Carlos Rendon v. Eric Holder, Jr.
782 F.3d 466
9th Cir.2015Background
- Petitioner Carlos Alberto Rendon was convicted under California Penal Code § 459 (burglary), which criminalizes entry with intent to commit “larceny or any felony.” The immigration consequence depends on whether the intent was larceny specifically.
- The panel decision in Rendon adopted a rule that, for textually disjunctive statutes, courts may consult Shepard documents only if the statutory alternatives are "elements" (requiring juror unanimity), and may not consult them if the alternatives are mere "means."
- Judge Graber (joined by eight judges) dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing Rendon conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Descamps v. United States.
- Graber contends Descamps’ footnote 2 instructs courts to consult Shepard documents whenever a statute is drafted in the alternative, regardless of the elements/means distinction, so as to determine what the jury actually found.
- Judge Kozinski also dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, proposing a narrower reading of Descamps’ footnote 2: consult Shepard documents only to determine whether the disjunctive statutory phrases are elements, and then choose between the categorical and modified categorical approaches.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether courts may consult Shepard documents when a statute is textually disjunctive regardless of elements/means classification | Rendon: no — consult Shepard docs only if statutory alternatives are elements (requires examining state-law unanimity) | Descamps/Graber: yes — Descamps footnote 2 says consult Shepard documents whenever statute lists alternatives; no state-law parsing | Panel denial of rehearing en banc; dissenters say Rendon conflicts with Descamps and rehearing should be granted |
| Proper role of elements/means distinction in modified categorical approach | Rendon: elements/means distinction controls — must parse state law on juror unanimity | Graber: elements/means distinction irrelevant for statutes drafted in alternative; use Shepard docs to see what jury found | Dissenters assert Supreme Court forbids Rendon’s state-law parsing; en banc rehearing denied |
| Scope of Shepard-document inquiry | Rendon: limited when alternatives are means; avoid consulting in many cases | Kozinski: consult Shepard docs narrowly to identify whether statutory alternatives are elements, then apply appropriate approach | Dissenters favor consulting Shepard docs (either broadly per Graber or narrowly per Kozinski); court denied rehearing en banc |
| Practical consequences for immigration/criminal law | Rendon: requires extensive, uncertain state-law parsing across many statutes | Graber/Kozinski: yields more administrable rule and fidelity to Descamps; avoids absurdities (e.g., drug cases) | Dissenters warn Rendon will create confusion; en banc rehearing not granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (U.S. 2013) (main holding and footnote 2 on use of Shepard documents for statutes drafted in the alternative)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (U.S. 2005) (approving use of certain conviction documents to identify crime’s elements)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (categorical approach to defining predicate offenses)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2010) (discussing modified categorical approach and statutory phrases covering different crimes)
- Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (U.S. 2007) (requiring a realistic probability, not theoretical possibility, in categorical analysis)
- United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557 (U.S. 2001) (lower courts must follow Supreme Court precedent)
- Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (U.S. 1997) (same proposition on following controlling precedent)
- Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1989) (on the Supreme Court’s prerogative to overrule its precedents)