Buford Lloyd Crowell v. the State of Texas, 14-20-00017-CR

Background

Appellant pleaded guilty (no agreed punishment) to: three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child <14, one count of sexual performance by a child <14, and possession with intent to promote child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to 70 years on each sexual-offense conviction and 15 years on the pornography conviction, with sentences ordered cumulated.
Appellant signed plea forms with a boilerplate appeal waiver, but the trial court certified he had the right to appeal and orally stated he had that right; the written judgments nonetheless indicated appeal was waived and appointed appellate counsel.
Appellant moved for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance (plea involuntary due to counsel’s representation about punishment and counsel’s expert evidence) and asserted he was constructively denied counsel because he was transferred to an "inaccessible" prison during the new-trial period.
The judgment for the sexual-performance offense labeled it a second-degree felony (20-year max) though plea paperwork and the indictment showed it was a first-degree offense (5–99 years); appellant argued the 70-year sentence was therefore void.
The cumulation orders stacked the child-pornography sentence between other sex-offense sentences. The State conceded the child-pornography sentence could not be stacked with the other offenses; the record also showed one aggravated-sexual-assault offense was committed July 1, 1997—before statutory stacking became effective for those offenses.
The court affirmed most rulings, found several clerical and substantive errors, sustained cumulation error issues in part, and modified judgments to correct degree, dates, and the chain of cumulation (making certain sentences concurrent and reordering valid consecutive runs).

Issues

Issue	Appellant's Argument	State's Argument	Held
1. Denial of hearing on motion for new trial (ineffective assistance)	Motion alleged counsel misrepresented punishment and made poor strategic choices; entitled to a hearing	Motion lacked required supporting affidavit and factual detail	Overruled — no hearing required; allegations conclusory and unsupported
2. Constructive denial of counsel during new-trial period (transfer to inaccessible prison)	Transfer made it physically impossible to meet and prepare affidavits for the motion	No record evidence; allegation conclusory	Overruled — no evidence of denial of counsel
3. Sentence void for sexual-performance conviction because judgment lists 2nd-degree felony	70-year sentence exceeds second-degree max and is void	Clerical error: offense is first-degree as charged and pleaded; sentence within statutory range	Overruled — judgment reformed to reflect first-degree felony; sentence valid
4. Erroneous cumulation (stacking) orders — child pornography stacking and stacking of 1997 offense	Child-pornography sentence not among enumerated offenses that may be stacked; sex-offense from 1997 cannot be stacked because committed before statutory change	Agrees child-pornography stacking improper; asks some cumulation orders be preserved	Sustained in part — modified judgments: delete cumulation for child-pornography cause; reframe 1633374 to run consecutive to 1633372 (validly stackable); make 1614719 and 1633373 concurrent (1997 offense cannot be stacked); correct clerical date/degree errors

Key Cases Cited

Willis v. State, 121 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (trial court may allow appeal despite written waiver when court grants permission)
Alzarka v. State, 90 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (oral trial-court grant can preserve appellate right despite printed waiver)
Grice v. State, 162 S.W.3d 641 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005) (certification controls over surplusage in judgment when documentation conflicts)
Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (motion for new trial requires supporting affidavit showing truth of allegations)
Jordan v. State, 883 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (conclusory affidavits do not entitle defendant to new-trial hearing)
Ex parte Beck, 922 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (sentence exceeding statutory maximum is unlawful)
Miles v. State, 506 S.W.3d 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (statutory scheme restricts stacking to offenses listed together; cannot stack across different subdivisions)
Ex parte Carter, 521 S.W.3d 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (erroneous cumulation order is reviewable and not procedurally defaulted as to being void)
Bonilla v. State, 452 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (trial court needs some evidence offense occurred after statutory effective date to exercise stacking discretion)
Carmona v. State, 610 S.W.3d 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020) (appellate court may reform judgments to make the record speak the truth)
Penton v. State, 489 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016) (illustrating modification of judgments to correct offense/degree clerical errors)
Ex parte Pharr, 897 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (defining "single criminal action" for stacking analysis)