Carter v. PATHFINDER ENERGY SERVICES, INC., 662 F.3d 1134

Background

Carter, a diabetic with fibromyalgia and postural hypotension, worked as a directional driller for Pathfinder Energy Services beginning December 2004; his health declined in 2006, reducing his workload and leading to termination for gross misconduct after a December 2006 incident.
Pathfinder’s offer and documents stated employment was at will and not a contract; handbook and receipt also stated at-will status, with a separate progressive discipline policy.
Carter’s health problems intensified in fall 2006; he reportedly could work full 24-hour shifts but needed rest between assignments, and hepatitis C surfaced around the time of or after termination (January 2007).
The firing occurred December 27, 2006, shortly after an on-site conflict with a coworker and a confrontational phone exchange with his supervisor, Rich Arnold.
Carter filed suit in December 2008 alleging ADA discrimination, ERISA interference, and implied-in-fact contract breach; the district court granted Pathfinder summary judgment on all claims, which this appeal partially reversed.
The pivotal factual question is whether Carter’s conditions rendered him disabled under the ADA and whether his discharge was motivated by disability (or pretext), justifying ADA relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
ADA disability status determination	Carter argues he was disabled under the ADA due to diabetes, hepatitis C, and related impairments.	Pathfinder contends Carter was not substantially limited, citing medication/diet control and lack of overall impairment.	A genuine dispute exists on disability status; substantial limitation must be decided by jury given record evidence.
Qualified to perform essential functions with accommodation	Carter can perform essential functions with a modified schedule/rest between jobs.	Pathfinder contends Carter was not qualified at the time of termination, absent accommodation; argues reduced workload was not viable as a basis for ongoing qualification.	There is a genuine dispute whether Carter was qualified with reasonable accommodation at the time of termination.
Causation—disability in firing decision	The firing was motivated by Carter’s disability and need for rest, not solely wrongdoing.	Firing based on two incidents (MFD altercation and expletive) with ordinary discipline contingencies; not necessarily disability-driven.	Evidence raises triable issue whether discharge was precipitated by disability or need for accommodation.
Pretext for discrimination	Evidence suggests Pathfinder’s stated reasons were pretextual to discontinue accommodating Carter.	Stated reasons (altercation and abrupt phone conduct) are legitimate and non-discriminatory.	Summary-judgment reversal on ADA claim remains appropriate where pretext evidence could lead a jury to find discrimination.

Key Cases Cited

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (U.S. Supreme Court 1999) (disability assessed with corrective measures; pre-ADAAA context)
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (U.S. Supreme Court 2002) (major life activities defined as central to daily life)
Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117 (10th Cir. 2003) (factors for substantial limitation; individualized analysis)
Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2007) (definition and scope of major life activities)
Johnson v. Weld County, Colo., 594 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2010) (substantial limitation standard in ADA context)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. Supreme Court 2000) (framework for pretext after prima facie case)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. Supreme Court 1973) (morter-burden shifting in discrimination)
E.E.O.C. v. Heartway Corp., 466 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2006) (evidence of discriminatory motive in ADA/Employment)
Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 1995) (pretext in ADA where employee unchecked by employer)