Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 159 A.3d 1112

Background

In 1987 Robert Breton stabbed to death his ex-wife and 15-year-old son; convicted of two counts of murder and one capital felony and sentenced to death; multiple prior appeals affirmed conviction and ultimately the death sentence.
At the guilt phase Breton instructed defense counsel not to present psychiatric testimony or an extreme emotional disturbance (EED) defense and consistently denied committing the crimes; trial court conducted colloquies and found him competent.
Defense pursued a reasonable-doubt strategy; later penalty-phase experts (Borden, Phillips) diagnosed severe mixed personality disorder and offered evidence supporting mitigation; habeas experts later diagnosed PTSD with dissociative features and posited methamphetamine intoxication (Desoxyn) at the time of the crimes.
Habeas petition argued guilt-phase counsel were ineffective for failing to (1) discover 1966 transcripts about Breton’s earlier killing of his father and (2) test an initial blood sample taken ~40 hours after the 1987 murders; argued these failures denied a meritorious EED/intoxication defense.
Habeas court found counsel deficient in not discovering transcripts and not testing the first blood sample but held Breton not prejudiced because he had knowingly and voluntarily forbidden counsel to present evidence tantamount to admitting he committed the crimes; habeas relief denied as to conviction claims.
Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed: held that a competent defendant’s clear, knowing, voluntary instruction not to present mitigating evidence can preclude Strickland prejudice; Breton’s record showed such a decision and no reasonable probability of a different outcome.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Breton)	Defendant's Argument (Commissioner)	Held
Whether counsel’s failure to discover 1966 transcripts was prejudicial under Strickland	Failure to find transcripts deprived counsel of proof of PTSD/dissociation that would have supported EED, so prejudice exists	Even if discovery was deficient, Breton’s refusal to permit mitigation forecloses prejudice; trial counsel had investigated and knew the same background facts	No prejudice; Breton had clearly and voluntarily refused mitigation that would amount to admitting the killings, so uncovering transcripts would not likely have changed result
Whether counsel’s failure to test the first blood sample for methamphetamine was prejudicial	A tested sample would have supported intoxication-based EED or negated specific intent, establishing prejudice	Prejudice lacking because Breton refused intoxication-based strategy and experts’ extrapolations from an 18-year-old sample were unreliable	No prejudice; record supports that Breton would not have permitted intoxication evidence and experts could not reliably establish intoxicating levels at the crime time
Whether counsel were ineffective for pursuing reasonable-doubt strategy instead of EED when Breton forbade psychiatric evidence	Counsel’s investigation was inadequate (Wiggins) so Breton’s refusal was uninformed; counsel should have overridden or further advised him	Client control of fundamental defense choices; competent defendant may refuse mitigation; counsel ethically must follow informed choice	Held for respondent: competent defendant’s clear instruction governs; counsel’s acquiescence was not ineffective where waiver was knowing and voluntary
Whether petitioner had right to effective counsel for petition for a new trial	Breton argued posttrial petition counsel was ineffective	State argued no constitutional right to counsel for a separate petition for a new trial under Connecticut law	Held for respondent: no constitutional right to counsel for such a petition; ineffective assistance claim unavailable

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance: performance and prejudice)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel must conduct reasonable investigation into mitigation; failure can be objectively unreasonable)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (counsel’s failure to review readily available court file that contained mitigating evidence was unreasonable)
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (defendant’s express instruction and disruptive conduct can preclude Strickland prejudice from failure to investigate mitigation)
State v. Breton, 264 Conn. 327 (2003) (previous direct appeal affirming conviction and reviewing penalty-phase findings)
State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1 (2015) (interpreting repeal of death penalty and effect on execution of pre‑repeal capital offenders)