Brett Steele v. James Mattis, 899 F.3d 943

Background

DOD hired Dr. Brett Steele (age 47) as a three-year associate professor at the National Defense University; first year was probationary.
Midway through probation Steele had repeated disputes with supervisors (Dean Hanlon and Dr. Alejandra Bolanos) about teaching methods and curriculum adherence.
The College faced budget cuts and decided to eliminate three positions, selecting only from six probationary faculty; Steele was among three chosen for termination and resigned shortly before the effective date.
Steele alleged Dr. Bolanos made repeated age-biased remarks favoring younger hires and disparaging older employees; Bolanos denied the statements.
After termination younger faculty were hired and younger instructors covered much of Steele’s courses; Steele filed an ADEA claim, and the district court granted summary judgment for the government.
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding material disputes of fact existed about whether age motivated the termination and remanded for trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether summary judgment was proper on ADEA disparate-treatment claim	Steele says budget and performance explanations are pretext; supervisor’s anti-older-worker remarks and replacement by younger hires show age discrimination	Government says termination was for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons: budget cuts (and later, candidate qualifications); remarks were stray and made by non-decisionmaker	Reversed: summary judgment improper—triable issues exist on pretext and discriminatory motive
Whether supervisor Bolanos’s remarks constitute direct evidence or are merely stray remarks	Steele: Bolanos’s comments are direct evidence of age bias and relevant because she participated in discussions leading to termination	Government: Remarks are stray and irrelevant because Bolanos was not the final decisionmaker	Held: Remarks could be probative; Bolanos participated in discussions and may have caused a "cat’s paw" effect, so remarks are not automatically immaterial
Whether academic deference requires heightened pretext standard	Steele: No heightened pretext burden applies absent a genuinely academic judgment	Government: College’s academic context warrants more deference	Held: No automatic heightened pretext burden merely because defendant is an academic institution; standard remains ordinary Title VII/ADEA analysis
Whether budgetary rationale alone precludes finding discrimination	Steele: Budget cuts do not explain why Steele (vs. other probationary faculty) was chosen; explanations shifted over time, showing inconsistency	Government: Budget cuts (and later qualifications) justify selection	Held: Inconsistencies and insufficiency of the budget explanation, plus other evidence (remarks, younger replacements), permit a reasonable jury to find pretext

Key Cases Cited

General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (U.S. 2004) (purpose of ADEA is to protect older workers from arbitrary, stereotypical distinctions)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (U.S. 2000) (framework for evaluating employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason and plaintiff’s showing of pretext)
Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (U.S. 2009) (but-for causation standard for individual damages under ADEA)
Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ("a factor" standard for prospective injunctive/declaratory relief against federal employers under § 633a)
DeJesus v. WP Co., 841 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (summary-judgment standards and burden-shifting under ADEA)
Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (U.S. 2011) ("cat’s paw" liability where biased subordinate’s actions proximately cause adverse employment action)
Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (plaintiff may prove discrimination by showing pretext or direct discriminatory motive)
Samii v. Billington, 195 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (budgetary decisions can be legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for personnel actions)
Durant v. District of Columbia Gov’t, 875 F.3d 685 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (similar recognition that budget-based terminations can be nondiscriminatory)