CARR v. the STATE.
829 S.E.2d 641
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2019Background
- Between 2009–2013 Jeffrey Carr, acting as a 93‑year‑old widow’s attorney‑in‑fact, received or caused transfers totaling over $3,046,934 from her accounts; the widow testified she never authorized such transfers.
- The widow was wealthy (estate ~$20–25M) and described as frugal; multiple witnesses (former business manager/attorney‑in‑fact, court‑appointed conservator, APS inquiries) testified that the transfers were irregular and produced no discernible benefit to the widow.
- Forensic accounting evidence showed dozens of checks/payments to Carr and family members, large transfers (~$1M and ~$700K), and spending on personal items (cars, jewelry, sports tickets).
- Carr and his father were indicted and convicted on three counts under Georgia’s RICO statute based on numerous alleged predicate acts (theft and money laundering); Carr received a 40‑year sentence with 10 to serve.
- On appeal Carr challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence for theft and money‑laundering predicates; (2) a mistaken jury instruction on money laundering (plain‑error claim); (3) admission of certain opinion/ultimate‑issue testimony; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the evidence sufficient to establish at least two predicate acts supporting RICO, that any jury‑instruction error did not produce plain error under the record, and that evidentiary rulings and counsel performance were not reversible error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Carr) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for RICO predicates | Evidence (victim testimony, conservator, forensic accountant, investigator) shows theft and laundering transactions supporting at least two predicate acts | Transfers were gifts or reimbursements; insufficient proof of theft or of concealment element for laundering | Conviction affirmed — ample evidence of at least two predicate acts (theft and/or laundering) supporting RICO |
| Jury instruction on money laundering | Even though trial court misstated laundering element, the indictment was read to jury, jury had indictment, and court properly instructed burden of proof | Erroneous money‑laundering charge (insertion of intent to promote) was plain error requiring reversal | No plain error: instruction read in context with indictment and burden charge; removal of any defective predicate leaves sufficient theft predicates |
| Admission of expert lay‑style opinion about handwriting/signature discrepancies | Forensic accountant properly testified to observed signature discrepancies as part of her document review (not as handwriting expert) | Testimony invaded domain of handwriting experts / was improper lay opinion | Admissible: testimony was rationally based on perception, helpful, and within discretion of trial court |
| Admission of expert testimony on conversion/benefit to victim (ultimate‑issue) | Forensic accounting expert explained transactional findings and inability to find benefit to victim — factual assessment beyond lay ken | Expert impermissibly opined on ultimate issue (conversion/intent) without firsthand knowledge | Admissible: expert offered fact‑based accounting conclusions (not legal conclusion) and assistance beyond average juror |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel | N/A (State defends adequacy) | Counsel erred by not filing general demurrer and not objecting to jury instruction, causing prejudice | Denied: indictment sufficient (no prejudice from not demurring) and Carr cannot show reasonable probability different outcome if counsel had objected |
Key Cases Cited
- Falay v. State, 320 Ga. App. 781 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence on appeal)
- State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29 (plain‑error test for jury instructions)
- Dorsey v. State, 279 Ga. 534 (two proven predicate acts sustain RICO conviction)
- Faulks v. State, 296 Ga. 38 (no reversible error where court charged other statutory forms when indictment charged a specific form)
- Dagne v. Schroeder, 336 Ga. App. 36 (trial court discretion on lay opinion evidence)
- Walton v. State, 291 Ga. App. 736 (limits and exception for expert testimony on ultimate issues)
- Arnold v. State, 292 Ga. 268 (ineffective assistance of counsel—Strickland standard)