Bomar v. City of Pontiac, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13400

Bomar alleges Officer Main violated her clearly established rights by pepper-spraying and punching her after she was restrained and handcuffed during a drug raid in Pontiac, Michigan.
The district court denied Main's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity due to a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Bomar was under control after handcuffing.
Main conceded post-handcuffing pepper spray and punch but argued Bomar was not under control, seeking to appeal the denial under the collateral order doctrine.
Pontiac was previously dismissed; the remaining claims include Bomar's §1983 excessive-force claim and a state-law battery claim against Main.
The panel held the appeal was jurisdictionally improper because structured as a qualified-immunity denial at summary judgment, which is not reviewable when it involves genuine factual disputes.
The court emphasized that, in qualified-immunity appeals, the court reviews legal issues only and cannot reweigh disputed facts; thus the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the appeal properly before the court.	Bomar (on behalf of herself) argues qualified-immunity denial is appealable as a final collateral-order.	Main contends the appeal is jurisdictionally proper under collateral-order doctrine and Johnson}	Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether Bomar was under control after handcuffing, making the use of force after restraint a triable issue.	Bomar contends continued force after restraint violated clearly established rights.	Main asserts no genuine issue exists about continued threat post-handcuffing.	District court decision on genuine issue of material fact remains; interlocutory review rejected
Whether the court may consider the factual record in determining jurisdiction.	Bomar relies on the full record to show a triable issue of fact.	Main argues the court should limit to plaintiff’s deposition per a narrow fact view.	Court rejects narrow view; considers entire record consistent with Rule 56
Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the merits of the state-law battery claim.	Bomar seeks review of all asserted claims.	Main asserts limited review; state-law battery merits not within interlocutory appeal.	We lack jurisdiction to review merits; only the federal qualified-immunity issue discussed

Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (distinguishes final-appealable from non-appealable summaries in qualified immunity)
Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (interlocutory jurisdiction for legal issues, not factual disputes)
Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 1998) (limits on interlocutory appeals in factual disputes)
Meals v. City of Memphis, 493 F.3d 720 (6th Cir. 2007) (facts viewed in light most favorable to plaintiff in qualified-immunity context)
Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2009) (blatantly false fact determinations exception to general rule)
Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 2008) (factors for record-view in pretrial rulings)
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (limits on reviewing district court factual determinations on appeal)
Wysong v. City of Heath, 260 F. App’x 848 (6th Cir. 2008) (briefly addresses scope of review in similar contexts)
Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 1999) (facts-alleged scope for appellate consideration in qualified immunity)