142 S.Ct. 1002
U.S.2022Background
- Kentucky enacted HB 454 (dilation-and-evacuation abortion restriction); EMW clinic and two doctors sued to enjoin enforcement.
- Plaintiffs named Kentucky Attorney General (Beshear) and the Cabinet Secretary for Health and Family Services as defendants; AG Beshear was dismissed by stipulation that reserved the AG office’s rights and made any final judgment binding on the AG’s office subject to appellate modification.
- After a bench trial the District Court permanently enjoined HB 454; the Secretary appealed to the Sixth Circuit and defended the law through appeal.
- Following elections, a new Attorney General (Cameron) and a new Secretary took office; the Secretary later stated he would not seek rehearing en banc or certiorari, and Cameron moved to withdraw as counsel for the Secretary and to intervene as a party and filed a rehearing petition within the 14-day window.
- A Sixth Circuit panel denied Cameron’s motion to intervene as untimely, lacking a substantial legal interest, and prejudicial to plaintiffs; the Supreme Court reversed, holding the Sixth Circuit erred in denying intervention.
Issues
| Issue | EMW (Plaintiff) Argument | Cameron (Defendant) Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a nonparty bound by a district-court judgment is jurisdictionally barred from moving to intervene on appeal if it did not timely file a notice of appeal | Motion to intervene is an improper end-run around jurisdictional appeal deadlines; AG’s office was bound and could have appealed within the statutory deadline | No statute or rule makes appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider a post-appeal intervention motion by a nonparty who is bound by the judgment | No jurisdictional bar; courts of appeals may consider such intervention motions — respondents’ theory lacks support in statutory or rule text |
| Whether the AG’s prior stipulation that his office would be bound by the final judgment precludes appellate intervention | The stipulation showed the AG had notice and waived future participation; he should be held to his prior position | The stipulation expressly reserved ‘‘all rights...in any appeals arising out of this action’’ including intervention and rehearing petitions | Stipulation did not categorically bar intervention; it preserved appellate rights and did not create a claims-processing bar |
| Proper standard and interests for permissive intervention on appeal | Permissive intervention should be denied where intervention comes late and would prejudice plaintiffs; courts properly exercise discretion to deny | State has a substantial sovereign interest in defending its statutes; refusal to allow the AG to intervene failed properly to weigh that interest | Apply district-court intervention policies (interest, timeliness, prejudice); Sixth Circuit abused discretion by underweighting the State’s significant interest in defending its laws |
| Whether Cameron’s motion was timely and whether intervention would prejudice plaintiffs | Motion was untimely because filed after years of litigation and after the panel decision; rehearing petition raised issues not pressed earlier | Timeliness is measured from when need to intervene arose (when Secretary ceased defending); motion filed promptly thereafter and within rehearing deadlines; prejudice is speculative | Motion was timely (filed as soon as need arose and within rehearing window) and denial of intervention based on prejudice was erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (courts must ensure jurisdictional requirements are satisfied at all stages)
- Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011) (a statute or rule is not jurisdictional unless its language clearly says so)
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (timely notice of appeal rule is jurisdictional)
- Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988) (requirements of Rule 3(c) are jurisdictional)
- Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1 (2002) (class-action context where nonnamed class members were treated as parties for appeal purposes)
- United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (timeliness of intervention assessed from when movant’s interests are no longer protected)
- Automobile Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965) (guiding policies underlying intervention)
- NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973) (timeliness and potential disruption bear on intervention decisions)
- Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (appellate court abuses discretion when ruling rests on an erroneous view of law)
- Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (States have a legitimate interest in continued enforceability of their statutes)