Brian K. Allison v. State of iowa
914 N.W.2d 866
| Iowa | 2018Background
- Brian Allison was convicted in 2011 of three counts of third-degree sexual abuse; procedendo issued September 6, 2012.
- He filed a timely first PCR (Mar. 6, 2013) alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate juror bias; the district court denied relief and the court of appeals affirmed in 2015.
- Allison filed a pro se second PCR on November 5, 2015, alleging his first PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to develop the juror-bias claim; he later filed an amended second petition adding claims of witness recantation and changed law on expert testimony.
- The State moved to dismiss the second petition as barred by the three-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code § 822.3; the district court dismissed, concluding ineffective PCR counsel is not a "ground of fact" to avoid the bar; the court of appeals affirmed relying on Dible v. State.
- The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review, vacated the court of appeals, reversed the district court, held that a successive PCR alleging ineffective assistance of prior PCR counsel can relate back to a timely first PCR when filed promptly after the first action concludes, and remanded for further proceedings on the amended petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 3-year PCR statute of limitations (Iowa Code § 822.3) bars a successive PCR that alleges first PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to develop a timely-raised trial-ineffectiveness claim | Allison: where a timely first PCR alleged trial counsel ineffective but PCR counsel failed to develop it, the second petition should not be time-barred (it effectively relates back to the first timely petition) | State: Dible controls; ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is not a "ground of fact" under § 822.3 and the second petition filed after three years is untimely | Held: Court qualified Dible — when a timely first PCR raised trial-ineffectiveness and a successive petition alleges prior PCR counsel was ineffective, the second petition relates back to the first for statute-of-limitations purposes if filed promptly after the first PCR concludes; reverse and remand to develop the claim |
| Whether the district court properly dismissed claims in Allison's amended second petition (recantation and change-in-law expert testimony) as unpreserved or too vague | Allison: amended claims were before the district court and civil rules apply to PCR; allegations suffice to require a hearing or a more specific statement request | State: error not preserved because district court never granted leave to amend; even if preserved, allegations are vague and insufficient to avoid dismissal | Held: Court found the amended claims were preserved; the State did not meet the heavy burden on a motion to dismiss and the claims should not have been dismissed; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Dible v. State, 557 N.W.2d 881 (Iowa 1996) (majority held ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel is not a "ground of fact" to avoid § 822.3 limitations)
- Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003) (recognizes newly discovered evidence/recantation may fit § 822.3 exception)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2012) (equitable rule excusing procedural default when initial-review collateral counsel is ineffective for trial-ineffectiveness claims)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (U.S. 1991) (federal rule that ineffective assistance in postconviction proceedings generally does not excuse procedural default, but reservation for initial-review collateral proceedings)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of trial counsel)
- Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 2011) (recognizing statutory right to effective PCR counsel)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (U.S. 2013) (extends Martinez framework where it is unlikely ineffective-trial-counsel claims can be raised on direct appeal)