Blach v. Diaz-Verson
303 Ga. 63
Ga.2018Background
- Plaintiff Harold Blach obtained a $158,343.40 judgment against Sal Diaz-Verson and repeatedly filed garnishments to collect from AFLAC, which made periodic payments to Diaz-Verson as a former employee/beneficiary.
- In December 2015 and thereafter, Blach served summonses of garnishment on AFLAC and AFLAC deposited over $140,000 into the court registry under the forms then used.
- Effective May 12, 2016, Georgia amended its garnishment statutes, creating a separate form and a five-day garnishment period for summonses "on a financial institution," while general garnishments follow a 29-day period.
- After the amendment, Blach continued to use the general garnishment form (29-day period); Diaz-Verson moved to dismiss garnishments served after May 12, 2016, arguing AFLAC is a "financial institution" and the shorter form should have been used, voiding the garnishments per OCGA § 18‑4‑7(d).
- The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia certified the question whether an insurance company is a "financial institution" under the garnishment statute when garnished based on earnings it owes as an employer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Blach) | Defendant's Argument (Diaz‑Verson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an insurance company is a "financial institution" under OCGA § 18‑4‑1(4) when garnished for earnings it owes as employer | The statutory list is meant to identify places that act as banks; an insurance company is a financial institution only when holding/depositing a defendant's funds or accounts, not when acting as an employer paying wages | The statutory text plainly lists "insurance companies" in the definition without limiting context, so an insurance company is always a financial institution for garnishment purposes | Held: No. "Financial institution" for the five‑day form is limited to entities holding defendant funds in accounts or as places of deposit/savings/investment; an insurance company garnished as employer is not a "financial institution" under OCGA § 18‑4‑4(c)(2) |
Key Cases Cited
- Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170 (2013) (statutory interpretation presumes legislature meant what it said and looks to ordinary meaning and context)
- Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589 (2015) (read statutory text in its natural way and consider context and related provisions)
- FDIC v. Loudermilk, 295 Ga. 579 (2014) (statutory words must be read with legal context; context is primary determinant of meaning)
- Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167 (1996) ("or" can be reiterative; context controls meaning)