Burnice Stackhouse v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services
111 A.3d 636
| D.C. | 2015Background
- Stackhouse, a DPW sanitation worker, was receiving workers’ compensation for 1993 workplace injuries.
- DPW sent notice (regular and certified mail; fax to counsel) requiring a medical exam on Sept. 6, 2012; Stackhouse did not attend and the certified letter was unclaimed.
- DPW suspended his benefits after he missed the Sept. 6 exam; Stackhouse later scheduled and attended an exam on Oct. 11, 2012, and benefits were reinstated as of that date.
- Stackhouse sought retroactive benefits for the suspension period (Sept. 6–Oct. 11, 2012); ALJ found he had received notice and denied retroactive payment; CRB affirmed.
- CRB relied on D.C. Code § 1-623.23(d) and 7 DCMR § 124.9, interpreting the statute to forfeit (not retroactively restore) benefits suspended for failure to submit to an examination.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether claimant is entitled to retroactive payment of benefits suspended for failing to submit to an ordered medical exam | Stackhouse: “Suspended” means temporary; benefits should be restored for the period because he remained medically eligible | District: Statute and regulation require suspension and deduction of the refusal period; benefits are reinstated only as of compliance date, not retroactively | Court: Affirmed CRB — statute reasonably interpreted to forfeit benefits during refusal period; no retroactive payment |
| Whether denial of retroactive benefits constitutes an uncompensated Fifth Amendment taking | Stackhouse: Denial of previously accruing benefits is a taking | District: No authority that denying benefits for failure to follow procedural requirements effects a taking | Court: Takings claim not raised below; even if considered, no authority shows constitutional taking; claim rejected |
Key Cases Cited
- Pierce v. District of Columbia Police & Firefighters’ Ret. & Relief Bd., 882 A.2d 199 (D.C. 2005) (deference to agency interpretations of statutes it administers)
- Williams v. United States, 878 A.2d 477 (D.C. 2005) (look to federal cases interpreting nearly identical federal statutes)
- McCamey v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 947 A.2d 1191 (D.C. 2008) (workers’ comp statutes liberally construed for humanitarian purpose)
- Brown v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 83 A.3d 739 (D.C. 2014) (agency interpretation consistent with incentive to cooperate with statutory requirements)
- Mason v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 562 A.2d 644 (D.C. 1989) (defer to agency when petitioners and agency make cogent but conflicting statutory constructions)
- Hill v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 717 A.2d 909 (D.C. 1998) (requirement to raise claims first before the agency)
- Horne v. Department of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (takings claim can be properly raised before an agency)
- Mack v. United States, 6 A.3d 1224 (D.C. 2010) (no serious constitutional doubt warranting rejection of agency interpretation)
