Carl Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corporation
740 F.3d 325
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- Summers, an Altarum analyst, was severely injured in October 2011 (bilateral leg fractures and tendon ruptures) and was expected to be unable to walk normally for about seven months.
- Summers requested short-term disability and proposed a graduated return-to-work plan (short-term disability then part-time remote work increasing to full time); Altarum’s insurer granted short-term disability benefits.
- Altarum did not engage in an interactive accommodation process and terminated Summers effective December 1, 2011.
- Summers sued under the ADA for wrongful discharge and failure to accommodate; the district court dismissed both claims, holding a temporary impairment (even up to a year) cannot be a disability and that Summers failed to request a reasonable accommodation.
- On appeal, Summers challenged only the wrongful-discharge dismissal; the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo and accepted Summers’s factual allegations as true.
- The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAA) and EEOC regulations allow sufficiently severe temporary impairments to qualify as disabilities.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a severe temporary impairment can be a "disability" under the ADA (actual-disability prong) | Summers: his injuries substantially limited major life activity (walking) for ~7+ months, so qualify as a disability under the ADAAA and EEOC regs | Altarum: temporary conditions (even lasting months) are not disabilities; district court was correct to dismiss | Court: Under the ADAAA and EEOC regulations, sufficiently severe temporary impairments can be disabilities; reversed dismissal |
| Whether pre-ADAAA precedent (Toyota) bars coverage for temporary impairments | Summers: ADAAA abrogated Toyota; statutory and regulatory text supports broad coverage including severe short-term impairments | Altarum: Toyota’s limiting approach should persist; Congress did not clearly intend to cover temporary injuries | Court: ADAAA expressly overruled Toyota; statute ambiguous at most, and EEOC regulation is a reasonable construction entitled to Chevron deference |
| Whether EEOC regulation treating <6-month impairments as potentially substantially limiting is entitled to deference | Summers: EEOC reasonably implemented congressional mandate to broaden coverage; regulation is consistent with ADAAA purposes | Altarum: Regulation is not entitled to Chevron deference and contradicts congressional intent to exclude temporary impairments | Court: Chevron step one finds no clear contrary congressional intent; step two defers to the EEOC as reasonable |
| Whether Summers’s ability to use a wheelchair defeats disability finding | Summers: Disability analysis must be made before asking if accommodations could enable work; ameliorative measures are disregarded per ADAAA | Altarum: Summers could have worked with a wheelchair, so he was not disabled | Court: District court inverted analysis; must determine disability without regard to mitigating measures or possible accommodations; Summers plausibly alleged a disability |
Key Cases Cited
- Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (Sup. Ct.) (pre-ADAAA restrictive interpretation of "disability")
- Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (Sup. Ct.) (framework for judicial deference to agency interpretations)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (Sup. Ct.) (plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal)
- Young v. United Parcel Serv., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir.) (elements of ADA wrongful-discharge claim)
- Reynolds v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143 (4th Cir.) (discussion of ADAAA and lifting-restriction example)
- Wilson v. Dollar General Corp., 717 F.3d 337 (4th Cir.) (employer duty to engage in interactive process)