Bowie v. Maddox
395 U.S. App. D.C. 301
D.C. Cir.2011Background
- Bowie, former Assistant Inspector General for Investigations at DC OIG, was terminated August 2002 for alleged performance problems, claimed retaliation for supporting Johnson.
- Johnson, Bowie’s subordinate, was fired in March 2000 after Bowie's dissent; Johnson filed an EEOC discrimination charge in March 2000.
- After Johnson’s charge, Bowie's performance evaluations declined (2001–2002) and Campane was elevated; Bowie was terminated less than three weeks after a peer-review reinspection in July 2002.
- Bowie sued District and OIG officials under §§1985(2), 1986, §1983 (First Amendment), and Title VII/DC Human Rights Act retaliation assertions; district court dismissed conspiracy and First Amendment claims, and trial proceeded on Title VII claim.
- The DC Circuit vacated the conspiracy dismissals under §§1985(2) and 1986, remanding for further proceedings; affirmed other aspects, including First Amendment ruling and evidentiary decisions.
- Defendants sought to add Carter and other officials; court rejected reinstatement/adding those defendants; various evidentiary rulings reviewed on abuse-of-discretion standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §1985(2) require class-based animus for conspiracy to deter testimony? | Bowie contends no such requirement. | District argues lack of invidious motive defeats claim. | No class-based motive required; conspiracy claim barred only if other elements fail. |
| Does intracorporate conspiracy doctrine preclude §1985(2) claim here? | Bowie argues doctrine may apply. | Defendants rely on intracorporate conspiracy to dismiss. | Court vacates dismissal to address novelty and district court’s rationale on remand. |
| Does §1985(2) reach an administrative agency like the EEOC? | §1985(2) protects attendance/testimony in federal courts. | EEOC is not a court of the United States for §1985 purposes. | EEOC not within §1985(2)’s scope; claim against Davis/Quon rejected. |
| Was Bowie's First Amendment retaliation claim properly granted summary judgment? | Speech related to Johnson and Bowie's position was protected. | Speech occurred in official capacity; not protected. | Summary judgment affirmed; speech not protected when made pursuant to official duties. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (U.S. 1983) (no requirement of invidious motive in §1985(2) clause one)
- Irizarry v. Quiros, 722 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1983) (mentions §1985 scope; right created by §1985(2))
- Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (U.S. 1979) (distinguishes Title VII from §1985 remedies)
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (U.S. 2006) (official duties limit First Amendment protection for employee speech)
- Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (speech as citizen vs. employee; Garcetti framework)