908 F.3d 546
9th Cir.2018Background
- Cary Wallace Williams pleaded guilty (1982) to a capital murder and related charges and was sentenced to death after a penalty-phase before a three-judge panel that found four aggravators (burglary, robbery, avoid lawful arrest, torture/depravity) and one statutory mitigator (age 19).
- Williams litigated multiple state post-conviction petitions over ~25 years; his sixth petition (filed 2003) was denied by the Nevada Supreme Court on timeliness/successiveness grounds, though two aggravators were later found invalid under Nevada law.
- Federal habeas proceedings began in 1998; counsel amended the petition in Sept. 1999 after court-ordered discovery and extensions; the district court later dismissed many claims as time-barred or procedurally defaulted and denied evidentiary hearings.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed equitable tolling/relation-back of the 1999 amended petition, multiple ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims (guilt and penalty phases), the constitutionality/notice of Nevada’s “avoid lawful arrest” aggravator, adequacy of Nevada’s §34.726 timeliness bar, and a Rule 60(b)/second-or-successive petition issue premised on Hurst.
- Key factual mitigation materials include: 1999 expert reports diagnosing mild neuropsychological impairment/traumatic brain injury; and numerous family declarations documenting extensive childhood abuse, neglect, head injuries, substance abuse, and trauma.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Williams) | Defendant's Argument (Filson/State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness / relation-back of 1999 amended petition (Rule 15(c) & AEDPA) | Amendments should relate back or equitable tolling applies because counsel followed court schedule and law was unsettled on relation-back | Mayle standard controls; some added claims do not relate back and are untimely | Ninth Circuit held Williams entitled to equitable tolling for 8/29/98–9/17/99; all claims in the Sept. 1999 amended petition are timely; remanded claims dismissed solely as untimely |
| IAC — failure to investigate/present brain-damage evidence (Claim 1(A)) | Trial counsel unreasonably failed to obtain neuropsych evals; experts show brain injury that would have mitigated at penalty phase | State: Nevada Supreme Court effectively adjudicated merits; evidence insufficient to show prejudice | |
| Court: Applied AEDPA deference; found counsel deficient (de novo for performance) but Nevada court reasonably concluded brain evidence alone did not create Strickland prejudice; no evidentiary hearing ordered | |||
| IAC — failure to investigate/present extensive childhood abuse (Claim 1(F)) | Counsel’s investigation was cursory; family declarations present powerful mitigation that would likely change sentencing outcome | State contends claim was considered in state proceedings or procedurally barred; district court denied hearing | |
| Court: District court abused its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing; Williams made colorable Strickland showing (deficient investigation and prejudice, especially combined with brain evidence); remanded for hearing | |||
| IAC — guilt-phase preparation and penalty-phase expert to rebut torture (Claims 1(B), 1(G)) | New documentary evidence (declarations, Reay report) supports these IAC claims and should be considered (or Martinez applies) | State: evidence was not presented timely to state courts; §2254(e)(2) bars supplementation; claims previously adjudicated | Ninth Circuit held district court correctly refused hearings: petitioner failed to develop evidence in state court so §2254(e)(2) barred supplementation; Martinez/Dickens pathway not satisfied because new documents did not create materially stronger/new claims |
| Validity & notice of Nevada’s “avoid lawful arrest” aggravator (Claim 16) | Aggravator is vague, overbroad, and lacked fair notice at time of offense (Ex Post Facto / Due Process) | State: Nevada courts have construed and limited the aggravator to murders to prevent a victim from testifying about an antecedent crime; thus it narrows death-eligibility and provided fair notice | Court rejected constitutional challenges; upheld aggravator as facially valid and as-applied (not an unexpected judicial expansion) |
| Adequacy/independence of Nevada’s §34.726 timeliness bar (procedural default) | §34.726 was inconsistently applied and not firmly established; State relied on it to bar many claims | State: §34.726 is an independent, adequate state ground regularly applied; petition was untimely | Ninth Circuit held §34.726 is an adequate and independent state procedural bar and affirmed dismissal of numerous claims; but reversed dismissal of several IAC claims that had been time-barred under AEDPA because equitable tolling applies, remanding for Martinez analysis as needed |
| Rule 60(b) / Hurst-based motion and successive-petition application | Hurst requires beyond-a-reasonable-doubt reweighing; Nevada did not apply that standard so Rule 60(b) relief or permission to file successive petition warranted | State: Hurst not retroactive on collateral review; Nevada applied beyond-a-reasonable-doubt when it reweighed; district court properly denied relief | Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of Rule 60(b); held Hurst rule would not apply retroactively, and Nevada had applied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard; denied successive-petition application |
Key Cases Cited
- Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644 (rule on relation-back of habeas amendments under Rule 15(c))
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (standards for equitable tolling of AEDPA deadlines)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (excusing procedural default of trial IAC when initial-review collateral counsel was ineffective)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance of counsel standard)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (AEDPA review limited to state-court record for merits adjudications)
- Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (limitations on statutory tolling interpretation)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence at capital sentencing)
- Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (importance of presenting strong mitigation evidence; ineffective assistance in mitigation context)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (deference under AEDPA and Strickland when applied together)
- Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (limitations on retroactive judicial expansion of criminal statutes)
- Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (aggravator must genuinely narrow death-eligible class)
- Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (consideration of post-conviction mitigation evidence; de novo review of some Strickland aspects)