Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department, Inc., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18447

Bryson, a long-time firefighter-member and administrative assistant, sues Middlefield Volunteer Fire Department and Scott Anderson for Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation.
The Fire Department is a non-profit entity in Ohio providing fire/EMS services with member classifications (active, associate, inactive, honorary, cadet).
District court granted partial summary judgment, ruling firefighter-members are not Title VII employees because the Department had fewer than fifteen employees and benefits were de minimis.
EEOC previously concluded the Department was an employer under Title VII, counting firefighter-members as employees, but Bryson’s federal claims were dismissed on remand.
Bryson's state-law claims were declined supplemental jurisdiction after federal dismissal; the district court left unresolved the scope of the firefighter-members’ relationship.
Sixth Circuit reverses, holding remuneration cannot be the sole antecedent factor and remands for weighing all relationship incidents; also remands the state-law claims for potential supplemental jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are firefighter-members Title VII employees?	Bryson argues firefighter-members are employees given benefits and Department control.	Department contends there are fewer than fifteen employees and benefits are de minimis, so no employer status.	Remand for fact-focused analysis; not conclusively decided here.
Is remuneration an independent antecedent factor to the common-law agency test for Title VII employment status?	Remuneration should be weighed with other factors, not treated as a separate prerequisite.	Remuneration must be a threshold step before applying the agency factors.	Remand; remuneration is not an independent antecedent requirement to determine employee status.
Should the district court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after Title VII dismissal?	State-law claims should be remanded with supplemental jurisdiction preserved for proper resolution.	District court may dismiss state-law claims without supplemental jurisdiction if federal claims are resolved.	Remanded to address supplemental jurisdiction consistent with this opinion.

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (U.S. 1992) (common-law agency framework for 'employee' status; multiple factors weigh)
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (U.S. 1989) (defines 'employee' via common law of agency; factors for control and entrepreneurship)
United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004) (two-step remuneration-plus-agency-factor test for employment status)
Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir. 1993) (threshold remuneration or benefits can establish employment in volunteers)
Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468 (2d Cir. 1999) (significant benefits can indicate employment status for volunteers)
Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo Ass'n, Inc., 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990) (compensation structure essential to employment-like relationship analysis)
O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997) (interns and education-related arrangements not employment absent remuneration)
Ware v. United States, 67 F.3d 574 (6th Cir. 1995) (application of common-law agency factors to employment questions)
Demaski v. U.S. Dept. of Labor, 419 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005) (non-employee status where no contractual relationship exists)