Jesse Lamar Arnold was tried by an Athens-Clarke County jury and convicted of the aggravated stalking and aggravated assault of his estranged wife, Lakeisha, and the murder of Eric Mattox. Arnold appeals, contending only that he was deprived of the effectivе assistance of counsel because his lawyer, he says, did not adequately investigate his mental health in her preparation for trial. We find no merit in this contention and affirm the judgment below.
2. Arnold contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his lawyеr did not investigate his mental health more thoroughly. In particular, Arnold complains that his lawyer failed to obtain a psychological evaluation to assess his competence to stand trial, whether he might have a viable insanity defense, and whеther he might properly assert a plea of guilty but mentally ill. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, Arnold must prove both that the performance of his lawyer was deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington,
(a) We turn first to the question of performance, and as we do so, we bear in mind that “[¡judicial scrutiny of сounsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland,
[i]t is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. Because of the diffiсulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.
Id. at 689-690 (III) (A) (citations and punctuation omitted). In this case, Arnold has failed, we think, to overcome the “strong presumption” that his lawyer rendered “reasonable professional assistance.”
At the hearing on his motion for new trial, Arnold callеd his trial lawyer to testify, and she explained that she was aware as she prepared for trial that Arnold had been treated for mental health issues in the past. For this reason, she obtained and reviewed mental health records from Charter Behаvioral Health System, which show that Arnold was admitted to a Charter facility in 1997, evaluated by a psychiatrist, diagnosed with major depression, and treated with antidepressant medications. She interviewed the psychiatrist, who had evaluated Arnold both at the time of his admission and the time of his discharge from the Charter facility, and who also had seen Arnold in two outpatient visits in the weeks following his discharge. The lawyer also confirmed that Arnold had not received further treatment for any mental health issues since his treatment at the
This is not a case in which counsel “made no effort” to investigate the potential for a defense or plea based on mental health issues, McKiernan v. State,
(b) In any event, Arnold also has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the failure of his trial lawyer to request a mental health evaluation. “Pursuant to Strickland, [Arnold] must offer more than speculation to establish prejudice.” Hambrick v. Brannen,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The events that form the basis for the convictions occurred on December 15,1999.Arnold was indicted on January 12,2000 and charged with malice murder, felony murder, aggravated stalking, and aggravated assault. His trial commenced on May 8, 2000, and the jury returnеd its verdict on May 10,2000, finding Arnold guilty on all counts. The verdict as to felony murder was vacated by operation of law, Malcolm v. State,
When Arnold was tried, his lawyer had been practicing law for more than 20 years, and most of her practice had been criminal defense. At the hearing on the motiоn for new trial, she testified that she had tried approximately 300 criminal cases, including numerous homicide cases, and that she taught trial advocacy at the University of Georgia School of Law. During her time as a criminal defense lawyer, she had represented numerous clients with mental health issues.
At trial, the court charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense.
A psychologist testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that the symptoms reflected in the Charter records shоw not only that Arnold suffered from depression, but suggest that Arnold also may have suffered a bipolar or other serious mood disorder. But there is no evidence that the trial lawyer should have suspected that the diagnosis of major depression might be incomplete. “The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct is to be viewed as of the time of trial and under the circumstances of the case. It is not to be viewed by hindsight.” Futch v. State,
The psychologist only became involved with this case in June 2009, when he was contаcted by appellate counsel for Arnold, nearly ten years after the crimes for which Arnold was convicted, and more than nine years after the trial. Because so much time had passed, the psychologist explained that, even if he undertook an evaluation of Arnold, he would have great difficulty in forming a reliable opinion about Arnold’s mental health at the time of the crimes and the trial. We take this opportunity to note that extended delays in proceedings on motions for nеw trial “put at risk the rights of defendants and crime victims and the validity of convictions obtained after a full trial,” and we remind that “it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system, including trial courts and prosecutors as well as defense counsel and defendаnts, to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed, litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” Shank v. State,