Borden v. United States
593 U.S. 420
SCOTUS2021Background:
- ACCA (§924(e)) imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum for a felon in possession who has three or more prior convictions for a “violent felony,” including offenses that “have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”
- Charles Borden pleaded guilty to felon-in-possession; the Government sought ACCA enhancement based on three prior convictions, one of which was Tennessee reckless aggravated assault (criminalized by recklessness).
- The legal question presented: can an offense that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness qualify under ACCA’s elements clause? Courts of appeals were split on that question.
- The Supreme Court applied the categorical approach (look to statutory elements, not underlying facts) and considered textual meaning, ordinary meaning of “violent felony,” and ACCA’s purpose.
- Majority (Kagan, joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, Gorsuch) held reckless-offense predicates do not qualify under the elements clause; Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment on alternative grounds; Kavanaugh (joined by Roberts, Alito, Barrett) dissented.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Borden) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an offense punishable by >1 year that requires only recklessness qualifies as a "violent felony" under ACCA’s elements clause | Reckless mens rea insufficient; elements clause requires purposeful or knowing use of force directed at another | "Use of force" includes volitional acts that make contact with another; recklessness can satisfy that standard | No — offenses that can be committed recklessly do not qualify under the elements clause |
| Whether the phrase "against the person of another" imports a mens rea/targeting requirement (i.e., force must be directed at a person) | "Against" means directed at/targeted — thus requires purposeful or knowing conduct toward another; recklessness is indifference to target and so excluded | "Against" means contact with a person (mere recipient), so it does not add an intent/targeting requirement; recklessness may suffice | The Court: "against" in context modifies volitional "use of force" to identify a conscious object/target and therefore implies a mens rea at least above negligence; recklessness is not directed/targeted and is excluded |
| Whether Voisine v. United States requires inclusion of reckless offenses under ACCA | Voisine does not control because that statute lacked the "against" language and had different purpose/context | Voisine shows "use" does not demand purpose or knowledge and so its logic should apply to ACCA | Voisine distinguished: it construed a different statute (domestic-violence misdemeanor) that lacks the "against the person of another" modifier and serves different aims; it does not compel inclusion of recklessness under ACCA |
Key Cases Cited
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (held negligent mens rea falls outside §16(a); emphasized the critical role of the phrase "against the person or property of another" in implying a higher degree of intent)
- Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. 686 (2016) (construed "use of physical force" in domestic-violence firearms ban to cover reckless conduct; emphasized statute lacked the "against" modifier and had different purpose)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (explained ACCA targets "armed career criminals" who commit purposeful, violent, aggressive crimes)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (applied categorical approach and construed ACCA language narrowly to identify a narrow category of violent, active crimes)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (held ACCA’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (adopted the categorical approach for identifying predicate offenses under ACCA)
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (addressed scope of domestic-violence statute; recognized inclusion of minor force in that context)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (explained categorical approach presumes the conviction rests on the least of the acts criminalized)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (used as textual support for reading "against" to indicate a target/goal of force)