302 Conn. 755
Conn.2011Background
- Brymer sues Town of Clinton for hypertension benefits under §7-433c(a).
- Claim is barred by one-year filing limit in §31-294c(a).
- Board upheld commissioner’s dismissal as untimely; Brymer appeals.
- Court decided Ciarlelli v. Hamden (2010) held the filing clock starts when a medical professional informs the employee of a hypertension diagnosis.
- Record shows prior normal readings; June 20, 2000 reading 140/100 led to a diagnosis debate; Knudson later clarified diagnosis often requires multiple readings.
- Winokur diagnosed hypertension on July 11, 2003; case remanded for consideration consistent with law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does §31-294c(a)’s one-year limit begin for §7-433c claims? | Brymer argues it begins upon medical-diagnosis notice. | Clinton contends based on evidence/notice as of awareness of symptoms. | Begins upon informed diagnosis by a medical professional. |
| Did Knudson’s June 20, 2000 report constitute notice of hypertension? | Yes, report diagnosed hypertension and informed Brymer. | Report alone supports notice. | No; not sufficient alone; diagnosis must be informed by professional notice per Ciarlelli. |
| Was the board’s reliance on Knudson’s report proper under Ciarlelli? | Board applied correct standard | Board could rely on report as basis for diagnosis. | Board applied incorrect legal standard; reversal required. |
| Should remand be ordered to apply proper legal standard to Brymer’s claim? | Remand for new consideration under correct standard. | Remand unnecessary if dismissal justified. | Remand with direction to proceed according to law. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265 (2010) (one-year limit begins upon diagnosis notice by medical professional)
- Tracy v. Scherwitzky Gutter Co., 279 Conn. 265 (2006) (appellate review of factual inferences; not a retrial of facts)
- D'Amico v. Dept. of Correction, 73 Conn.App. 718 (2002) (standard for clearly erroneous factual findings)
- Fadner v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 281 Conn. 719 (2007) (standard for weight of evidence; credibility of witnesses)
- Stevenson Lumber Co.-Suffield, Inc. v. Chase Associates, Inc., 284 Conn. 205 (2007) (exclusive province of trier of fact to weigh evidence and assess credibility)