Cary Michael Lambrix v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 756 F.3d 1246

Background

Cary Lambrix, convicted of two 1984 first-degree murders and sentenced to death, has pursued extensive state and federal post-conviction litigation over three decades.
Lambrix raised ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims in state 3.850 proceedings (1986–88) and in his initial federal § 2254 petition; the district court (1992) and the Eleventh Circuit (1996) reviewed those claims on the merits and denied relief.
Lambrix later filed multiple successive state and federal collateral petitions; this Court denied a 2010 application for leave to file a second/successive § 2254 petition (In re Lambrix).
In 2013 Lambrix moved pro se in federal court under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 for appointment of substitute federal counsel to prepare a successive § 2254 petition invoking Martinez/Trevino to excuse procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims.
The district court construed the motion as a successive § 2254 petition and dismissed for lack of authorization; Lambrix appealed the denial of appointed counsel under § 3599.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding appointment of counsel would be futile because Martinez does not apply, the claims are successive and time‑barred, and Martinez does not create a freestanding claim for ineffective state collateral counsel.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Martinez/Trevino excuse procedural default of Lambrix’s ineffective-trial-counsel claims so he may file a successive § 2254 and obtain appointed counsel under § 3599	Martinez creates equitable cause because state collateral counsel failed to raise those ineffective-trial-counsel claims in initial state proceedings	Martinez does not apply here; claims were previously raised and decided on the merits, so no procedural default to excuse	Denied — Martinez inapplicable because claims were adjudicated on the merits in initial § 2254 proceedings
Whether appointment of substitute federal counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 was required	Counsel needed to prepare Martinez-based successive petition	Appointment not required where proposed petition would be futile or barred	Denied — appointment would be futile under § 3599 because claims are barred for multiple reasons
Whether Martinez allows overcoming statutory successive-petition bar (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b))	Martinez’s equitable rule excuses procedural default and enables successive filing	§ 2244(b) statutory requirements are independent; Martinez cannot satisfy successive-petition thresholds	Denied — claims are impermissibly successive and Martinez cannot circumvent § 2244(b) statutory bars
Whether Martinez or equitable tolling makes new ineffective-trial-counsel claims timely under AEDPA (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d))	Martinez-based cause or equitable tolling permits late filing	Martinez is an equitable rule limited to cause for procedural default and does not affect AEDPA’s statute of limitations; equitable tolling not available via Martinez	Denied — proposed claims are time‑barred; Martinez does not toll or reset AEDPA limitations

Key Cases Cited

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (establishes procedural-default rule and that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel generally does not constitute cause)
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849 (right to counsel includes assistance in preparing a habeas application prior to filing)
Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180 (an order denying court‑appointed federal habeas counsel under § 3599 is appealable)
Chavez v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 742 F.3d 940 (11th Cir.) (Martinez is limited and does not alter AEDPA timeliness or create a freestanding claim; court may deny appointment where claims are futile)
Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1996) (appellate decision rejecting Lambrix’s ineffective-assistance claims on the merits)
In re Lambrix, 624 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (denial of leave to file successive § 2254 petition)