Black v. Mississippi Department of Rehabilitation Services, 3:20-cv-00643

Six individual Black employees sued the Mississippi Department of Rehabilitation Services (MDRS) alleging race discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, asserting denials of promotions, disparate pay, and failure to post/notify about openings.
Individual allegations included: Black and Gathings claim MDRS failed to notify them about promotion filled by Carol Elrod; Gray and McCurdy allege pay disparities with a later-hired white coworker; Laury alleges pay discrimination versus a white male coworker; Hart alleges she was passed over for a promotion given to a less-qualified white male.
Some plaintiffs filed EEOC charges tied to specific alleged acts (Elrod promotion, pay disparities, Hart’s bypass, Laury’s wage claim); others did not attach EEOC exhaustion documents for all asserted acts.
MDRS moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing failure to administratively exhaust Title VII claims beyond the discrete acts in the EEOC charges and that plaintiffs cannot bring a Title VII pattern-or-practice claim as individual plaintiffs.
The court applied the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard and the Morgan continuing-violation framework, granted MDRS’s motion, and dismissed: (1) the plaintiffs’ Title VII pattern-or-practice claim, and (2) Black’s and Gathings’ Title VII claims for acts other than the Elrod promotion (failure to exhaust).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Title VII claims not included in EEOC charges are actionable as a continuing violation	Plaintiffs argued MDRS’s conduct is part of a continuing course of discrimination that renders discrete acts timely	MDRS argued plaintiffs exhausted only the acts in their EEOC charges and discrete acts cannot be saved by continuing-violation theory	Court held continuing-violation doctrine applies only to hostile-work-environment claims; Black and Gathings’ Title VII claims unrelated to Elrod’s promotion are dismissed for failure to exhaust
Whether individual plaintiffs can pursue a Title VII pattern-or-practice claim	Plaintiffs argued their individual allegations show a systematic, direct pattern of discrimination and sought class relief	MDRS argued pattern-or-practice claims require government or a class action and cannot be brought by individual plaintiffs	Court held pattern-or-practice under Title VII is for the Government or a class action and dismissed plaintiffs’ pattern-or-practice claim

Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (describing the Rule 12(b)(6) central-issue standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state plausible claim, not conclusory allegations)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading standard requiring more than labels and conclusions)
Hughes v. The Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2001) (cited on Rule 12(b)(6) standard)
Davis v. Fort Bend County, 893 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2018) (EEOC charge exhaustion and filing deadline requirements)
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (distinguishing discrete acts from continuing violations in Title VII)
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (pattern-or-practice framework where plaintiff is government)
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, L.L.C., 826 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2016) (applying Teamsters pattern-or-practice framework to class actions)
Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2016) (reply briefs may not raise new arguments)