245 So. 3d 760
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2018Background
- Byron McGraw was rendered unconscious after a single-car rollover; police detected alcohol odor at the scene and accompanied him to the hospital, where he remained unconscious.
- Officer De Santis requested and provided a blood-draw kit to hospital staff; no warrant was obtained and McGraw did not (and could not) expressly consent.
- McGraw was later charged with DUI causing injury based on the warrantless blood-test results and moved to suppress the blood evidence.
- The county court found the blood draw was an unconstitutional search but denied suppression under the good-faith exception, and certified whether Fla. Stat. §316.1932(1)(c)’s “unconscious clause” is constitutional.
- The Fourth District affirmed: it held Florida’s implied-consent statute (which imposes administrative/evidentiary, not criminal, consequences) remains constitutional under McNeely and Birchfield, and that an unconscious driver can be treated as having implied consent in these circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | McGraw’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fla. Stat. §316.1932(1)(c) permits a warrantless blood draw of an unconscious driver | The statute cannot substitute for actual Fourth Amendment consent; an unconscious person cannot consent and the statute is unconstitutional as applied | Implied-consent statute valid; it supplies consent for unconscious drivers where breath testing is unavailable and statute imposes only administrative/evidentiary penalties | Statute survives McNeely and Birchfield; unconscious driver may be deemed to have implied consent under §316.1932(1)(c) |
| Whether McNeely/Birchfield render implied-consent laws per se invalid | Birchfield and McNeely require a warrant or exigency for nonconsensual blood draws; implied consent cannot supply constitutionally valid consent for unconscious persons | Birchfield preserved implied-consent regimes that impose civil/administrative penalties; those statutes remain constitutional and can justify compelled blood draws when breath tests are infeasible | Birchfield distinguishes criminal penalties (invalid) from administrative/evidentiary implied-consent laws (valid); Florida’s statute falls in the latter category and remains constitutional |
| Whether the totality of circumstances supported exigency or other warrant exceptions | No exigent circumstances shown; officer did not try to obtain a warrant | Breath test was not available for an unconscious person; statutory implied consent is the applicable exception | Court did not rely on exigency; held breath unavailable for unconscious person and implied consent valid here |
| Whether suppression is required despite statute’s validity (good-faith exception) | Suppression required because statute cannot supply constitutionally valid consent | Officer reasonably relied on plain statutory language; good-faith exception applies | Court affirmed denial of suppression on either basis: statute constitutional and, alternatively, officer acted in objectively reasonable good faith |
Key Cases Cited
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (blood draws are Fourth Amendment searches)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (no per se exigency for warrantless blood draws; exigency determined case-by-case)
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (breath tests permissible incident to arrest; blood tests more intrusive and criminal penalties for refusal to submit to blood testing are invalid; implied-consent laws imposing civil/evidentiary penalties survive)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good-faith exception to exclusionary rule for objectively reasonable reliance on statute/warrant)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (objectively reasonable mistakes of law by officers can justify searches under good-faith analysis)
- State v. Liles, 191 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (statutory implied consent is not equivalent to Fourth Amendment consent where a conscious defendant explicitly withdraws consent)