275 F. Supp. 3d 1240
D. Kan.2017Background
- Floyd Bledsoe was convicted in 2000 of the rape and murder of a 14‑year‑old (Camille Arfmann) and sentenced to life; DNA testing and other post‑conviction developments identified his brother Thomas (Tom) as the likely perpetrator and Bledsoe’s conviction was vacated in 2015.
- Tom initially confessed to the murder, led police to the body, surrendered a gun, and identified burial details; several officers and Tom’s court‑appointed attorney Michael Hayes were present during these events.
- Plaintiff alleges that Hayes, Jefferson County prosecutor Jim Vanderbilt, KBI agents (Terry Morgan, Jim Woods, George Johnson), and others conspired to fabricate Tom’s recanted testimony to frame Floyd, coached Tom to implicate Floyd, suppressed Tom’s inculpatory statements and physical evidence, and emphasized evidence against Floyd while neglecting Tom’s home.
- Tom later admitted responsibility in a suicide note and additional DNA testing excluded Floyd and pointed to Tom; the conviction was vacated and charges dismissed in December 2015.
- Bledsoe sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting due‑process fabrication claims, conspiracy, Brady violations, malicious prosecution, failure to intervene, municipal liability, and indemnification; several defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The district court, applying the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard and qualified/absolute immunity doctrines, denied all moving defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether private counsel (Hayes) acted "under color" of state law (§ 1983 conspiracy) | Hayes conspired with state actors to fabricate evidence and thus was a state actor | Hayes was a court‑appointed private attorney performing traditional defense functions and not a state actor | Court: Allegations of meetings, solicitation of Vanderbilt, warnings to plaintiff sufficiently plead a conspiracy to act under color of state law; claim survives 12(b)(6) |
| Whether Hayes is entitled to qualified immunity for fabricating/withholding evidence and malicious prosecution | Fabrication/omission of evidence and causing prosecution violated clearly established rights | Hayes (as court‑appointed counsel) seeks qualified immunity | Court: Even if entitled to raise it, Pierce precedent shows rights against deliberate/reckless fabrication/omission were clearly established; immunity not available at motion to dismiss |
| Whether malicious prosecution and accrual (statute of limitations) bar claims | Malicious prosecution elements are pleaded; claims did not accrue until conviction was invalidated | Defendants contend claims accrued at conviction (2000) and are time barred | Court: Under Heck, § 1983 claims challenging conviction accrue only after conviction is invalidated; Bledsoe filed timely after 2015 vacatur; malicious prosecution elements plausibly pleaded |
| Whether prosecutor Vanderbilt is immune for alleged pre‑trial fabrication and conspiracy | Vanderbilt conspired pre‑trial to fabricate testimony and participated in investigative misconduct | Vanderbilt asserts absolute prosecutorial immunity for actions tied to the judicial phase | Court: Buckley distinguishes investigative/pretrial fabrication (no absolute immunity); allegations describe pre‑arrest/ investigative conspiracy so absolute immunity inapplicable; qualified immunity similarly defeated by clearly established law |
| Whether KBI officers (Morgan, Woods, Johnson) are plausibly alleged to have personally participated in fabrication, Brady violations, malicious prosecution, failure to intervene, and conspiracy | Officers directed investigation, conducted polygraphs, allegedly coached/withheld Tom’s statements, failed to search Tom’s home, and suppressed physical evidence; grouped allegations refer to named officers | Officers argue collective allegations are insufficient to show each officer’s personal participation and seek qualified immunity | Court: Complaints specifically allege individual acts (e.g., Johnson polygraph conduct; Morgan limited search; Woods withheld documentation) and collective "defendant officers" references are not unduly vague; qualified immunity not available under Pierce; claims survive 12(b)(6) |
Key Cases Cited
- Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (private contractor may act under color when performing government‑assigned duties)
- Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (§ 1983 requires conduct fairly attributable to the state)
- Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (public defenders generally not state actors when performing traditional defense functions)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (Twombly pleading standard and concerted action allegations)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity two‑prong framework and its discretionary sequencing)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (qualified immunity framework articulated)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (objective reasonableness standard for qualified immunity)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (absolute prosecutorial immunity for advocacy functions)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (no absolute immunity for prosecutorial fabrication during preliminary investigation)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (§ 1983 claims that would imply invalidity of conviction accrue only after conviction is reversed)
- Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (Tenth Circuit: no qualified immunity for falsification/omission of evidence; malicious prosecution causation explained)