Daniel LADO, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
No. 09-0853.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Sept. 2, 2011.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 2011.
804 N.W.2d 248
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Thomas J. Gaul, Assistant Appellate Defender, fоr appellant.
ZAGER, Justice.
Daniel Lado appeals the district court‘s dismissal of his application for postconviction relief for failure to prosecute under
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Daniel Lado pleaded guilty to dependent adult abuse in July 2006. The trial court imposed a ten-year prison term, suspended the sentence, and placed Lado on probation. In January 2007, after an evidentiary hearing, Lado‘s prоbation was revoked, and his prison sentence was reinstated. Lado filed several requests for his sentence to be reconsidered, which the court denied.
Lado‘s counsel filed an application to copy the file on December 10, 2008. On January 7, 2009, the court granted Lado‘s application. On January 29, the State filed an answer to Lado‘s pro se petition, and the State also filed a motion for summary judgment and dismissal of Lado‘s petition. The State alleged summary judgment should be granted for several reasons, including “the application is subject to dismissal pursuant
In response, appointed counsel filed an application for extension on February 19. Counsel admitted he had not reviewed the еntire file or discussed the State‘s motion with Lado. Counsel, however, made no motion to extend or seek relief from the
The court set a hearing for March 17, and ordered the parties to provide written materials at least two days before the hearing. The State filed a written argument in support of its motions for summary judgment and dismissal. Lado‘s counsel filed nothing. Lado‘s counsel did represent him at his hearing, which was not reported. The district court entered its order of dismissal on May 6, 2009, finding that the case had been dismissed on January 1, 2009, by operation of
Lado filed a pro se notice of appeal alleging dismissal under
II. Standard of Review.
This court generally reviews an appeal from a denial of a postconviction relief application for correction of errors at lаw. Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 155 (Iowa 2010). When the applicant‘s claims are of a constitutional nature, this court engages in a de novo review. Id. Lado, however, has a statutory, not constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on postconviction relief. See Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 14-15 (Iowa 1994) (finding
In Dunbar, we used federal constitutional law to guide our analysis of the postconviction relief applicant‘s statutory right to effective assistance of counsel. See Dunbar, 515 N.W.2d at 15 (analyzing the applicant‘s ineffective-assistance claim under the well-established Strickland two-prong test). Sincе the parties do not advocate any other framework, we will use constitutional ineffective-assistance-of-counsel precedent to guide our analysis in this case.
To establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a claimant must demonstrate “(1) his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.” State v. Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064-65, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)). The claimant must prove both elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). We address each prong in order.
A. Breach of Essential Duty. An attorney breaches an essential duty when “counsel‘s representation [falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. “Miscalculated trial strategies and mere mistakes in judgment normally do not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Millam v. State, 745 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Iowa 2008) (quoting Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143). Ineffective assistance, hоwever, is more likely when counsel‘s alleged actions or inactions result from a lack of diligence, rather than use of judgment. Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142-43. “Clearly, there is a greater tendency for courts to find ineffective assistance when there has been ‘an abdication—not exercise—of ... professional [responsibility].‘” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 216 (8th Cir. 1974)).
Lado‘s counsel was apprised of the pending
B. Prejudice. Ordinarily, a claimant must prove “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different” to establish prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698. This is because “the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 667 (1984). In other words, a person‘s right to counsel is only implicated when attorney error undermines the reliability and fairness of the criminal process. Most ineffective-assistance claims involve “trial error” which implicates counsel‘s performance during the course of a legal proceeding. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481-82 (2000).
Defense counsel, however, may also commit “structural errors.” Structural errors are not merely errors in a legal proceeding, but errors “affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302, 331 (1991). We have recognized structural error occurs when: (1) counsel is completely denied, actually or constructively, at a crucial stage of the proceeding; (2) where counsel does not place thе prosecution‘s case against meaningful adversarial testing; or (3) where surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness, such as where counsel has an actual conflict of interest in jointly representing multiple defendants. State v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Iowa 2008) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S. Ct. at 2047, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 668).1
Under these сircumstances, “[n]o specific showing of prejudice [is] required” as the criminal adversary process itself is “presumptively unreliable.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S. Ct. at 2047, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 668; see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 77-78, 88, 109 S. Ct. 346, 348-49, 354, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300, 307, 314 (1988) (finding complete denial of counsel where appellate counsel‘s appeal was entitled “Certificаtion of Meritless Appeal and Motion” and contained no argument). Stated another way, when counsel commits a structural error, the defendant does not have to show he would have obtained a different outcome absent the counsel‘s structurаl error because such an analysis “would be a speculative inquiry into what might have occurred in an alternate universe.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2565, 165 L. Ed. 2d 409, 420 (2006) (presuming prejudice where trial court erroneously inhibited defendant from having his choice of counsel). In cases where defеnse counsel fails to file an appeal against the defendant‘s wishes, the Court has determined the “serious denial of the entire judicial proceeding itself ... similarly demands a presumption of prejudice.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 483, 120 S. Ct. at 1038, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 999. In sum, when a structural error occurs in a proceeding, the underlying criminal proceeding is so unreliable the constitutional or statutory right to counsel entitles the defendant to a new proceeding without the need to show the error actually caused prejudice.
The court specifically wаrned Lado‘s counsel that his postconviction relief application was subject to
Lado has proven his counsel was ineffective in failing to seek a continuance to prevent dismissal under
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except MANSFIELD, J., who takes no part.