Carmichael v. Chappius
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2794
2d Cir.2017Background
- Brian Carmichael was convicted in New York state court (jury trial, Oct. 2007) of three counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance and sentenced to concurrent 17‑year terms.
- During voir dire the State used peremptory strikes to remove 6 of approximately 8 black venirepersons (about 75% exclusion of black panelists; blacks were roughly 14–16% of the venire). Defense counsel repeatedly raised Batson challenges based primarily on those numbers; the trial court denied each challenge and did not require race‑neutral explanations.
- The New York Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the numerical evidence, while potentially sufficient in some cases, did not here create a prima facie inference of discrimination.
- Carmichael filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging a Batson violation (and ineffective assistance of counsel). The District Court granted the writ, finding the Appellate Division unreasonably applied Batson given the exclusion rate.
- The Second Circuit reversed the District Court, holding the District Court applied AEDPA too stringently; the Appellate Division’s conclusion that Carmichael failed to make a prima facie Batson showing was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Appellate Division unreasonably applied Batson under AEDPA | Carmichael: the exclusion rate and pattern of strikes (6 of 8 black panelists) sufficed to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination at Batson step one | Chappius/State: the Appellate Division reasonably concluded that numerical evidence alone did not warrant an inference of discrimination given the total circumstances | The Second Circuit held the Appellate Division’s conclusion was not an unreasonable application of Batson; AEDPA deference required vacating the District Court’s grant of habeas relief |
| Whether statistical evidence alone necessarily establishes a prima facie Batson showing | Carmichael: statistical disparity here should have triggered step two and required race‑neutral explanations | State: statistical evidence may suffice in some cases but does not automatically compel a prima facie finding; trial court discretion matters | Court: statistics can suffice in some circumstances, but here reasonable jurists could disagree; state court decision gets deference |
| Whether the District Court applied the correct AEDPA standard on habeas review | Carmichael: District Court concluded Appellate Division unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent | State: District Court failed to apply the highly deferential AEDPA standard (must be beyond fairminded disagreement) | Court: District Court applied too strict a standard; vacated habeas grant and remanded |
| Whether countervailing evidence undermined inference of discrimination | Carmichael: emphasized exclusion rate and proportion of strikes against black panelists | State: pointed to (a) defense counsel’s admission that he relied only on numbers, (b) two black jurors were seated, (c) small sample size and lack of other indicia of racial motive | Court: these factors made the Appellate Division’s conclusion reasonable under Batson step one |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (established three‑step Batson framework for peremptory strikes)
- Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (prima facie showing may be established by a variety of evidence; consider all relevant circumstances)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (explains AEDPA’s "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" standards)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (state court rulings must be so lacking in justification as to leave no possibility for fairminded disagreement)
- Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (when precedent is general, state courts have more leeway in application)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (reinforces AEDPA deference to state court decisions)
- Overton v. Newton, 295 F.3d 270 (2d Cir.) (discusses Batson burdens and standards on review)