Brittan Holland v. Kelly Rosen
895 F.3d 272
| 3rd Cir. | 2018Background
- New Jersey amended its Constitution and enacted the Criminal Justice Reform Act (effective Jan. 1, 2017) to shift from a money-centric bail system to a risk-based framework prioritizing non-monetary conditions (e.g., supervision, curfew, electronic monitoring, home detention) for "eligible defendants."
- The Act requires Pretrial Services to prepare a Public Safety Assessment and a Decision-Making Framework; monetary bail (cash or corporate surety) remains available only if non-monetary conditions (or unsecured recognizance) are inadequate to achieve the Act’s goals.
- Plaintiff Brittan Holland (charged with aggravated assault) negotiated and accepted level 3+ release conditions (home detention and electronic monitoring) after the prosecutor filed a motion for pretrial detention; Lexington National Insurance (bail bond company) sued as well, claiming business injury.
- Holland sought a preliminary injunction arguing the Act (by subordinating monetary bail) violated the Eighth Amendment (Excessive Bail), the Fourteenth Amendment (substantive and procedural due process), and the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable searches/seizures).
- The District Court denied the injunction; the Third Circuit affirmed: Holland has standing, Lexington does not; the court held there is no federal constitutional right to monetary bail (cash deposit or corporate surety) on parity with non-monetary conditions and upheld the Act’s procedures.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Eighth Amendment guarantees a right to monetary bail (cash or corporate surety) equivalent to non-monetary conditions | Holland: Excessive Bail Clause secures a right to have monetary bail considered as an equal option; subordinating it allows severe liberty restrictions without monetary alternative | State: Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail but does not require monetary bail or parity with non-monetary conditions; bail broadly means pretrial release conditioned on assurances | Held: No. Even if there is a "right to bail," it does not historically or contemporaneously require cash deposits or corporate sureties as an equal alternative to non-monetary conditions. |
| Whether the Act violates substantive due process by subordinating monetary bail | Holland: Monetary bail is a fundamental liberty-protecting option (rooted in history/ordered liberty) and must be available to avoid severe pretrial liberty deprivations | State: Cash bail and corporate surety are not historically fundamental; subordination is rationally related to legitimate state interests (reduce wealth-based detention, assure safety, appearance) | Held: No fundamental right implicated; rational-basis review applies and the Act is rationally related to legitimate interests. |
| Whether the Act violates procedural due process by giving lower priority to monetary bail | Holland: Process is inadequate because monetary bail is effectively excluded | State: Act provides robust procedural protections (pretrial assessment, detention hearing, counsel, discovery, appeal, modification) comparable to federal standards | Held: No. Under Mathews factors, procedures are adequate; requiring monetary-bail consideration would have low probable value and impose burdens. |
| Whether imposing non-monetary conditions (e.g., electronic monitoring/home detention) without monetary-bail alternative violates the Fourth Amendment | Holland: Electronic monitoring/home detention are intrusive searches/seizures and less intrusive monetary options exist | State: Conditions are justified by reduced privacy expectation after arrest and legitimate governmental interests; Fourth Amendment does not demand least-intrusive means | Held: No. Even assuming intrusion, reasonableness—not least-intrusive-means—governs; Holland unlikely to prevail. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (describing bail as pretrial release conditioned on adequate assurances)
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding federal preventive-detention scheme; Excessive Bail Clause limits only excessive conditions)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (limits on Younger abstention and standards for prompt probable-cause determinations)
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (principles of federal-court abstention in ongoing state proceedings)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three-factor test for procedural due process adequacy)
- Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013) (discussing reduced privacy expectations after arrest)