C.P. v. State of Indiana, 39 N.E.3d 1174

On July 14, 2014, off-duty IMPD Officer Jeffrey Wood, working as church security at a festival, twice placed his hand on juvenile C.P.’s shoulder to guide him off church property after C.P. repeatedly wore sagging pants and cursed.
After the second contact, C.P. spun, took a fighting stance, and shoved Officer Wood; Wood arrested C.P. and the State charged C.P. as a delinquent for what would be Level 6 battery on a public-safety official if an adult.
At the fact-finding hearing, C.P. moved to suppress all evidence after Officer Wood’s hand-on-shoulder contact, arguing he was illegally seized because there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The juvenile court initially granted suppression but later found the shoulder contact was not a stop; on appeal the Court of Appeals held the shoulder contact did constitute an unconstitutional seizure under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
The central legal question became whether evidence of C.P.’s subsequent battery must be excluded as fruit of that illegal seizure or whether a new-crime exception permits admission of the battery evidence.

Issue	Appellant's Argument (C.P.)	Appellee's Argument (State)	Held
Was C.P. seized when Officer Wood put his hand on C.P.’s shoulder?	The shoulder contact was a physical seizure absent reasonable suspicion, so it was unconstitutional.	The contact was a non-seizure, or otherwise lawful, because it was a minimal, noncoercive guide off private property.	Held: Yes. Two touches to restrain movement constituted a seizure; no reasonable suspicion existed, so the seizure was illegal under both the Fourth Amendment and Indiana Constitution.
Does the exclusionary rule bar admission of evidence of a new crime (battery) committed in response to an unlawful seizure?	Evidence of the battery is fruit of the illegal seizure and must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.	The new-crime exception applies: when a defendant commits a new, distinct crime in response to an illegal seizure, evidence of that new crime is admissible because suppression would not further deter police misconduct and would incentivize violence.	Held: The court adopted the new-crime exception for both the Fourth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution and affirmed admission of the battery evidence; C.P.’s delinquency adjudication was affirmed.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (indicates when police-citizen contact becomes a seizure)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (physical touching can constitute a seizure)
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule)
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (attenuation and social costs of exclusionary rule)
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (exclusionary rule as last resort; deterrence focus)
United States v. Pryor, 32 F.3d 1192 (7th Cir.) (articulating policy supporting the new-crime exception)
State v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d 145 (Conn. 2003) (adopting new-crime exception under Fourth Amendment)
Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249 (Ind. 2014) (holding unlawful order to stop negates resisting-by-fleeing charge)
Trotter v. State, 933 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing nonapplication of attenuation doctrine under Indiana Constitution)
Lusby v. State, 198 P.3d 735 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008) (noting near-universal acceptance that violence against officer after illegal seizure is admissible)