Carolyn Moya v. Healthport Technologies, LLC
375 Wis. 2d 38
| Wis. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Carolyn Moya authorized her personal-injury attorney, Robert Welcenbach, via HIPAA release forms to obtain her medical records; Healthport (which handles Aurora’s records requests) charged certification ($8) and retrieval ($20) fees when fulfilling the attorney’s requests.
- Welcenbach paid the fees and Moya was billed via a deduction from her settlement; Moya filed a class action seeking refunds on behalf of similarly-situated patients.
- Statute at issue: Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. permits charging those fees only when the requester is not the patient or a “person authorized by the patient.” The definition of “person authorized by the patient” appears in Wis. Stat. § 146.81(5), which includes “any person authorized in writing by the patient.”
- The circuit court denied Healthport’s motion for summary judgment; the court of appeals reversed and held the attorney was not a “person authorized by the patient.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court held that the statutory definition’s phrase “any person authorized in writing by the patient” is unambiguous and encompasses an attorney authorized in writing by the patient to obtain records, so such attorneys are exempt from the certification and retrieval fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an attorney with a patient-signed written HIPAA release is a “person authorized by the patient” under Wis. Stat. § 146.83(3f)(b)4.-5. | Moya: the plain statutory definition in § 146.81(5) expressly includes “any person authorized in writing by the patient”; a HIPAA release satisfies that writing. | Healthport: in context the phrase should be limited to those authorized to make health-care decisions (decision-makers), not mere recipients; attorneys aren’t listed and were intended to remain excluded. | Held: The phrase is a standalone category; an attorney with written authorization to obtain records is a “person authorized by the patient” and thus exempt from the $8 certification and $20 retrieval fees. |
| Whether the voluntary payment doctrine bars Moya’s claim | Moya: doctrine should not defeat statutory rights established by the legislature. | Healthport: payment without protest precludes later challenge. | Held: Voluntary payment doctrine does not apply where its application would undermine the statute’s manifest purpose. |
| Whether waiver bars the claim because Moya authorized her attorney to request records | Moya: authorization does not amount to waiver of statutory exemption rights. | Healthport: authorizing attorney was an intentional relinquishment of the right to avoid fees. | Held: Waiver doctrine does not apply; written authorization makes the attorney a statutory “person authorized by the patient,” so no waiver defeats the claim. |
Key Cases Cited
- State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 271 Wis. 2d 633 (2004) (principles of statutory interpretation and reliance on plain meaning and context)
- Moya v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., 366 Wis. 2d 541 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (court of appeals decision reversing circuit court on same issue)
- Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis. 2d 304 (1987) (two-step summary judgment framework)
- Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., Ltd. P’ship, 255 Wis. 2d 447 (2002) (voluntary payment doctrine explained)
- MBS-Certified Pub. Accountants, LLC v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 338 Wis. 2d 647 (2012) (inapplicability of common law doctrines when they would undermine a statute’s purpose)