interruption interfering with the operation of such plant, mine, or facility by giving direction or guidance in the conduct of such interruption, or by providing funds for the conduct or direction thereof or for the payment of strike, unemployment, or other benefits to those participating therein. No individual shall be deemed to have violated the provisions of this section by reason only of his having ceased work or having refused to continue to work or to accept employment.
“(b) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this section shall be subject to a fine of not more than $5,000, or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.”
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”“DISPOSITION UPON NOTICE AND HEARING. A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant‘s consent. Upon a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.”
The opinion states: “In imposing a fine for criminal contempt, the trial judge may properly take into consideration . . . the necessity of effectively terminating the defendant‘s defiance as required by the public interest . . . .” 330 U.S. 258, 303.Noteworthy also is the allegation in the affidavit that the defendants’ violation of the restraining order had “interfered with this Court‘s jurisdiction.” And the charge in the petition of “wilfully . . . and deliberately” disobeying the restraining order indicates an intention to prosecute criminal contempt.