Bragg v. State
295 Ga. 676
| Ga. | 2014Background
- On September 9, 2002, Tom Bragg was killed by blunt-force trauma consistent with hammer blows; no forced entry and a blood trail led from the bedroom to the front door and porch.
- Mary Ann Bragg left the house that morning, picked up a friend, and drove to an appointment; a neighbor shortly thereafter saw a glow on Bragg’s screened porch.
- Investigators interviewed Bragg multiple times; she asked about insurance proceeds and later admitted to extramarital affairs discovered on her computer after a warrant for data was obtained.
- The State presented three similar-transaction incidents showing Bragg solicited others to kill her former husband, plus testimony that Bragg threatened her husbands and friends who said she admitted killing Tom.
- Bragg was convicted by a jury of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault; sentenced to life for malice murder (other counts merged or vacated); she appealed raising evidentiary, jury-charge, and ineffective-assistance claims.
Issues
| Issue | Bragg's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of similar-transaction evidence | Trial court erred in admitting prior solicitations to kill her former husband and failing to limit jury use | Prior acts were similar in motive, scheme, identity, and intent and admissible for proper purposes | Admission was within trial court’s discretion; jury was instructed on proper purposes and twice limited use to identity, state of mind, common scheme, intent |
| Jury charge on parties to a crime | Charge was improper because insufficient evidence supported involvement of another person | Slight evidence (porch glow soon after Bragg left; medical testimony that Bragg was physically incapable) supported instruction on parties | Charge was authorized; slight evidence sufficed to permit instruction on parties to a crime |
| Suppression of computer evidence / voluntariness of statements (Jackson v. Denno) | Counsel ineffective for not moving to suppress computer evidence seized and not requesting a Jackson v. Denno hearing to exclude statements/medical records | Computer data were obtained under a later specific warrant; Bragg was not in custody so statements were not involuntary or Miranda-triggered; objections would have lacked merit | No deficient performance or prejudice shown; suppression motions or Denno hearing would have been meritless and, even if seizure error occurred, any error was not prejudicial given the overall evidence |
| Alleged ineffective assistance based on trial tactics (objections, hearsay, circumstantial-evidence charge, jury instructions) | Counsel failed to object to hearsay, failed to seek limiting or additional jury instructions, and failed to request circumstantial evidence charge | Counsel pursued reasonable trial strategy (cross-examination rather than contemporaneous objections), court gave proper instructions, and circumstantial-evidence charge not required absent written request when direct evidence existed | Tactical choices were reasonable; counsel not deficient and cumulative error/prejudice not shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of the evidence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)
- Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (test for admissibility of similar transactions)
- Pareja v. State, 286 Ga. 117 (focus on similarities for similar-transaction admissibility)
- Moore v. State, 293 Ga. 676 (admissibility of similar transactions reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Briggs v. State, 281 Ga. 627 (proper purposes for similar-transaction evidence jury instruction)
- Davis v. State, 269 Ga. 276 (slight evidence can authorize jury instruction on parties to a crime)
- Poole v. State, 291 Ga. 848 (no deficient performance when counsel fails to object to admissible evidence)
- Durden v. State, 293 Ga. 89 (custodial interrogation and Miranda requirement)