Cathey v. DEPT. OF HEALTH
31 A.3d 94
| Md. | 2011Background
- Cathey, a developmentally disabled adult, has a joint custody arrangement with New Jersey and Maryland parents, living with each parent in alternating two-week blocks.
- New Jersey court ordered joint legal and residential custody, requiring equal time with each parent; Cathey spends two weeks in Maryland each month with her father.
- Cathey’s DDA eligibility in Maryland depends on residency; New Jersey provides services when she is there, Maryland provides DDA services only during Maryland residence.
- Maryland DDA denied eligibility in 2006 based on COMAR residency, treating 'resident' as equivalent to domicile and requiring Maryland-domiciled status.
- ALJ and Board affirmed, concluding Cathey’s Maryland residency did not exist; Circuit Court affirmed, and the Court granted certiorari to resolve residency for DDA eligibility.
- Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ‘residence’ under COMAR may be met during periods Cathey actually lives in Maryland with her father, without requiring domicile.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does COMAR residency require domicile for DDA eligibility? | Cathey argues residency should be construed broadly as actual place of living, not strict domicile. | Department argues residency equates to domicile under COMAR, constraining eligibility. | Residency may be actual place of living, not domicile. |
| Is Cathey eligible for DDA services during Maryland periods of custody with her father? | Petitioner should receive DDA services when living in Maryland per custody order and statutory remedial purpose. | Residency requirements restrict eligibility to Maryland-domiciled individuals. | Yes; Cathey is a Maryland resident during the time she lives with her father in Maryland. |
| Should the Maryland DDA be interpreted liberally as a remedial statute? | The statute should be liberally construed to advance remedy for individuals with developmental disabilities. | Remedial status does not compel a contrary reading of regulatory text. | Yes; the regulation is to be liberally construed to advance the remedy. |
| May multiple residences under a joint custody arrangement support DDA eligibility without duplicative benefits concerns? | Multiple residences can coexist with eligibility; benefits should align with where the person resides at any given time. | Concern about duplicate benefits warrants strict interpretation. | Multiple residences compatible with benefits; no risk of duplicate benefits given placement and funding structure. |
Key Cases Cited
- Blount v. Boston, 351 Md. 360 (Md. 1998) (domicile concept contrasted with residence in residency analysis)
- Boer v. Univ. Speciality Hosp., 421 Md. 529 (Md. 2011) (residency as element of domicile; distinguishes from strict domicile)
- Gosain v. County Council, 420 Md. 197 (Md. 2011) (standing and residency analysis; interpretation of 'in' not equal to domicile)
- Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396 (Md. 2000) (remedial statute interpretation for public good)
- Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315 (Md. 2003) (remedial statutes liberally construed to advance remedy)
- Doe v. Roe, 419 Md. 687 (Md. 2011) (remedial construction and regulatory interpretation)
- Bainum v. Kalen, 272 Md. 490 (Md. 1974) (residence versus domicile principle in constitutional rights)