Bowens v. Commissioner of Correction, 333 Conn. 502

Background

August 18, 1996: victim shot at ~11:18 p.m. at a well‑lit intersection; T’lara Phelmetta (passenger) observed the shooter and identified Bowens from a photographic array the next day and in court.
Two neutral witnesses (Daniel Newell and Hilda Diaz) corroborated key aspects of Phelmetta’s account; Diaz placed a man she later identified as Bowens near a house he frequented shortly after the shooting.
Bowens presented an alibi: he testified he was at a Fair Haven party that night and produced three alibi witnesses and taxi records; one host (Crystal) testified for the state that she had never seen him.
Postconviction: Bowens convicted (1998) and sentenced to 50 years; first habeas denied; second habeas: Bowens offered expert Margaret Kovera (eyewitness ID reliability) and three witnesses claiming Bowens’ cousin Napoleon confessed; habeas court denied relief.
On appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court Bowens raised (1) actual innocence, (2) due‑process challenge to identification, (3) ineffective assistance for habeas counsel’s failure to challenge trial counsel’s failure to impeach Crystal, and (4) Eighth Amendment / Miller sentencing claim.

Issues

Issue	Bowens' Argument	Commissioner’s Argument	Held
Actual innocence	Kovera’s expert critique of eyewitness ID plus third‑party confession witnesses prove Bowens is actually innocent (clear and convincing).	Evidence only cast doubt; not affirmative proof of innocence; third‑party testimony not credible; failure to meet clear‑and‑convincing standard.	Denied. Kovera’s testimony merely weakens state case; other corroborating evidence (Newell, Diaz) and alibi inconsistencies preclude clear‑and‑convincing proof.
Due process — identification	ID was unreliable (suggestive photo array; estimator factors like weapon, stress, night) and thus violated due process.	Array claim was litigated on direct appeal; absent police misconduct reliability challenges go to the jury (Perry).	Denied. Array issue barred by direct appeal; estimator factors insufficient to create constitutional violation given corroborating testimony.
Ineffective assistance — habeas counsel failed to challenge trial counsel for not impeaching Crystal	Cannatelli was ineffective for not asserting Ullmann’s failure to impeach Crystal with prior statement.	No prejudice: Crystal not called at habeas so unknown how she would explain; her rebuttal testimony was limited and not dispositive.	Denied. Habeas court reasonably found no prejudice (and no clear deficient performance need be decided).
Eighth Amendment / Miller sentencing	50‑year sentence for offense at 17 violated Miller absent consideration of youth; res judicata should not bar habeas review.	Parole eligibility under P.A.15‑84 is an adequate remedy; res judicata or controlling precedent forecloses relief.	Denied on merits: following State v. McCleese and State v. Williams‑Bey, parole eligibility under P.A.15‑84 negates Miller relief and resentencing not required.

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972) (due‑process test for suggestive identification procedures)
Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228 (2012) (eyewitness reliability generally for jury absent improper police conduct)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard)
Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 242 Conn. 745 (1997) (standard for habeas actual‑innocence relief)
Gould v. Commissioner of Correction, 301 Conn. 544 (2011) (actual innocence requires affirmative proof)
State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378 (2019) (parole eligibility under P.A.15‑84 is adequate remedy for juvenile‑sentencing Miller claims)
State v. Williams‑Bey, 333 Conn. 468 (2019) (same)
State v. Bowens, 62 Conn. App. 148 (2001) (Appellate Court decision on direct appeal addressing photographic array)