960 F.3d 487
8th Cir.2020Background
- Brian McCoy was convicted of voluntary manslaughter (18 U.S.C. § 1112) and of using a firearm in relation to a "crime of violence" (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)); the district court imposed consecutive terms of 96 months and 120 months.
- McCoy filed a § 2255 motion arguing that voluntary manslaughter is not a "crime of violence" after Johnson v. United States invalidated a similar residual clause.
- The district court relied on Eighth Circuit precedent (Prickett) and denied relief; the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further consideration after Dimaya.
- On remand, the Supreme Court held in Davis that § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, leaving the question whether voluntary manslaughter qualifies under the § 924(c)(3)(A) "force" clause.
- The court applied the categorical approach, recognized that § 1112 creates distinct voluntary and involuntary manslaughter offenses, and considered whether voluntary manslaughter’s elements "have as an element the use . . . of physical force against the person of another."
- Relying on Voisine and the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Fogg (reckless conduct can be a "use" of force), the court held voluntary manslaughter qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) and affirmed the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague | McCoy: clause is like the one invalidated in Johnson, so conviction cannot stand | Government: Prickett and precedent foreclose Johnson-based relief | Resolved by Davis: residual clause is void (remand context) |
| Whether voluntary manslaughter is a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (force clause) | McCoy: voluntary manslaughter can be committed with mere recklessness and thus need not involve a "use" of force | Government: voluntary manslaughter necessarily includes the use of physical force against another (including reckless means) | Court: voluntary manslaughter qualifies under the force clause because reckless conduct can constitute a "use" of physical force (Voisine, Fogg) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (held similar federal residual clause vague)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (held § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016) (reckless domestic assault constitutes a "use" of physical force)
- United States v. Fogg, 836 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2016) (held reckless drive-by shooting qualifies as use of force under ACCA clause)
- United States v. Prickett, 839 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2016) (addressed Johnson’s effect on § 924(c) residual clause)
- United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2016) (indirect means like poison can constitute a use of force)