Brown v. Flowers
974 F.3d 1178
10th Cir.2020Background
- Brittney Brown, a pretrial detainee at Pontotoc County Justice Center, was summoned by jailer Roger Flowers to the control tower; she felt compelled to comply because of the jail’s power dynamics.
- Flowers exposed Brown, demanded sexual contact, and had intercourse; Brown cried and did not physically resist, fearing retaliation or charges; Flowers later gave her cigarettes; a similar incident occurred a week later.
- Flowers later pleaded guilty in Oklahoma state court to two counts of second-degree rape under a statute criminalizing sex between a guard and a prisoner.
- Brown sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging constitutional sexual-abuse claims; the district court treated consent/coercion as fact issues for a jury and denied Flowers summary judgment and qualified immunity.
- On interlocutory appeal, the Tenth Circuit accepted the district court’s factual view (that a jury could find coercion/nonconsent) and reviewed only legal questions about a constitutional violation and qualified immunity.
- The Tenth Circuit affirmed denial of qualified immunity, holding coerced nonconsensual sex by a jailer violates clearly established constitutional rights; the court also granted in part Flowers’s motion to seal certain jail-security exhibits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Flowers’s conduct violated the Constitution (pretrial detainee excessive-force/sexual-abuse claim) | Brown: coerced, nonconsensual sex by a jailer is objectively harmful and unconstitutional | Flowers: evidence shows consent; no constitutional violation | Court: Accepting facts favoring Brown, coerced nonconsensual sex by a jailer violates the Constitution (objective standard applies for detainees) |
| Whether consent/coercion was a question for the judge or jury | Brown: disputed facts (power dynamics, crying, post-event statements) make consent a jury issue | Flowers: undisputed facts show consent, so no constitutional violation as a matter of law | Court: Lacked jurisdiction to revisit district court’s factual finding on consent; concluded a reasonable jury could find coercion/nonconsent |
| Whether the right was clearly established for qualified-immunity purposes | Brown: longstanding Tenth Circuit precedent puts officers on notice that sexual abuse of inmates is unconstitutional, including nonphysical coercion | Flowers: no controlling case on these specific facts (e.g., post-sex gifts, subtle coercion); law too general | Court: Precedent clearly established that nonconsensual/coerced sex by custodians is unconstitutional; qualified immunity denied |
| Motion to seal exhibits | Brown: opposed unsealing; some exhibits were publicly posted by counsel | Flowers: jail-security records could jeopardize safety and investigations | Court: Granted sealing for exhibits revealing jail surveillance/layout; denied sealing for other records; ordered removal of publicly posted sealed exhibits |
Key Cases Cited
- Giron v. Correctional Corp. of America, 191 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir.) (1999) (sexual abuse and rape by guards violate the Constitution)
- Smith v. Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2003) (constitutional violation where guard coerced inmate into sex through threats)
- Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013) (treats sexual abuse of prisoners as a species of excessive-force claim; consent can defeat claim when overwhelming evidence supports consent)
- Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998) (power dynamics can render sexual conduct constitutionally serious even without physical force)
- Castillo v. Day, 790 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2015) (recognizes constitutional violations based on sexual abuse involving nonphysical coercion)
- Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015) (pretrial detainee excessive-force claims are governed by an objective standard)
- Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (context-specific analysis for clearly established law in qualified-immunity inquiries)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) (cautions against defining clearly established law at a high level of generality)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (precept that precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable officer would understand the unlawfulness of conduct)